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Machine learning (ML) is increasingly being used in a wide variety of application domains. However,
deploying ML solutions poses a significant challenge because of increasing privacy concerns, and require-
ments imposed by privacy-related regulations. To tackle serious privacy concerns in ML-based applications,
significant recent research efforts have focused on developing privacy-preserving ML (PPML) approaches by
integrating into ML pipeline existing anonymization mechanisms or emerging privacy protection approaches
such as differential privacy, secure computation, and other architectural frameworks. While promising, ex-
isting secure computation based approaches, however, have significant computational efficiency issues and
hence, are not practical.
In this dissertation, we address several challenges related to PPML and propose practical secure com-
putation based approaches to solve them. We consider both two-tier cloud-based and three-tier hybrid
cloud-edge based PPML architectures and address both emerging deep learning models and federated learn-
ing approaches. The proposed approaches enable us to outsource data or update a locally trained model in
a privacy-preserving manner by employing computation over encrypted datasets or local models. Our pro-
posed secure computation solutions are based on functional encryption (FE) techniques. Evaluation of the
proposed approaches shows that they are efficient and more practical than existing approaches, and provide
strong privacy guarantees. We also address issues related to the trustworthiness of various entities within
the proposed PPML infrastructures. This includes a third-party authority (TPA) which plays a critical role
in the proposed FE-based PPML solutions, and cloud service providers. To ensure that such entities can
be trusted, we propose a transparency and accountability framework using blockchain. We show that the
proposed transparency framework is effective and guarantees security properties. Experimental evaluation
shows that the proposed framework is efficient.
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1.0 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) is increasingly being applied in a wide variety of application domains. Especially,
emerging deep neural networks (DNN) (a.k.a, deep learning (DL)) models have shown significant model
accuracy and performance improvement in many application areas such as computer vision, natural language
processing, speech, or audio recognition, etc., [105, 76, 147]. Federated learning (FL) (a.k.a collaborative
learning) is another emerging ML technique that enables training a high-quality centralized model while
training data remains distributed over multiple decentralized devices [120, 100]. FL has shown its promise
in various application domains including healthcare, vehicular networks, and smart manufacturing, [188,
155, 82]. Although these models have shown huge success in the AI-powered or ML-driven applications,
they still face several challenges such as (i) lack of powerful computational resources, and (ii) availability
of huge volumes of available data to be used for training ML models. For example, a well-performing deep
neural networks model relies on a huge volume of training data and high-powered computational resources
to support both the training and inference phases.
To address the need of powerful computing resources with higher performance CPUs and GPUs, larger
memory storage, etc., existing commercial ML-related infrastructure service providers such as Amazon,
Microsoft, Google, and IBM have devoted significant amounts of their efforts toward building infrastructure
as a service (IaaS) or machine learning as a service (MLaaS) platforms with appropriate rental fees for
clients that do not have such powerful computing resources. Clients can employ such an ML-related IaaS to
manage and train their ML models and provide data analytics and prediction services in their applications
or to their customers directly.
Another key challenge is the availability of data to train ML models. With larger training datasets, we
have a possibility of training ML models that have better accuracy. Hence, there is a need for collecting
large volumes of data potentially from multiple sources. However, the collection and use of datasets raise
serious privacy concerns because of privacy-sensitive information they may contain, as is evident from recent
data breaches [150, 176]. An adversary may also be able to infer private information from an ML model; for
instance, the adversary may infer that a patient’s data has been included in the training of an HIV-related
ML model (a.k.a, the membership inference attack [167, 19, 90, 110, 130]). Furthermore, existing regulations
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and more recent ones such as the
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Cybersecurity Law of China, New York SHIELD
Act, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), etc., place various restrictions on the availability and use
of privacy-sensitive data. Such privacy concerns and regulatory restrictions pose a significant challenge in
training a well-performing ML model and can hinder the use of ML models for real-world applications.
To tackle the increasing privacy concerns related to using ML in applications where users’ privacy-
sensitive data such as electronic health/medical records, location information, etc., are stored and processed,
1
Figure 1.1: Two typical architectures of PPML systems.
it is important to devise well-designed privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) approaches. Towards
this, there are significant efforts focused on PPML research that aims at integrating existing anonymization
mechanisms or newly designed privacy-preserving approaches and ML. Further discussion on existing related
work is presented in Chapter 2. Existing privacy-preserving approaches have been proposed to address
some of these privacy issues, and integrated into ML approaches; however, these approaches still have their
own limitations. For instance, integration of differential privacy in ML models has been shown to lead to
potential loss of model [1]. Similarly, the use of general secure multi-party computation (garbled circuits-
based) approaches incurs high communication overhead because of large volumes of intermediate data such
as garbled tables of circuit-gates that need to be transmitted during the execution of the protocols [151].
In this dissertation, we explore secure computing approaches and show that they are promising for
generating PPML models with privacy guarantees. Towards this, we propose efficient and practical PPML
approaches based on functional encryption techniques. In these proposed approaches, data is protected using
encryption and computational ML tasks are carried out over such encrypted data. We also explore the issues
related to the trustworthiness of the proposed PPML infrastructure and propose our solutions.
In the rest of the chapter, we first discuss the motivation and challenges for the proposed research and
outline the key research tasks.
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
Early research related to PPML can be traced back to privacy-preserving data mining research several
years ago, as discussed and analyzed in [9, 114]. PPML is currently an active area of research because of
(i) rapid developments in ML research, including in DNN or federated learning (FL), and their increasing
adoption in applications; and (ii) significant privacy concerns users have with regards to the use of ML
models, and accompanying stricter privacy protection regulations and acts, which restrict the use of privacy-
2
sensitive data for training ML models. In addition, there also has been significant progress in privacy research
that has produced various privacy protection approaches that can be used to address PPML challenges.
To tackle increasing privacy concerns of deploying ML techniques, more recent research work on PPML
is being proposed from broader research communities of machine learning, distributed systems, security, and
privacy. In this dissertation, we mainly focus on secure computation techniques - a fundamental component
in PPML systems - to allow a third-party to acquire the result of a computation (e.g., the trained model)
over privacy-sensitive data without disclosing private information to the third-party. In particular, we use
functional encryption techniques as the underlying cryptographic framework to address PPML challenges
by considering various ML approaches (mainly DNN and FL) and architectures (i.e., two-tier and three-tier
PPML-enabled systems as depicted in Figure 1.1) as follows:
Two-Tier PPML Architecture . A two-tier PPML architecture includes a cloud layer containing IaaS,
MLaaS or coordinating servers, and a client layer including participants that are primarily data sources
and/or those who own data as well as partial computational resources. In general, the raw data or the
locally trained model is protected by a cryptography scheme and the subsequent processes like aggregate
computation and training computation are carried over the encrypted data or model parameters. Here we
focus on two areas of ML.
Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning : FL has been shown as a promising architectural ML approach
that enables collaborative training of models among multiple participants - under the orchestration of a
coordinator - without sharing any of their raw training data. FL can thus provide basic privacy protection
as data remains local to users’ own domains. To enhance privacy guarantee, additional privacy-preserving
approaches such as differential privacy (DP) and secure multi-party computation (SMC) are being integrated
within an FL framework to protect each participant’s model updates. However, integrating a DP mechanism
in ML can introduce some loss in utility (i.e., reduces the accuracy of a trained ML model), while integrating
SMC techniques in ML can introduce significant communication or computational overheads. The main
challenge here is how to enhance privacy guarantees for FL while taking into account model accuracy,
communication efficiency, training efficiency, and support of dynamic participants, etc.. In particular, we
propose to address the following key research questions in this dissertation:
• How to provide enhanced privacy protection in FL to protect each participant’s model updates while
providing acceptable model accuracy?
• How to ensure that privacy-preserving approaches support efficient aggregation with regards to compu-
tational and communication overheads?
• How to ensure that such an approach can support a group of participants that provide datasets, where
each participant is able to join or leave the group even during the learning phase?
• How to ensure that a privacy-preserving approach incorporates various data partitioning cases, where
each participant may only have a part of horizontally and/or a vertically partitioned dataset.
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Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Networks: Training DNN models require high-performance computing re-
sources; however, such machines are not available for most enterprises, especially, the small-scale businesses.
Thus, existing ML-related IaaSs are employed to train ML models to enhance their businesses. However, such
services do not appropriately address privacy concerns associated with processing of the privacy-sensitive
data. Here, the main challenge is how to enhance privacy protection in an existing two-tier IaaS-based
architecture using appropriate privacy-preserving approaches; in particular, such an approach should pro-
vide protection of privacy-sensitive data through the use of a cryptosystem, and training of an ML model
is done over encrypted data. To be specific, the following key research questions will be addressed in this
dissertation:
• How can we train a DNN over encrypted privacy-sensitive data? We note that most of the existing similar
approaches only work in the inference phase of an ML model in a third-party IaaS;
• While training such a privacy-preserving DNN model, how can we ensure it is efficient with regards to
training time and communication overheads so as to make it practically deployable?
• How can we ensure that such a privacy-preserving technique is scalable with regards to including multiple
data sources, and multiple cloud services while considering various dataset partitioning cases?
Three-Tier PPML Architecture . A three-tier PPML includes a cloud layer and a client layer as in the
two-layer PPML architecture, but it additionally contains an edge layer including several edge nodes that can
preprocess data sent by the devices (e.g., sensors or mobile devices) in the client layer in a privacy-preserving
manner. Similar to the two-tier PPML system, the raw data or the local ML models are also protected by
some crypto schemes. The preprocessing at the edge and final processing at the cloud are both done over
the encrypted data. The three-tier PPML architecture tries to take advantage of the recently emerging
promising edge computing paradigm where edge nodes are placed closer to mobile devices or sensors so as
to deliver highly responsive and scalable cloud services, and to provide preprocessing services in the Internet
of Things (IoT) ecosystem. However, such a three-tier architecture brings new challenges. In particular, we
propose to address the following key issues in this dissertation:
• In contrast to cloud data centers where cloud servers are managed through strict and regularized policies,
edge nodes may not have the same degree of regulatory and monitoring oversight. Thus, edge nodes may
not be as trusted as the cloud data centers; so an appropriate privacy protection mechanism is needed
to ensure privacy leakage is prevented at the edge layer.
• Existing crypto-based secure computation techniques are not applicable in such a three-tier edge com-
puting architecture. In particular, existing homomorphic encryption (HE) based PPML approaches are
computationally inefficient to be deployed at the edge layer of IoT devices with limited capabilities. While
more efficient functional encryption (FE) based PPML has been proposed in the literature, they have not
been aimed at such three-tier edge computing-based architecture, so they cannot be directly employed.
In essence, compared to general-purpose garbled-circuits based secure computation approaches, emerging
4
Figure 1.2: Overview of research tasks in this dissertation.
crypto-based secure computation techniques (i.e., computing over the encrypted data) have been shown to
be more promising in terms of achieving a strong privacy guarantee as the data is protected by an encryption
algorithm. Further, it is easier to integrate them with other types of approaches to form a customized hybrid
approach. Our proposed secure computation based approaches in this dissertation are essentially hybrid in
nature based FE techniques.
Another critical issue is the trustworthiness of various entities involved in PPML. For instance, an IaaS
server is a coordinating server discussed above, which is assumed to be honest-but-curious. In addition,
edge nodes in a three-tier ML architecture may also be semi-trusted. Besides, part of crypto-based secure
computation approaches rely on a critical component, namely, the third-party authority (TPA), that needs
to be fully trusted. However, for practical deployment of PPML such trust assumptions (e.g., fully trusted
TPA) can be a problem. Thus, mechanisms are needed to remove such trust assumptions and ensure that
all the entities are honest and can be trusted during the training or inference phases of a PPML approach.
1.2 Overview of Research Tasks
In this dissertation, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, we carry out the following four research tasks: (i)
development of an efficient and secure aggregation technique for privacy-preserving FL frameworks and an
efficient secure computation approach for privacy-preserving DNN models over an encrypted local model or
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raw datasets in a two-tier PPML architecture; (ii) design of an efficient secure aggregation technique for
training FL models in three-tier PPML architecture to leverage the benefits of edge layer; (iii) construction
of mechanisms to make secure computation based PPML infrastructures as proposed in the tasks (i) and (ii)
more transparent to increase its trust. We present an overview of proposed research tasks below.
1.2.1 Practical Secure Computation in a Two-Tier PPML System
For two-tier PPML architecture, we focus on practical secure computation techniques for privacy pre-
serving FL (PPFL) and privacy-preserving DNN (PPDNN).
Efficient Secure Aggregation in PPFL. In FL, there are several participants each training its own ML
model locally based on its own local training dataset. A coordinator helps to coordinate and aggregate
the model update parameters from each participant to generate a more accurate global model. To prevent
inference attacks where an honest-but-curious coordinator may infer private information from a local model
uploaded by a participant, a secure aggregate computation approach is needed to protect the privacy of each
participant’s local model. However, existing secure aggregate computation approaches have limitations in
terms of computational efficiency or complex protocol interactions. To address these issues, in this research
task, we propose secure aggregation approaches that improve the efficiency of a PPFL framework while
providing a strong privacy guarantee. Based on the types of partitioning of datasets, we divide the research
task into two sub-tasks:
• Development of a secure aggregate computation approach for horizontal PPFL: A horizontal FL is one
where datasets are horizontally partitioned, i.e., each participant has a complete set of features of each
sample in its training dataset, and hence each participant is able to train a complete local model inde-
pendently. We propose a new secure aggregate computation approach for horizontal PPFL that improves
efficiency over existing approaches while protecting the privacy of each participant’s local model.
• Development of a secure aggregate computation approach for vertical PPFL: A vertical FL represents
federated learning over vertically partitioned datasets, where each participant has a partial set of features
of each sample in its training dataset. As a result, each participant is able to train only a “partial” local
model instead of a complete one independently and the aggregation operation is not as straightforward as
in a horizontal PPFL. In this sub-task, we propose a vertical PPFL approach that addresses the challenge
of computing over these “partial” models efficiently.
Efficient Secure Computation in PPDNN. We propose several secure computation approaches for
PPDNN to support computational tasks related to training a DNN model over an encrypted dataset using
a client-server or a client-cloud architecture. In such a case, a client that has privacy-sensitive data but
limited computational resources can train a DNN model by employing a third-party IaaS without leaking
its privacy-sensitive data. Existing secure computation approaches, such as ones based on homomorphic
encryption [129], that can be used to support training a DNN model over encrypted data have efficiency
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problems, making it difficult for practical deployment. In this task, we propose an innovative approach to
construct secure computation protocols based on a functional encryption family. The proposed privacy-
preserving approach supports both the training and the inference phases of a DNN model. In particular, our
proposed PPDNN supports training neural networks over encrypted datasets from multiple sources. In the
above-mentioned two-tier client-cloud or client-server architecture, the third-party ML-related IaaS platform
is responsible for training the DNNs, while the clients provide their encrypted privacy-sensitive training
datasets. As we know, the performance of a DNN model relies on the size of a training dataset. In general,
a single client or data source may not be able to provide an adequate amount of training data. In this task,
we develop an efficient secure computation approach that supports training DNNs over multiple encrypted
datasets from multiple data sources, where each dataset may be partitioned vertically or horizontally.
1.2.2 Practical Secure Computing for Three-Tier PPML System
In this dissertation, we also propose a secure aggregation approach applicable for a three-tier PPML
architecture that leverages the benefits of emerging edge computing paradigm to support a broader set of
applications. In particular, such a system includes the following entities:
• IoT devices that can easily encrypt raw data;
• untrusted or semi-trusted edge nodes that have the capability of processing encrypted data (i.e., partially
decrypt the encrypted raw data) without learning any privacy-sensitive information from the encrypted
data;
• a cloud data center that can construct the final aggregation results, but still cannot learn any privacy-
sensitive information.
We propose a three-tier PPML framework that includes a novel and efficient secure computation approach
to support practical secure aggregation over encrypted data at the edge. In general, the cloud center can
specify a random number of edge nodes to collaboratively preprocess the encrypted data where the processed
data is still in ciphertext form, without leaking any information to the edge nodes. Then the cloud can
decrypt the preprocessed ciphertexts to compose the final aggregation results in plaintext. The proposed
secure computation approach can dramatically reduce the overall decryption time and save computational
resources for the cloud, as the edge nodes are allowed to do some preprocessing over the encrypted data.
Our proposed three-tier PPML framework is based a novel threshold functional encryption (TFE) scheme.
1.2.3 Trustworthy Infrastructure for Secure Computation
In this dissertation, we also propose an approach to build a trustworthy infrastructure for the above-
mentioned proposed secure computation approaches. As introduced in research tasks 2 and 3, the proposed
secure computation solutions are based on a functional encryption family that relies on a third-party au-
thority (TPA) that is responsible for providing key services such as initializing and distributing public-key
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parameters, and generating functional private keys. The proposed approach assumes that TPA is fully
trusted, but for practical deployment of such approaches simply trusting the TPA is not adequate. Besides,
the IaaS platform and the coordinator are also assumed to be honest-but-curious, which is a common as-
sumption in most PPML frameworks. It is also critical that we have mechanisms in place to ensure that all
these entities indeed behave honestly or can be trusted. Towards this, we propose a transparency framework
to ensure that the TPA infrastructure is trustworthy. The proposed transparency approach ensures that
the operations of these entities are monitored and audited by participants based on the logged pieces of
information.
1.3 Summary and Dissertation Outline
In this chapter, we have presented the background, motivation, and challenges related to secure compu-
tation based PPML. We have also overviewed the research tasks carried out as part of this dissertation to
address the PPML challenges identified.
The outline of this dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 2, we present a literature review related to
the proposed tasks. We present the proposed secure computing approaches for PPML in Chapter 3, and
for training DNNs using encrypted multi-sourced datasets in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we present the pro-
posed solution for practical secure aggregation issues in edge-enabled architecture. We present the proposed
transparency framework using blockchain in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we present conclusions and future
work.
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2.0 Literature Review
In this chapter, we present a literature review of related work in privacy-preserving machine learning
(PPML) that are related to our proposed approaches. We discuss several representative PPML solutions
proposed in the literature, as summarized in Table 2.1, from three dimensions: affected phase of an ML
pipeline and design goals. In general, privacy-preserving techniques such as differential privacy and vari-
ous types of secure computation techniques have most commonly been employed for PPML. Furthermore,
recently proposed secure computation approaches for PPML that rely on emerging cryptosystems such as
homomorphic encryption and functional encryption have shown promise for achieving strong privacy guar-
antees. More detailed discussion is presented in the rest of the chapter.
2.1 Affected Phases of Privacy-Preserving Approaches
Typical phases of an ML system include production phase and consumption phase. The production phase
mainly focuses on how to train an ML model using the collected training data or local model update from the
data producer, while the consumption phase works on how to consume those trained models, such as making
use of inference service. So existing privacy-preserving machine learning solutions target privacy-preserving
training, privacy-preserving inference, or both.
From the perspective of computation, there is no strict boundary between a privacy-preserving training
and a privacy-preserving inference as computation in the inference procedure could be viewed as a simplified
version of training procedure without training labels [54]. For instance, the training phase of a neural network
model could be viewed as a process where a set of data is continuously fed into the designed network for
multiple training epochs, while the inference phase could be treated as one epoch of computation for one
data sample to generate a prediction label. Formally, given a set of training samples (x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn),
where xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ R, the goal of a MM model (for simplicity, assume a linear model) is to learn a fit
function denoted as
fw,b(x) = w
ᵀx + b, (2.1)
where w ∈ Rm is a set of model parameters, and b is the intercept. To find proper model parameters, usually,
we need to minimize the regularized training error given by
E(w, b) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(yi, f(xi)) + αR(w), (2.2)
where L(·) is a loss function that measures model fit and R(·) is a regularization term (a.k.a. penalty) that
penalizes model complexity; α is a non-negative hyperparameter that controls the regularization strength.
Regardless of various choices of L(·) and R(·), stochastic gradient descent (SGG) is a common optimization
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Table 2.1: Representative proposal of privacy-preserving machine learning systems
Proposals Affected Phase Designing Goals
[38, 91] Training Differential privacy data release
[1, 72, 109] Training Differential private SGD
[166] Training Distributed selective SGD
[120, 100, 138, 154] Training Federated learning
[125] Both Secure computation delegation
[128, 151] Both GC-based secure computing
[73, 78, 75, 86, 31, 139, 92] Inference HE-based secure computing
[27] Inference customized SC by HE
[22] Training FL/secret sharing/encryption
[129] Both HE-based secure computing
[191] Both FE-based secure computing
[173] Training FL/DP/THE-based secure computing
[189] Training FL/DP/FE-based secure computing
method for unconstrained optimization problems as discussed above. A simple SGD method needs to iterate
over the training samples and for each sample it needs to update the model parameters according to the
following update rule
w ← w − η∇wE ← w − η[α∇wR+∇wL] (2.3)
b← b− η∇bE ← b− η[α∇bR+∇bL] (2.4)
where η is the learning rate which controls the step-size in the parameter space. Given a trained model
(wtrained, btrained), the goal of the inference phase is to predict a label yˆ with target sample x as follows:
yˆ ← fwtrained,btrained(x) (2.5)
In general, the task of privacy-preserving training is more challenging than the task of privacy-preserving in-
ference. Most of the existing privacy-preserving training solutions indicate the inclusion of privacy-preserving
inference even though they may not explicitly state that.
2.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Training
The goal of a privacy-preserving training is to prevent the leakage of privacy sensitive information in
training data. Essentially, the key factors related to training are data and computation, and consequently,
existing proposed approaches try to tackle the challenge of privacy-preserving training from the following two
aspects: (i) how to distill/filter the training data such that the processed data includes less or no privacy-
sensitive information; or (ii) how to process or compute over the training data in a privacy-preserving
manner.
From the perspective of data, existing privacy-preserving training approaches either (i) adopt traditional
anonymization mechanisms such as k-anonymity[171], l-diversity[118] and t-closeness [111] to remove iden-
tifier and quasi-identifier information in the training data before sending it out for training, or (ii) employ
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-differential privacy [59, 62, 61] mechanism to add privacy budget (noise) into the dataset to avoid leakage
of private information against a set statistical queries.
For instance, the approach proposed in [67] tries to provide k-anonymity for data mining algorithms,
while the approaches proposed in [107, 98] focus on the utility metric and provide a suite of anonymization
algorithms to produce an anonymous view based on ML workloads. On the other hand, recently, differential
privacy mechanism has shown its promise in emerging deep learning models that rely on training on a large
dataset. For example, the early work in [1] proposes a differentially private stochastic gradient descent
(often abbreviated SGD) approach to train a privacy-preserving DL model. The approach proposed in [121]
demonstrates that it is possible to train large recurrent language models with user-level differential privacy
guarantees with only a negligible cost in predictive accuracy. Parameter-transfer based meta-learning (i.e.,
applications including few-shot learning, federated learning, and reinforcement learning) often requires task-
owners to share model parameters, because of which privacy leakage becomes possible. Proposed approaches
for privacy-preserving meta-learning such as in [72, 189] try to tackle the problem of private information
leakage in FL by employing an algorithm to achieve client-sided differential privacy. The method proposed in
[109] formalizes the notion of task-global differential privacy and proposes a differentially private algorithm
for gradient-based parameter transfer that satisfies the privacy requirement while retaining provable transfer
learning guarantees in convex settings.
Emerging area of secure computation over encrypted data in the cryptography community is showing
another promising approach to protecting the privacy of training data. Unlike a traditional anonymization
technique or a differential privacy mechanism that aims at protecting against inference or de-anonymization
attacks, such as those demonstrated in [183, 146, 167, 144], wherein an adversary may have additional
background knowledge, the encryption based approaches can provide strong privacy guarantees, referred
to as confidential-level privacy in this chapter; these approaches have received more and more attention in
recent studies such as in [173, 191, 189, 69, 83, 39, 73, 31, 129]; in these approaches, the training data or the
shared model updates are protected by cryptosystems.
From the perspective of computation, existing privacy-preserving training approaches are also correspond-
ingly divided into two approaches: (i) cases where the training data is processed by traditional anonymiza-
tion mechanisms or differential privacy mechanism; in such cases, computation involved in training is as
normal as in non-PPML model training; (ii) cases where the training data is protected via cryptosystems to
achieve a confidential-level privacy; here, the privacy-preserving (i.e., referred to as crypto-based) training
computation is more complex compared to that in normal non-PPML model training. Crypto-based train-
ing approaches rely on recently proposed cryptographic schemes, mainly, homomorphic encryption schemes
[70, 175, 28, 119, 6] and functional encryption schemes [25, 74, 4, 14, 13, 2, 3]. Unlike in a normal training
process, it is worth noting that there is an extra step - data conversion - in crypto-based training approaches
because most of these cryptosystems are built on the integer group while most of the training data is in
floating-point number format, especially, after normalization. Note that normalization is a very common
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preprocessing method in most of ML approaches [189, 191, 83, 129]. The data conversion step includes a pair
of encoding and decoding operations. The encoding step is commonly adopted to convert the floating-point
numbers into integers so that the training data can be encrypted and then used in a crypto-based training.
On the contrary, the decoding step is applied to the trained model or the result of crypto-based training
to recover the floating-point numbers. Obviously, the data conversion procedure indicates that there is a
potential precision loss during a crypto-based training. We will discuss the details of the potential impact
of data conversion step in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Privacy-Preserving Inference
Several existing PPML approaches that focus on privacy-preserving training indicate that the proposed
solution may also support privacy-preserving inference, as illustrated in [128, 151, 125, 191, 129]. We also
observe that most of the proposals that apply cryptographic approaches mainly use homomorphic encryption
and its related schemes, such as in [73, 78, 75, 86, 31, 139, 92, 27]. These approaches only target the inference
phase, as these cryptosystems are not efficient enough to be applied in the training phase as it involves
complex and massive computation.
Part of privacy-preserving inference approaches also focus on the privacy-preserving model query or
publication; in this case, a model user is separate from a model owner. And a key concern here is how to
prevent adversaries (i.e., a curious model user) from inferring private information of the model owner from
the model itself, in particular, when an adversary has been allowed to iteratively query the inference service.
To address these issues, a naive privacy-preserving solution is to limit the number of queries for a model
user.
In addition to these, existing prevention methods can be categorize into three approaches:
• a private aggregation of teacher ensembles (PATE) approach [136, 138], wherein the knowledge of an
ensemble of “teacher” models is transferred to a “student” model, with intuitive privacy provided by
training teachers on disjoint datasets and strong privacy guaranteed by noisy aggregation of teachers’
answers;
• model transformation approach such as MiniONN [115], where an existing model is transformed into an
oblivious neural network supporting privacy prediction with reasonable efficiency;
• model compression approach, especially, applied in emerging DL models with a large set of model param-
eters, where knowledge distillation methods [88, 143] are adopted to compress the trained DL models.
Even though the main goal of knowledge distillation is to reduce the size of a DL model, such a method
also brings additional privacy-preserving features [137, 178]. Intuitively, the distillation procedure not
only removes the redundant information in a model but also reduces the probability that an adversary
can infer potential private information in the model through iterative queries.
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2.2 Design Principle of Privacy-Preserving Approaches
In this section, we discuss privacy-preserving approaches in a more fine-grained manner, namely, the
design principles used in these approaches; here, we focus how these approaches tackle the following issues:
• How is privacy-sensitive data released?
• How is privacy-sensitive data processed?
• Does a PPML architecture prevent the disclosure of private information?
Correspondingly, we introduce the following four types of the privacy-preserving approaches: (i) data pub-
lishing based approaches; (ii) data processing based approaches; (iii) architecture-based approaches; and (iv)
hybrid approaches that may combine or integrate previous approaches.
2.2.1 Data Publishing Based Approaches
In general, a data publishing based privacy-preserving approach includes the following:
• De-identification-based Approaches that partially remove the identifiers in the raw data;
• Perturbation-based Approaches that partially perturb the statistical result of the raw data;
• Crypto-based Approaches that totally encrypt the raw data.
De-identification-based Approaches: De-identification based approaches essentially remove some in-
formation that can lead to identification. Here, techniques such as k-anonymity[171], l-diversity[118] and
t-closeness [111] are applied to the raw privacy-sensitive data to remove privacy-sensitive information so
as to protect from potential inference attacks. Specifically, a k-anonymity mechanism can ensure that the
information for each person contained in the released dataset cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 other
individuals whose information is also released in the dataset. To achieve that, k-anonymity approaches define
identifiers and quasi-identifiers for each data attribute, and then remove the identifiers and partially hide
the quasi-identifiers information. The l-diversity mechanism introduces the concept of equivalence classes,
where an equivalence class satisfies l-diversity if there are at least l “well-represented” values for a sensitive
attribute. A dataset satisfies l-diversity if every equivalence class of the dataset satisfies l-diversity [171, 118].
Essentially, as an extension of the k-anonymity mechanism, l-diversity mechanism reduces the granularity
of the data representation and additionally maintain the diversity of sensitive fields by adopting techniques
like generalization and suppression such that given any records it can be mapped to at least k − 1 other
records in the dataset. t-closeness is further refinement of l-diversity by introducing additional restriction
on the distribution value over an equivalence class. An equivalence class satisfies t-closeness if the distance
between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution of all attributes in the
whole dataset is no more than a threshold t. Similarly, a dataset satisfies t-closeness if all equivalence classes
satisfy t-closeness.
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Perturbation-based Approaches: Perturbation based approaches mainly refer to using -differential pri-
vacy techniques [59, 62, 61]. As per [60, 62], differential privacy can be defined as follows: a randomized
mechanismM : D → R with domain D and rangeR satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent
input d, d
′ ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R, it holds that
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ (2.6)
The additive term δ allows for the possibility that plain -differential privacy is broken with probability δ
(which is preferably smaller than 1/|d|). Usually, a paradigm of an approximating a deterministic function
f : D → R with a differentially private mechanism is via additive noise calibrated to function’s sensitivity
Sf , which is defined as the maximum of the absolute distance |f(d)−f(d′)|. The representative and common
additive noise mechanisms for real-valued functions are Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism defined,
respectively, as follows:
MGauss(d; f, , δ) = f(d) +N (µ, σ2) = f(d) +N (0, 2 ln(1.25/δ)
2
· S2f ) (2.7)
MLap(d; f, ) = f(d) + Lap(µ, b) = f(d) + Lap(0,
S2f

) (2.8)
Typical uses of differential privacy enabled PPML i along two directions: (i) directly adopting above-
mentioned additive noise mechanism on the raw dataset in the case of publishing data, as illustrated in
[38, 91]; or (ii) transforming the original training method into differentially private training method so that
the trained model has -differential privacy guarantee in the case of publishing model, as illustrated in
[1, 72, 109].
Sketching is an approximate and simple approach for data stream summary, by building a probabilistic
data structure that serves as a frequency table of events, like counting Bloom filters. Recent theoretical
advances [7, 123] have shown that differential privacy is achievable on sketches with additional modifications.
For instance, the work in [16] focuses on the privacy-preserving collaborative filtering, a popular technique
for a recommendation system, by using sketching techniques to implicitly provide the differential privacy
guarantees by taking advantage of the inherent randomness of the data structure used. Most recent work as
reported in [113] proposes a novel sketch-based framework for distributed learning; this approach involves
compressing the transmitted messages via sketches to simultaneously achieve communication efficiency and
provable privacy benefits.
In summary, traditional anonymization mechanisms and differential privacy mechanisms are designed
to tackle general data publishing problems. More recently, differential privacy has been widely adopted
in privacy-preserving DL and privacy-preserving FL approaches, such as in [1, 121, 72, 109, 173, 189].
Furthermore, differential privacy shows its promise in helping generate synthetic data [59, 94, 172] and
emerging generative adversarial networks (GANs) [187, 65].
Cryptography-based Approaches: The third approach mainly refers to cryptography based techniques
that totally obfuscate the raw data to achieve a stronger privacy guarantee (i.e., confidential-level pri-
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vacy) compared to the traditional anonymization mechanisms and differential privacy mechanisms. Existing
cryptographic approaches for data publishing for the purpose of training an ML can be seen along the
following two directions: (i) applying traditional symmetric encryption schemes such as AES, which is as-
sociated with garbled-circuits based secure multi-party computation protocols [127, 180, 142]; (ii) applying
emerging cryptosystems such as homomorphic encryption schemes [70, 175, 28, 119, 6] or functional en-
cryption schemes [25, 74, 4, 14, 13, 2, 3]. These include necessary algorithms to carry out computation
over encrypted data; here, only a party with the issued key is able to acquire the computation results.
The typical PPML approaches such as thos proposed in [151, 149] could be classified to the first direc-
tion of the crypto-based data publishing approach, while more and more recent works such as proposed in
[173, 191, 189, 69, 83, 39, 73, 31, 129] focus on the direction (ii).
Essentially, crypto-based data publishing approaches cannot work independently and usually are associ-
ated with related secure computation approaches, as it is expected to let the data receiver only learn the
data processing result rather than the original data. These crypto-based approaches provide a promising
candidate for data publishing, but the emphasis of crypto-based approaches is on computation over the
encrypted data. More details related to that will be presented in the next section.
2.2.2 Data Processing Based Approaches
Based on different data/model publishing methods, data processing approaches can be as follows: normal
training and training using secure computation. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, if the data is published
using traditional anonymization or differential privacy mechanisms the training process is similar to that
in non-PPML. Here, by privacy-preserving data processing based approach we mainly refer to the secure
computation based approach that can be adopted in both training and inference phases.
Secure computation problems and the corresponding solutions were initially proposed by Andrew Yao in
1982 in a garbled-circuits protocol for two-party computation [192]. The primary goal of secure computation
is to enable two or more parties to evaluate an arbitrary function over both their inputs without revealing
anything to either party except for the output of the function. These secure computation approaches could
be basic secure two-party computation (2PC) or more general secure multi-party computation (MPC) for
multiple parties. These protocols include two types of security guarantees considering different adversarial
models: semi-honest (passive) security and malicious (active) security. We refer the reader to [49, 84] for
more details related to secure multi-party computation.
Here, we discuss existing secure computation techniques that have been used in PPML from the per-
spective of the underlying designed principle. In general, these secure computation techniques include the
following: (i) pairwise blinding using perturbation or dining cryptographer networks (DC-net) or (verifiable)
secret sharing; (ii) garbled-circuits with oblivious transfer; and (iii) emerging cryptographic schemes.
Pairwise Blinding based Approaches: One category of secure computation approach is the pairwise
blinding using perturbation techniques, where the private values are blinded/masked with randomized values.
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One type of perturbation is additive perturbation. For instance, in a generic additive perturbation based
privacy-preserving summation [156] - a function-specific (i.e., the aggregation function) secure multi-party
computation - the coordinator gives its input x0 by adding a randomized perturbation r, and then each
participant adds its input xi on x0 + r and passes the result to the next participant. Finally, the coordinator
acquires
∑
xi+r and removes its randomized perturbation r to acquire the aggregated result. Another type
of perturbation in pairwise blinding is multiplicative perturbation where the random projection or random
rotation techniques are used to perturb the values. Besides, anonymous communication could also be the
candidate method in the pairwise blinding based approaches. For example, DC-nets [34] or mix-nets [35] is
a class of anonymous communication network, where a single participant at a time can send an anonymous
message, which can be viewed as a restricted case of secure aggregation. Adopting DC-nets or mix-nets,
a trusted coordinator can collect input from each party in an anonymous manner and then compute the
function results, which provides some privacy-preserving feature because the coordinator cannot learn the
source of each function input. Furthermore, secret sharing techniques can also be adopted in pairwise blinding
based secure computation approaches. For instance, suppose that the coordinator is issued a randomized
secret s, and each participant is issued secret sharing si to integrate into its input xi as a perturbation.
Then, the coordinator can aggregate
∑
xi by removing the recovered secret s.
In short, most pairwise blinding based approaches can be viewed as a lightweight approach compared to
other secure computation related approaches. As illustrated in existing proposals [9, 96, 96, 29, 56, 22], these
classes of secure computing approaches are mostly adopted in traditional data mining area [9, 96] and have
not been used much in recently proposed PPML approaches. Specifically, approaches proposed in [29, 56]
focus on the k-means clustering machine learning algorithms. The solution in [29] proposes two types of
pairwise blinding methods, namely, a division protocol and a random value protocol to perform two-party
division and to sample uniformly at random from an unknown domain size. The approach proposed in [56]
utilizes additive secret sharing as a cryptographic primitive to implement a secure multiparty computation
protocol to do privacy-preserving clustering. The approach proposed in [22] employs a t-of-n secret sharing
scheme with additional decisional Diffie–Hellman(DDH) based key agreement and authenticated encryption
to construct a protocol for securely computing sums of vectors with low communication overhead, robustness
to failures, which requires only one server with limited trust.
Garbled Circuits based Approaches: Garbled-circuits and oblivious transfer techniques constitute an-
other type of foundation to build secure computation solutions. For simplicity, we use the garbled-circuits
based 2PC protocol as an example to illustrate that. The basic idea is that one party (a.k.a, the garbled-
circuit generator) prepares a circuit computing function that includes garbled gates that are encrypted via
traditional symmetric encryption scheme such as AES, and then the other party (a.k.a, the garbled-circuit
evaluator) obliviously computes the output of the circuit without learning any intermediate information.
Specifically, the function f is transferred to a Boolean circuit composed of huge amounts of different types
of garbled gates (e.g., AND-gate, OR-gate, and XOR-gate). Suppose that an AND-gate gAND is associated
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Table 2.2: Example of the AND-garbled gate table
bi bj gAND(bi, bj) garbled output permuted garbled output
0 0 0 Ew0i ,w
0
j
(w0k) ⇒ Ew0i ,w0j (w
0
k)
1 0 0 Ew1i ,w
0
j
(w0k) ⇒ Ew1i ,w0j (w
1
k)
0 1 0 Ew0i ,w
1
j
(w0k) ⇒ Ew0i ,w1j (w
0
k)
1 1 1 Ew1i ,w
1
j
(w1k) ⇒ Ew1i ,w1j (w
0
k)
with two input wires i and j, and one output wire k. The generator first generates two cryptographic keys
for each input wire, denoted as w0i , w
1
i , w
0
j , w
1
j , where the superscript represents the the encoded input bits
(e.g., w0i encodes 0-bit input of wire i, while w
1
i encodes 1-bit input of wire i). For inputs data bi, bj ∈ {0, 1},
the generator computes the ciphertext as Esymmetric.E(k)
w
bi
i ,w
bj
j
(w
gAND(bi,bj)
k ), and Table 2.2 presents the gate
table in detail. Then, the evaluator is able to acquire its input wire associated keys w0j , w
1
j with its input
bj ∈ {0, 1} without revealing that input to the generator using the 1-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) technique.
With the input associated key wbj and the received permuted garbled table, the evaluator is able to decrypt
the corresponding ciphertext to acquire the output w
gAND(bi,bj)
k without learning the input of the generator.
Finally, these different types of garbled gates can compose any function that can be used in the secure
computation protocols.
Even though garbled-circuits based 2PC and MPC problems have been there for several decades, the
security community is still working on improving its efficiency and practicality [127, 18, 179, 180, 97].
The garbled-circuits based 2PC or MPC have been recently adopted to address the challenge of secure
computation issues in popular machine learning algorithms, even complex DL models [69, 128, 115, 151, 32].
Chameleon [149] combines the best aspects of generic secure function evaluation protocols where linear
operations are achieved by additive secret sharing values and nonlinear operations are implemented by
garbled-circuit protocols. Based on the efficient mixed 2PC proposed in [55], similar to the Chameleon
framework, ABY 3 in [126] proposes a design and implementation of a general framework for PPML and use
it to obtain new solutions for different ML algorithms in a three-server model wherein data owners secretly
share their data among three servers that train and evaluate models on the joint data using three-party
computation. Based on Yao’s garbled-circuits, DeepSecure [151] presents a secure DL framework that is
built upon automated design, efficient logic synthesis, and optimization methodologies. Recently proposed
QUOTIENT [8] is a new method for discretized training of DNNs along with a customized 2PC protocol.
EzPC [32] is another type of 2PC framework that generates efficient 2PC protocols from high-level, easy-
to-write programs, where the proposed compiler can generate protocols that combine both arithmetic and
boolean circuits for better performance.
Even though these garbled-circuits based solutions can provide provably secure and show its promise in
training phase rather than just inference phase in deep neural networks without relying on the non-colluding
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two or three servers as illustrated in [151, 8], the obvious limitation of the garbled-circuits based solutions is
the size of the data transmission. As illustrated in Table 2.2, for a simple computation on two input bits such
as bi ∧ bj , it involves transferring four ciphertexts and additional oblivious transmission for the key, where
the size of each ciphertext and keys depends on the adopted symmetric encryption algorithm. Considering
the complex computation functions in ML, the size of transmitted data will explode significantly.
Emerging Cryptographic based Approaches: Emerging cryptogahic approaches such as homomorphic
encryption and functional encryption that support computation over the ciphertext provide other approaches
toward building secure multi-party computation approaches for PPML systems. Emerging cryptography
based secure computation also provides strong privacy guarantees like the garbled-circuits based approaches
providing confidentiality-level security. However, unlike the garbled-circuits based secure protocols that
involve huge amounts of transmitted data, these emerging cryptosystem based approaches only need to
transfer the encrypted data instead of the data-encoded garbled-circuits, and related keys via oblivious
transfer technique. Here, we briefly introduce homomorphic encryption schemes [70, 175, 28, 119, 6] and
functional encryption schemes [25, 74, 4, 14, 13, 2, 3] that are mainly employed in existing PPML proposals
[191, 80, 133, 47, 73, 31, 129, 117, 31].
Homomorphic Encryption is a form of cryptosystem with an additional evaluation capability for computing
over ciphertexts without access to the private secret key, in which the result of operations over the ciphertexts,
when decrypted, matches the result of operations as if they have been performed on the original plaintext.
Some typical types of HE are partially homomorphic, somewhat homomorphic, leveled fully homomorphic,
and fully homomorphic encryption according to the capability of performing different classes of computations.
Unlike a traditional encryption scheme that includes three main algorithms: key generation (Gen), encryption
(Enc), and decryption (Dec), an HE scheme also has an extra evaluation (Eval) algorithm. Formally, an
HE scheme EHE includes the above four algorithms such that
EHE.Decsk(EHE.Evalpk(f, EHE.Encpk(m1), ..., EHE.Encpk(mn))) = f(m1, ...,mn), (2.9)
where {m1, ...,mn} is a set of messages to be protected, pk and sk are the key pairs generated by the key
generation algorithm. Based on our observation, we present several commonly adopted HE implementations
used in PPML solutions. The Paillier cryptosystem [135] is an additive partially homomorphic encryption
system, where given the message mi and mj , the Paillier system EPaillierHE satisfies the equation (2.9) such
that EPaillierHE .Enc(mi) · EPaillierHE .Enc(mj) = EPaillierHE .Enc(mi + mj). HElib [79] implemented several typical
fully homomorphic encryption schemes such as in [28, 40, 170, 71] with applied optimization techniques like
bootstrapping, smart-vercauteren, and approximate number. SEAL [124] is another HE library that allows
additions and multiplications to be performed on encrypted integers or real numbers. Other operations,
such as encrypted comparison, sorting, or regular expressions, are in most cases not feasible to be done over
encrypted data using this technology.
The approach proposed in [80] makes use of homomorphic encryption in constructing a protocol for
regression analysis, while the approach proposed in [133] focuses on privacy-preserving ridge regression on
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millions of records by combining both homomorphic encryption and garbled-circuits. The approach proposed
in [47] provides a computationally secure two-party protocol based on additive homomorphic encryption
that substitutes the trusted initializer. Recent work in [41] tries to evaluate the possibility of homomorphic
encryption to fully implement its program in ML applications by addressing both the issue of comparison
and selection/jump operations.
CryptoNets proposed in [73] tries to apply neural networks to encrypted data by employing a leveled
homomorphic encryption scheme to the training data, which allows adding and multiplying encrypted mes-
sages; but it requires that one knows in advance the complexity of the arithmetic circuit. Unlike the potential
ineffectiveness issue for DNNs in CryptoNets, the proposed approach in [31] combines the original ideas of
Cryptonets’ solution with the batch normalization principle for a classification problem. Besides, the ap-
proach proposed in [129] uses the open-source FHE toolkit HElib for DNN training using a stochastic gradient
descent training method. Several recent proposals as in [50, 117, 87] focus on the same problem but with
different optimization approaches to increase efficiency as well as model accuracy.
Functional Encryption is another form of cryptosystem that also supports computation over a ciphertext.
Typically, an FE EFE includes four algorithms: setup, key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms,
such that
EFE.Decskf (EFE.Encpk(m1), ..., EFE.Encpk(mn)) = f(m1, ...,mn), (2.10)
where the setup algorithm creates a public key pk and a master secret key msk, and key generation algorithm
uses msk to generate a new functional private key skf associated with functionality f . Those two algorithms
usually are run by a trusted third-party authority. At this moment, there is a lack of well-known libraries for
FE like the HElib and SEAL libraries for the HE. Existing construction of functional encryption schemes for
general functionality, such as recently proposed constructions in [74, 24, 182, 68, 30, 108], only focus on the
theoretical feasibility or functionality existence. Only a few recently proposed works such as in [4, 5, 10, 20]
focus on the simple and applicable FE, but the functionality is limited to the inner-products.
As presented above, the main similarity between FE and HE is that both support computation over a
ciphertext. At a high-level, the main difference between functional encryption and the homomorphic encryp-
tion is that given an arbitrary function f(·), the homomorphic encryption allows computing an encrypted
result of f(x) from an encrypted x, whereas the functional encryption allows to compute a plaintext result
of f(x) from an encrypted x [12]. Intuitively, a function computation party in a HE scheme (i.e. the eval-
uation party) can only contribute its computational resources to obtain the encrypted function result, but
cannot learn the function result unless it has the secret key, while the function computation party in the FE
scheme (i.e., usually, the decryption party) can obtain the function result with the issued functional private
key. Besides, except for several most recently proposed decentralized FE schemes [43, 3, 42], the classic FE
schemes rely on a trusted third-party authority to provide a key service such as issuing a functional private
key associated with a specific functionality.
Unlike HE-based secure computation techniques that have been widely adopted as a candidate solution
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Figure 2.1: Several typical architectures adopted in existing PPML systems.
for secure computation for PPML, recently proposed FE-based PPML solutions such as in [189, 191, 153]
also show its promise in terms of its efficiency and practicality. The approach proposed in [153] provides
a practical framework for performing partially encrypted and privacy-preserving predictions that combines
adversarial training and functional encryption. Our earlier proposed approach such as in [191] presents a
CryptoNN framework that supports training a neural network model over encrypted data by using FE to
construct a secure computation mechanism. An approach we have proposed as part of this dissertation
(presented in Chapter 3.1), [189] focuses on PPFL by utilizing FE to construct a secure aggregation protocol
to protect each participant’s input in PPFL.
Remark - Impact of Encoding: Unlike in anonymized or differentially private PPML training, where the
training data or trained model is in the format of floating-point numbers, the secure computation approaches
using crypto-based PPML training data should be in integer format. As a result, there is typically a procedure
to convert the training data into integer format before secure computation operations and then recover the
computational result back into the floating-point numbers. Due to this procedure, an issue related to crypto-
based secure computation is how to decide the encoding degree and what would the impact of the encoding
precision be. As partially illustrated in [191, 189], the encoding issue is a trade-off problem; i.e., a higher
encoding precision indicates a higher model accuracy, whereas a higher encoding precision denotes more
computational time (i.e., more training time).
2.2.3 Architecture Based Approaches
Recently, architecture based approaches have also been shown to be promising for PPML, although there
is no generic paradigm for architecture-based approaches. As depicted in Figure 2.1, we present four typical
architectural approaches as examples to illustrate how privacy can be guaranteed for ML models.
Delegation based ML Architecture. It is a classic architecture that gives the parties with limited compu-
tational resources the capability to create and use ML models. With additional secure techniques or proper
trust assumptions, a delegation-based architecture can also provide a privacy-preserving feature for ML. For
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instance, CryptoML [125] proposes a practical framework that supports provably secure and efficient delega-
tion for contemporary matrix-based ML, where a delegating client with memory and computational resource
constraints is able to assign the storage and computational tasks to the cloud via an interactive delegation
protocol based on provably secure Shamir’s secret sharing technique. Similarly, the approach proposed in
[112] includes a framework for privacy-preserving outsourced classification in a cloud computing scenario,
where an evaluator can securely train a classification model over the encrypted multiple data sources with
different public keys. Unlike outsourcing the computation to one party, SecureML [128] presents efficient
2PC protocols that fall in two-server model where data owners distribute their private data among two
non-colluding servers that train various models on the joint data using 2PC to support PPML for linear
regression, logistic regression and neural network training using the SGD method.
Distributed Selective SGD based Architecture. As proposed in [166] distributed selective SGD enables
multiple parties to jointly learn an accurate neural network model without sharing their input datasets, where
the system includes several participants, each of which has a local private dataset available for training,
and one parameter server which is responsible for maintaining the latest values of parameters available
to all parties. In particular, the approach assumes two or more participants training independently and
concurrently. At each round of local training, the participants acquire the latest values of most-updated
parameters and integrate the selected partial parameters into local gradients. After local training, each
participant can fully control which gradients to share and how often.
Federated Learning Architecture. FL [120, 100] is also a decentralized ML approach with similar ar-
chitecture as a distributed selective SGD [166], where each participant maintains a private local dataset of
its facilities, and a shared global model is trained by the coordinator (i.e., a central server) using the local
model updates generated by those users. Since the training data does not leave each participant’s domain,
FL can provide the primary privacy guarantee. In particular, a FL architecture can be treated as a general
paradigm for a distributed selective SGD architecture. Usually, a FL framework requires that the participant
download all gradients in the global model, train the model with the local dataset, and then upload it to the
coordinator if the participant does not drop-out in current training epoch, whereas the distributed selective
SGD approach gives more control to a participant to select partial parameters in the gradients. Essentially,
the distributed selective SGD approach is a sketching version of a FL architecture.
Knowledge Distillation based Architecture. The basic knowledge distillation architecture is a teacher-
student model. As illustrated in PATE framework [136, 138], it mainly focuses on the inference phase
of an ML system. In PATE (private aggregation of teacher ensembles) approaches, the knowledge of an
ensemble of “teacher” models (i.e., initially trained models) is transferred to a “student” model (i.e., model
that will be used), with intuitive privacy provided by training teachers on disjoint data and strong privacy
guaranteed by noisy aggregation of teachers’ answers. Other typical approaches are model transformation
and model compression. For instance, in MiniONN [115], an existing model is transformed into an oblivious
neural network supporting privacy-preserving predictions. Existing DL models in NLP domain with a large
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number of model parameters can be compressed to lightweight DL models via knowledge distillation methods
[88, 143]. Except for the primary goal of reducing the size of a DL model, it can also bring additional privacy-
preserving features [137, 178].
2.2.4 Hybrid Approaches
Due to the higher privacy protection requirements and recently illustrated privacy attacks such as mem-
bership inference attacks [167, 19, 90, 110, 130] and model inversion attacks [66, 186, 181, 85], existing single
type of privacy-preserving approaches discussed above are not enough. For instance, existing FL frameworks
only provide a basic privacy guarantee as each participant can locally hold the training data. However, the
global trained model cannot prevent membership inference attacks. To address this issue, one type of hybrid
approaches as proposed in [1, 72, 138] tries to integrate FL with a differential privacy mechanism. Similarly,
the approach proposed in [116] shows that sketching algorithms have a unique advantage in that they can
provide both privacy and performance benefits while maintaining accuracy, where the local model updates
do not need to be shared; only sketched updates need to be shared instead. Furthermore, to avoid a curi-
ous coordinator investigating the participants’ input in FL while increasing the global model performance,
another type of hybrid approach as proposed in [173, 189] integrates crypto-based secure computation and
differential privacy mechanism into a FL framework to provide stronger privacy guarantee. On the other
hand, approaches proposed in [83, 22, 39] also utilize secure multi-party computation and FL techniques to
collaboratively train an ML model over multiple vertically partitioned datasets. As we introduced in earlier
for delegation-based ML system [125, 112, 128], besides the designed delegation based architecture, such a
design also relies on secure computation techniques.
In short, traditional anonymization mechanisms and perturbation techniques (i.e., the differential privacy
mechanism) can provide privacy protection on final trained model to avoid attacks such as membership
inference attack, but cannot completely prevent a honest-but-curious central server that may infer private
information from the participants’ input in the FL framework or delegation based ML systems. Secure
computation techniques such as garbled-circuits-based or crypto-based 2PC and MPC are able to protect
each participant’s input but cannot prevent private information leakage in the final trained model. To
pursue a stronger privacy guarantee, well-designed PPML frameworks may need to rely on the integration
of de-identification approaches, perturbation techniques, and secure computation within a properly designed
architecture.
2.3 Transparent and Trustworthy Infrastructure
The provisioning of openness and accountability, also referred to as transparency in recent literature
[104, 152, 102, 122, 58, 33, 64], can additionally help increase users’ trust or confidence on service providers,
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e.g., cryptography infrastructure, cloud infrastructure, with respect to the protection of their sensitive data.
The concept of transparency in the digital world is used to avoid malicious activities or misbehavior in
the critical infrastructures. Certificate transparency proposed in [104, 102] aims to mitigate the certificate
based threats caused by fake or forged SSL certificates that are mistakenly or maliciously issued by insiders.
Certificate transparency model creates an open framework for monitoring the TLS/SSL certificate system
and auditing specific TLS/SSL certificates. Then, several works related to certificate transparency were
proposed in [64, 58, 46, 168, 103] to deal with revocation, security and privacy issues.
Most recent and related work is CONIKS and transparency overlay. CONIKS proposed in [122] deals
with key transparency in end-to-end encrypted communications systems where the public keys of end users
are a general version of the digital certificate. Transparency overlay propose a formal framework with a
specific security proof in [33]. However, such transparency model and framework cannot deal with the trust
and other issues we have addressed in this paper, e.g., how to ensure authorities’ fulfillment of obligations
in key services phases. To address that issue, we have proposed the notion of authority transparency in
[190] to address similar but more complex issues related to a TPA that is the critical component of many
emerging cryptosystems. To extend the notion of authority transparency for the entire secure computing
infrastructure including the TPA, the third-party IaaS server and coordinator server, we propose the trans-
parent and trustworthy secure computation infrastructure using emerging Ethereum blockchain techniques
in this dissertation.
2.4 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented existing privacy-preserving approaches that have been adopted in ML
considering various factors, such as, various phases of ML systems and the underlying design principles; we
also presented corresponding PPML approaches that have been proposed in the literature. Furthermore, we
also discussed about transparent and trustworthy infrastructure for PPML approaches.
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3.0 Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning using Secure Computing
While traditional ML approaches depend on a centrally managed training data set, privacy considerations
have driven interest in decentralized learning frameworks in which multiple participants collaborate to train
an ML model without sharing their respective training data sets. Federated learning (FL) [120, 100] has
been proposed as a decentralized process that can scale to thousands of participants. Since the training
data does not leave a participant’s domain, FL is suitable for applications such as health care and financial
services, where data sharing raises significant privacy concerns. In primary FL design, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1, each participant trains a model locally and exchanges only model parameters with others, instead
of sharing privacy-sensitive training data. An entity called coordinator merges the model parameters of
different participants. Often, a coordinator is a central entity that also redistributes the merged model
parameters to all participants; but other topologies have been used as well, e.g., co-locating a coordinator
with each participant.
There are two types of FL, vertical FL and horizontal FL, that mainly differ on the information available
to each participant. In horizontal FL, all participants have access to the entire feature set and labels, and
thus, they can train their local models based on their own datasets and later share model updates with
a coordinator based on their local models. The coordinator then creates a global model by averaging the
model weights received from individual participants. In contrast, vertical FL refers to collaborative scenarios
where the complete set of features and labels are not known to a single participant.
The primary horizontal FL design aims at protecting data privacy by ensuring each participant would
keep its data locally and transmit model parameters [120]. Although at first glance it may provide some level
of privacy, attacks reported in literature have demonstrated that it is possible to infer private information
through various inference attacks: inference attacks in the learning phase have been proposed in [131]; and
deriving private information from a trained model has been demonstrated in [167]. To fully protect the
privacy of the training data from inference attacks, the concept of privacy-preserving federated learning
(PPFL) has been raised in the recent literature. Furthermore, vertical FL is particularly challenging as
each participant cannot train a model using its own dataset locally. Participants need to collaborate to find
the complete feature vector without exposing their training data, and after aligning their data in a private
way. A process to collaboratively train the model needs to take place in a privacy-preserving way without
exposing the raw data of each participant.
In this chapter, we propose two PPFL frameworks - HybridAlpha and FedV 1 - focusing on the horizontal
PPFL and vertical PPFL as presented in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, respectively.
1Note that the HybridAlpha and most of work of FedV was accomplished while interning at the IBM Research - Almaden,
and here I would like to acknowledge the continued collaboration with the team - AI Security and Privacy Solutions and the
help from co-authors - Dr. Nathalie Baracaldo, Dr. Yi Zhou, Dr. Ali Anwar and Dr. Heiko Ludwig.
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Figure 3.1: General architecture of federated learning. Note that the training process is orchestrated by
a coordinator that acts as a third-party semi-trusted (a.k.a, honest-but-curious) entity and interacts with
participants (i.e., p1, p2, ..., pn). FL training is a process of repeatedly merging the local model updates,
where for each iteration the coordinator first sends the global model wg that could be randomly initialized or
a pre-trained to each participant. Once wg is received, each participant pi trains the local model wpi using
local data based on wg, and sends back the model updates. The coordinator aggregates all the received
model updates to for one round of model training.
3.1 HybridAlpha: An Efficient Secure Computing Approach for Horizontal PPFL
3.1.1 Background and Motivation
Participants in a FL process cooperatively train a model by exchanging model parameters instead of
the actual training data, which they might want to keep private. However, parameter interaction and the
resulting model still might disclose information about the training data used. For instance, this approach
still poses privacy risks such as inference attacks in the learning phase have been proposed by [131] and
deriving private information from a trained model has been demonstrated in [167].
To address such privacy leakage, differential privacy [60, 62] has been proposed for a learning framework
[1, 138], in which a trusted coordinator controls the privacy exposure to protect the privacy of the model’s
output. Similarly, [141] proposes to combine differential privacy techniques and secure multiparty compu-
tation (SMC) to support privacy-preserving analyses on private data from different data providers, whereas
[22] combines secret sharing and authenticated encryption in a failure-robust protocol for secure aggregation
of high-dimensional data.
Inspired from the hybrid methodology [141], a recent paper [173] also proposed a hybrid solution that
provides strong privacy guarantees while still enabling good model performance. This hybrid approach com-
bines a noise-reduction differential privacy approach with protection of SMC protocol, where the underlying
security cornerstone is additive homomorphic encryption, i.e., threshold Paillier system [51]. Even though the
hybrid approach has good model performance and privacy guarantees, it comes with long training time and
high data transmission cost and cannot deal with participants dropping out during the FL process. In Table
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Table 3.1: Comparison of privacy-preserving approaches in horizontal FL framework
Threat Model Privacy Guarantee SMC Features
Proposals participant coordinator computation output type ∗ communication dynamic
[166] honest honest 7 3 − 1 round 3
[138] honest honest 7 3 − 1 round −
[154] honest HbC 3 3 HE 2 rounds† −
[22] dishonest HbC 3 3 SS+AE 3 rounds† dropout
[173] dishonest HbC 3 3 TP 3 rounds† 7
HybridAlpha dishonest HbC 3 3 FE 1 round† dropout/join
∗ “SS+AE”represents secret sharing techniques with key agreement protocol and authenticated encryption scheme; “HE”
is homomorphic encryption scheme; “TP” is Threshold-Paillier system, a partially additive homomorphic encryption
scheme; “FE” indicates functional encryption scheme; symbol − indicates non-comparative option.
 HbC is the abbreviation of honest-but-curious.
† The count is based on one epoch at the training phase between the coordinator and the participant. The key distribution
communication is not covered here.
3.1, we summarize existing privacy-preserving approaches for horizontal FL from the perspectives of threat
model, privacy guarantees, and offered features. We believe a privacy-preserving FL framework should strive
for strong privacy guarantees, high communication efficiency, and resilience to changes. As shown by Table
3.1, approaches that offer privacy guarantees incur a large number of communication rounds, substantially
increasing the training time for FL systems.
To fully protect the privacy of the training data from inference attacks, it is necessary to provide the
privacy of the computation and the output.
Privacy of Computation. Malicious participants involved in FL training may have an incentive to infer private
information of others. Messages exchanged with the coordinator contain model updates that leak private
information. For instance, if a bag of words is used as embedding to train a text-based classifier, inspecting
gradients can help an adversary identify what words where used (e.g., non-zero gradients constitute words
used). SMC protocols can be used to protect inference attacks at training time. These protocols ensure that
individual results cannot be exposed while still allowing the computation of aggregated data.
Privacy of Output. ML models can also leak private information about the training data [66, 167, 131]. Here,
adversaries can repeatedly query the model to identify if a particular observation was part of the training
data. To prevent against these attacks, differential privacy has been proposed. In this case, noise is added
to the model to protect individual records in the training dataset.
Limitations in Existing Approaches. Although some of them provide privacy guarantees for the com-
putation and output, they lack relevant features for FL systems. In particular, approaches that increase the
number of communication rounds can hinder the applicability of FL, as they augment the training time and
amount of data exchanged. For large models such as neural networks, this is a major concern. Another
important feature should be provided by FL frameworks is the support for dynamic participation. In some
scenarios, participants may leave the training process at any time, we refer to these as dropouts. As shown in
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Figure 3.2: Overview of HybridAlpha framework. Note that we only present one epoch here. Each participant
does the local training based on their owned dataset, and then sends out the model parameters using our
proposed efficient privacy-preserving approach.
Table 3.1, existing approaches cannot gracefully deal with dropouts and require re-doing an overall training
round with new keys. New participants may also join the training process at any time. Existing approaches
do not provide support for this dynamic flow and require full-re-keying.
Our proposed HybridAlpha reduces significantly the training time by limiting the number of messages
exchanged to one by round - substantially less than existing approaches that offer privacy of computation.
In what follows, we present in detail some of the basic building blocks that allow us to achieve this result.
3.1.2 Hybrid-Alpha Framework
Figure 3.2 presents an overview of HybridAlpha. Participants want to collaboratively learn a machine
learning model without sharing their local data with any other entity in the system. They agree on sharing
only model updates with an coordinator. This entity is in charge of receiving model updates from multiple
participants to build a common machine learning model.
Participants want to protect their data against any inference attack during the FL process and from the
final model. For this purpose, they join a HybridAlpha, which has a Third Party Authority (TPA). This
entity provides a key management service that initiates the cryptosystem and provides functional encryption
keys to all participants. To prevent potential leakage of information, HybridAlpha also includes an Inference
Prevention Module that limits what type of functional encryption keys are provided. This module is designed
to ensure that decryption keys cannot be obtained by curious coordinators and to limit potential collusion
attacks. We detail this module in the rest of this section.
Threat Model. We consider the following threat model:
• Honest-but-curious coordinator : We assume that the coordinator correctly follows the algorithm and
protocols, but may try to learn private information inspecting the model updates sent by the participants
in the process. This is a common assumption [173, 22].
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• Curious and colluding participants: We assume that participants may collude to try to acquire private
information from other participants by inspecting the messages exchanged with the coordinator or the
final model.
• Trusted TPA: This entity is an independent agency which is widely trusted by the participants and the
coordinator. In real scenarios, different sectors of the economy already have entities that can take such
role. For instance, in the banking industry, central banks often play a fully trusted role, and in other
sectors, a third company such as a service or consultant firm can embody the TPA. We also note that
assuming such trusted and independent agency is a common assumption in existing cryptosystems that
have employed the TPA as the underlying infrastructure [25, 23, 77]. The TPA is in charge of holding the
master private and public key. The TPA is also trusted to perform public key distribution and function
derived secret key generation. Similarly, Inference Prevention Module is fully trusted.
We assume that secure channels are used in all communications, thus, man-in-the-middle and trivial
snooping attacks are prevented. We also assume a secure key-provisioning procedure such as Diffie-Hellman
is in place to protect key confidentiality. Finally, attacks that aim to create denial of service attacks or inject
malicious model updates are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Based on the threat model above, our proposed privacy-preserving framework can ensure that (i) the semi-
honest coordinator cannot learn additional information except for the expected output by the differential
privacy mechanism, and (ii) the malicious colluding participants cannot learn the parameters of other honest
participants.
Detailed Operations. We now describe in detail the operations of HybridAlpha and begin by introducing
the notation used. Let C be the coordinator and SP be a set of n participants, where each participant Pi
holds its own dataset Di. We denote as LFL the learning algorithm to be trained. Here, we first introduce
the operations of the framework for non-adversarial settings, and then explain how additional features are
used to protect against the inference attacks defined in the threat model section.
Non-adversarial Setting : HybridAlpha’s operations under non-adversarial settings are indicated in Al-
gorithm 1. As input, HybridAlpha takes the set of participants, the algorithm used for training, and the
differential privacy parameter .
HybridAlpha initiates via the TPA setting up keys in the system. In particular, the TPA runs the Setup
and PKDistribute algorithms presented in Appendix A, so that each participant Pi has its own public key
pki (see TPA-initialization function). We note that HybridAlpha allows new participants to join the training
process even if it has already started. To achieve this, the TPA provisions a larger number of keys than the
initial set of participants (line 3). In this way, when new participants join the training process, they need
to acquire the individual public key from the TPA, and then participate in the learning protocol; all this
without requiring any changes for other participants.
To begin the learning process, the coordinator C asynchronously queries each participant Pi with a query
to train the specified learning algorithm LFL and the number of participant. Then, the coordinator collects
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Algorithm 1: HybridAlpha
1 .LFL := Machine learning algorithms to be trained;  := privacy guarantee; SP := set of participants, where
Pi ∈ SP holds its own dataset Di; N := maximum number of expected participants; t := minimum number
of aggregated replies;
2 function TPA-initialization(1λ, N,SP)
3 mpk,msk← EFMCIPFE .Setup(1λ,F1N ) s.t. N  |SP |;
4 foreach Pi ∈ SP do pki ← EFMCIPFE .PKDistribute(mpk,msk,Pi) ;
5 function aggregate(LFL,SP , t)
6 foreach Pi ∈ SP do asynchronously query Pi with msgq,i = (LFL, |SP |) ;
7 do Smsgrecv ← collect participant response msgr,i while |Smsgrecv | ≥ t and still in max waiting time;
8 if |Smsgrecv | ≥ t then
9 specify vP vector; request the skf,vP from TPA;
10 M← EFMCIPFE .Decrypt(skf,vP , wP ,Smsgrecv);
11 returnM
12 function participant-train(, t,msgq,i,Di,pki)
13 Mi ← LFL(Di);
14 MDPi ← DP(,Mi, t);
15 msgr,i ← EFMCIPFE .Encrypt(MDPi ,pki);
16 sends msgr,i to coordinator;
the responses of each participant Pi (see aggregate function).
When all responses are received, assuming there is quorum, C needs to request a key from the TPA
corresponding to the weighted vector vp that will be used to compute the inner product. That is, the
coordinator requests private key skf,vp from the TPA based on vp. For computation of average cumulative
sum of each participant’s model, vp can be set as vp = (
1
n ,
1
n , ...,
1
n ) s.t. |vp| = n, where n is the number of
received responses. Then, C updates the global modelM by applying the decryption algorithm of the MIFE
cryptosystem on collected ciphertext set Smsgrecv and skf,vp . Note that here we assume the coordinator C
will get all responses from every participant. In the case of dropouts, n can be changed so that it reflects
the number of participants that are being aggregated. In the next subsection, we show how HybridAlpha
provides recommendations to set up t so that the number of allowed dropouts are limited for security reasons.
At the participant side, when a query for training is received by participant Pi, it trains a local model
Mi using its dataset Di. During the training process2, the participant adds differential privacy noise to the
model parameters according to the procedure presented in Appendix B. Finally, Pi encrypts the resulting
noisy model using the MIFE encryption algorithm and sends it to the coordinator (see participant-train
function).
Inference Prevention Module : In our threat model, we assume an honest-but-curious coordinator that
tries to infer private information during the training process. We consider multiple potential attacks where
the coordinator manipulates the weighted vector to perform inference.
In particular, suppose that C wants to infer the model of Pi. C can try to launch an inference attack to
2The differential privacy mechanism depends on the machine learning model being trained. For simplicity, in Algorithm 1
we show the noise added after the training process takes place. However, we note that some DP mechanisms add noise during
the training process e.g., to train a neural network with the DP mechanism in [1]
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obtain the model updates of participant k by setting the weighted vector as follow:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} : v′p =
 vpi = 1, if i = k
wpi = 0, if i 6= k
 (3.1)
If a malicious coordinator is allowed a key to perform the inner product of this vector with the model updates,
the model updates of target user k would become visible; this follows because v
′
p zeros-out the model updates
of all other participants except for the ones sent by target participant k. If this is not avoided, C would
acquire wi +
1
nN(0, S
2σ2) as the decryption result of the MIFE cryptosystem. Here, the reduced noise
1
nN(0, S
2σ2) does not provide the expected privacy guarantee to protect Mi of Pi because each honest
participant is injecting noise, assuming its model update is aggregated privately with other n participants.
An honest but curious coordinator may also try to create a smaller weighted vector to exclude a subset of
participants from the aggregation process. In the worst case, the malicious coordinator would try to shrink
the weighted vector to include one single participant to uniquely “aggregate” the model updates of that
participant.
Following this same attack vector, a malicious coordinator colluding with dishonest participants may try
to build a vp vector such that: (i) a target participant model update is included in the vectors; (ii) all other
honest participants model updates are not aggregated, and (iii) updates of dishonest participants are included
in the aggregation process. Since the coordinator is colluding with the dishonest participants included in
the aggregation process and only the target participant is included in the aggregation, the model update of
the target participant is easily reconstructed (its the single unknown variable in the average equation).
To prevent such inference attacks, we propose an additional component called Inference Prevention
Module collocated with the TPA. This module intercepts and inspects requests for private keys for given
weighted vectors to prevent a curious coordinator from obtaining a key that will allow for an inference-
enabling inner product.
To this end, the Inference Prevention Module takes as input a parameter t that defines a threshold on the
number of non-colluding participants, where t ≥ n2 + 1, that is more than half of the participants should not
be colluding. By running Algorithm 2 and using parameter t, it is possible to prevent the attacks previously
described. In particular, the Inference Module enforces that keys are only provided to weighted vectors that
have at least t non-zero elements and that the weight for each included model update is the same.
Threshold t has an impact on the number of dropouts allowed by the system. Mainly, it helps set
up the minimum quorum of participants replying to the system. HybridAlpha allows a limited number of
participants to dropout without requiring any re-keying; only the weighted vector sent by the coordinator
needs to be updated by uniquely including the weights of model updates received.
We also note that t has an impact on how much differential privacy noise is added by each participant
to achieve a pre-defined . Concretely, the number of aggregated replies is always at least t, so as explain
in Appendix B, the noise can be adapted to always account for t non-colluding participants contributing to
the average, e.g., N(0, 1tS
2σ2). For this purpose, t needs to be communicated among all participants and
30
Algorithm 2: Inference Prevention Module
1 . vp:=A weighted vector to be inspected for inference attacks; t:= threshold of minimum number of
dropouts and expected number of non-colluding participants;
2 function inference-prevention-filter(vp, t)
3 cnz ← count the non-zero element in vp;
4 if cnz < t then return ”invalid vp” ;
5 foreach non-zero vpi ∈ vp do
6 if vpi 6= 1cnz then return ”invalid vp”;
7 forward vp to the TPA;
the coordinator.
Underlying ML Models of HybridAlpha : For simplicity we only use the neural networks as the under-
lying ML model in our FL framework for illustration and evaluation, however, the our HybridAlpha supports
various ML algorithms. As functional encryption enables the computation of any inner-product based oper-
ation, any model that can be trained through a stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-based algorithm can be
trained via our proposed HybridAlpha; models in this pool include SVMs, logistic regression, linear regres-
sion, Lasso, and neural networks, among others. Other models such as decision trees and random forests
which require aggregating counts from each participant can also be trained by considering the counts sent
to the coordinator as a vector.
3.1.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
We analyze the security and privacy of our proposed framework from three different perspectives: security
offered by MIFE scheme, privacy guarantees of the framework, and prevention for different types of inference
attacks.
Security of the Cryptographic Approach: The security of MIFE is critical to HybridAlpha, since it is the
underlying infrastructure of SMC protocol that supports secure aggregation in HybridAlpha. In our adoption
of MIFE, we add a public key distribution algorithm run by the TPA as a beneficial supplement of the original
MIFE scheme proposed in [5] to make it applicable to our FL framework.
Specifically, the additional algorithm is only responsible for distributing each participant’s respective
unique public key pki. Unlike the original design of encryption algorithms where each participant encrypts
the data using the master secret key msk, our encryption algorithm uses pki that is derived from the master
keys mpk and msk. However, the core method in the encryption algorithm remains intact, and our design has
no impact on other algorithms, e.g., SKGenerate, Decrypt. As a consequence, our adoption of MIFE does
not change the security construction in the original MIFE scheme in [5]. It is then as secure as proved in
[5]. To avoid redundancy, we do not present the correctness and security proofs to MIFE here, and readers
can refer to [5] for more details.
Privacy of the Output Model : We provide -differential privacy guarantee via existing methods presented
in previous works, e.g., [173, 1, 141]. These papers have shown via theoretical analysis and experimental
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results that such a mechanism can achieve target privacy along with acceptable performance for the final
trained model. As a consequence, our proposed framework can also achieve the same privacy guarantee for
the output model as demonstrated in [173, 141].
Privacy of Computation: We exploit multi-input functional encryption as the underlying infrastructure for
SMC protocol to compute the average of the weights of the participants’ local trained models. As stated in
Appendix A.3, the MIFE scheme is secure so that any plaintext under its protection cannot be compromised
by malicious attackers. The MIFE scheme also guarantees that the decryptor, the coordinator in our FL
framework, can only acquire the function results, i.e., the average weight, but not the original data, i.e.,
weights of the participants’ local models.
Inference Attack Prevention: Next, we consider inference attacks for two adversaries: (i) a curious coordina-
tor, and (ii) malicious or colluding participants. In Section 3.1.2, we have shown that a curious coordinator
can launch an inference attack targeting a specific participant by manipulating the weighted vector wp and
subsequently requesting the function private key. To prevent such inference attacks, we add an additional
module in TPA to filter requests for weighted vectors that are maliciously defined to isolate the reply of a
single participant. Algorithm 2 verifies that at least t replies are used for aggregation, because there are at
least t > (n/2) + 1 non-colluding participants; even if the coordinator colludes with dishonest participants
he cannot isolate the reply of a target participant.
Even if an adversary manages to collect other participants’ encrypted data for a possible brute-force
attack, this attack is not successful. In particular, suppose that there exits a malicious participant P ′i with
its own public key pkP′i , collected encrypted data cj = EncpkPj,j 6=i (mj) from Pj , and its own original data set
S ′ . Here mj is the corresponding plaintext of cj , and mj and any m′ ∈ S ′ belong to a same integer group.
The semantic security of the underlying MIFE scheme in our SMC protocol ensures that the adversary
P ′j does not have a non-negligible advantage to infer the original data mj compared to the random guess.
Furthermore, as we assume the existence of at least t honest participants where each participant does not
share the same public key for encryption, the colluding participants cannot infer/identify private information
using the output of the coordinator with their local models.
Note that based on the threat model defined in Section 3.1.2, we do not consider the DDoS attack on
the coordinator where a malicious coordinator or a outside attacker will interrupt the network or replace a
valid update from an honest participant.
3.1.4 Experimental Evaluation
We perform a detailed evaluation of our proposed approach to answer the following questions:
• How does HybridAlpha perform theoretically when compared to existing techniques that have similar
threat models? More specifically, how many crypto-related operations can be reduced by using Hybri-
dAlpha?
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of aggregation via different crypto-based SMC solutions.
• How does our proposed SMC perform under benchmarking? How does precision setting impact com-
putation time compared with existing techniques? What impact do different numbers of participants
have?
• How does HybridAlpha compare to existing techniques in terms of performance efficiency?
Baselines and Theoretical Analysis. We compare the proposed HybridAlpha with two state of the
art private-federated learning approaches: [173] and [154], which use different SMC techniques. A graphical
overview and comparison of these baselines can be found in Figure 3.3, the steps performed by each approach
are defined in this figure. We will use this notation to report our results. Additionally, we provide a brief
description of our baselines:
• We refer to the first baseline as TP-SMC [173]. This FL approach uses a threshold-based homomorphic
cryptosystem that allows for a trusted parameter t that specifies the number of participants that are
trusted not to collude.
• We refer as P-SMC to our second baseline which is inspired by PySyft [154], an opensource system
that uses SPDZ protocol [52, 53]. This construct supports homomorphic addition and multiplication.
Because the SGD aggregation only requires addition, we opted for a additive homomorphic approach for
the comparison, thus, the results reported for this baseline are representative yet faster than PySyft.
We note that the contrasted approaches follows a similar threat model to [173] with a honest-but-curious
coordinator, and potentially colluding and malicious participants. However, they differ in the assumption
of a TPA. We therefore, show how making use of a TPA, HybridAlpha can significantly reduce the training
time of machine learning models.
Theoretical Comparison : We now theoretically compare the crypto-related communication steps asso-
ciated with the contrasted approaches. Suppose that there are n participants and m coordinators in the
FL framework, and the threshold for decryption of Threshold-Paillier cryptosystem is t. As shown in Table
3.2, in total, HybridAlpha reduces m(n − 1) and m(2t − 1) operations compared to P-SMC and TP-SMC
solutions, respectively. This is achieved because HybridAlpha doesn’t require sending back encrypted ag-
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Table 3.2: The number of crypto-related operations required for each solution.
Communication TP-SMC P-SMC HybridAlpha
Step (1) n n n+m
Step (3) n×m n×m n×m
Step (5) m× t n×m -
Step (7) t×m - -
TOTAL 2mt+mn+ n 2mn+ n mn+m+ n
gregated model updates to the participants for decryption. In the following, we also provide the details of
experimental results that are consistent with the theoretical analysis.
Experimental Setup. To benchmark the performance of HybridAlpha, we train a convolutional neural
network (CNN) with the same topology as the one used in [173] to classify the publicly available MNIST
dataset of handwritten digits [106]. The CNN has two internal layers of ReLU units, and a softmax layer of
ten classes with cross-entropy loss. The first layer contains 60 neurons and the second layer contains 1000
neurons. The total number of parameters of this CNN is 118110. We also use the same hyperparameters
reported in previous work: a learning rate of 0.1, a batch rate of 0.01. and for differential privacy we use
a norm clipping of 4.0, and an epsilon of 0.5. We used noise-reduction method as in [173] as differential
private mechanism. We run experiments for 10 participants, and each participant was randomly assigned
6,000 data points from the MNIST dataset. For model quality, we used the pre-defined MNIST test set. Our
implementation uses Keras with a Tensorflow backend.
Cryptosystems Implementation : We implement the contrasted cryptosystems in python based on the
opensource integer group of the Charm framework [11]. Charm uses a hybrid design, where the underlying
performance-intensive mathematical operations are implemented in native C modules, i.e., the GMP library
3, while cryptosystems themselves can be written in a readable, high-level language. Even though there exists
Paillier implementation including its threshold variant using other programming languages, we re-implement
them in a unified platform to allow for fair benchmarking and to enable easy integration with python-based
machine learning frameworks such as Keras and Tensorflow.
In our implementation, we incorporated the following accelerating techniques. In HybridAlpha, as pre-
sented in Appendix A, the final step of MIFE decryption is to compute the discrete logarithm of an integer,
which is a performance intensive computation. An example would be how to compute f in h = gf , where
h, g are big integers, while f is a small integer. To accelerate the decryption, we use a hybrid approach to
solve the discrete logarithm problem. Specifically, we setup a hash table Th,g,b to store (h, f) with a specified
g and a bound b, where −b ≤ f ≤ b, when the system initializes. When computing discrete logarithms, the
algorithm first looks up Th,g,b to find f , where the complexity is O(1). If there is no result in Th,g,b, the
algorithm employs the traditional baby-step giant-step algorithm [161] to compute f , where the complexity
3The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (https://gmplib.org/).
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is O(n 12 ) .
The second acceleration method we implemented modifies the encryption and decryption algorithms
to allow for a one-shot encryption call of a tensor. Here, each generated random nonce is applied to the
whole tensor instead of a single element. We note that a further performance enhancement technique that
could be used is parallelizing the encryption/decryption implementation, however, we did not include this
enhancement.
Environment Setup: All the experiments are performed on a 2 socket, 44 core (2 hyperthreads/core) Intel
Xeon E5-2699 v4 platform with 384 GB of RAM. Note that the FL framework is simulated (not run on
the real distributed environment), hence the network latency issues are not considered in our experiment.
However, we report a comparison of data transfer by contrasted approaches.
Experimental Results. Here, we first present the benchmark result of three contrasted approaches, and
then show the experimental efficiency improvement.
Impact of Floating Point Precision : The parameters of a neural network (weights) are represented
as floating point numbers. However, cryptosystems take them as input integers. Hence, the floating point
parameters should be represented and encoded into integers. The precision number denotes the number
of bits used after the decimal point of a floating point number. In Table 3.3 we present the impact of
the precision on the computation time of each crypto-based SMC. Based on our experimental results, the
precision setting has no significant impact on operation time of each cryptosystem. To be specific, the time
cost of encryption, decryption, and other ciphertext computations in each cryptosystem is stable, respectively,
of length of the integer.
For encryption, the average time cost of 10 participants on 118110 gradients for HybridAlpha is around
4 seconds, while the time cost of P-SMC and TP-SMC under the same setting is about 35 seconds. For
decryption, under the same setting, the cost time of HybridAlpha is about 30 seconds, while the time cost
of P-SMC and TP-SMC are 31 and 88 seconds, respectively. Note that the decryption time of TP-SMC
includes the share decryption by part of participants and the final combination decryption by the coordinator,
without considering network latency of transmitting the partial decrypted ciphertext. We can conclude that
our proposed approach has significant advantages on both encryption/decryption time cost comparing to
P-SMC and TP-SMC solutions.
Finally, the number of decimal points used in the conversion impacts the overall accuracy of the trained
model. In the remaining of the experiments, we used 6-digits which allows for good model and training time
performance.
Impact of Number of Participants: We also measure the impact of the number of participants on
the time cost for each crypto operation. The experimental results are shown in Table 3.4. We see two
different trends on the participant and on the coordinator side. At the participant side, the encryption
and decryption runtime stays the same for all of the evaluated approaches as the number of participants
increases. In contrast, on the coordinator side, the time cost of ciphertext multiplication increases almost
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Table 3.3: The impact of precision on computation time of three SMC approaches.
TP-SMC .Time (s) P-SMC Time (s) HybridAlpha Time (s)
precision encavg ctfuse decshare,avg deccombine encavg ctfuse dec encavg dec
2 35.120 2.586 61.080 28.465 35.752 2.269 32.042 4.157 30.075
3 35.675 2.604 61.929 28.202 35.725 2.369 31.574 4.158 30.512
4 35.841 2.571 60.832 28.324 35.821 2.387 31.856 4.110 29.865
5 35.767 2.635 60.369 28.816 35.857 2.493 31.625 4.075 30.149
6 35.724 2.578 60.326 28.286 35.985 2.532 31.587 4.095 30.803
. The threshold parameter of Threshold-Paillier encryption system is set to half the number of participants.
Table 3.4: The impact of participant numbers on computation time of three SMC approaches.
TP-SMC Time (s) . P-SMC Time (s) HybridAlpha Time (s)
participants encavg ctfuse decshare,avg deccombine encavg ctfuse dec encavg dec
6 35.968 1.375 60.555 22.184 35.934 1.332 31.616 4.241 20.246
8 35.375 1.843 60.820 23.980 36.039 1.859 31.611 4.092 25.349
10 35.693 2.358 60.988 28.401 36.847 2.611 32.197 4.077 31.782
12 35.685 2.759 60.947 34.684 36.142 2.959 31.588 4.091 36.884
14 35.688 3.215 60.965 39.838 35.932 3.330 31.503 4.126 42.683
16 35.721 3.694 60.917 46.849 36.533 4.481 32.020 4.059 47.435
18 35.683 4.170 60.879 53.441 36.628 5.368 32.996 4.594 56.519
20 35.697 4.764 60.816 97.224 36.743 5.765 31.923 4.147 59.823
. The threshold parameter of TP-SMC is set to half the number of participants.
Table 3.5: Impact of threshold for TP-SMC on computation time.
threshold† encavg time (s) ctfuse time (s) decshare,avg time (s) deccombine time (s)
2 35.577 2.602 60.736 12.700
4 35.697 2.592 60.420 23.293
6 35.713 2.625 60.238 34.427
8 36.054 2.623 60.767 46.462
10 35.880 2.626 60.650 58.293
† The total participants number is set to 10 and the precision number is set to 6.
linearly with the increase in the number of participants (shown in italicized numbers in Table 3.4). However,
we note a significant difference between HybridAlpha and TP-SMC. For HybridAlpha the decryption time
increases approximately linearly with the increase of participants, while for TP-SMC, the decryption time
increases exponentially as the number of participants increases. Focusing on the TP-SMC, we also evaluate
the impact of threshold t, which indicates the minimum number of participants who are required to do partial
decryption. As shown in Table 3.5, only the final decryption has significant relationship with threshold t.
For the same number of participants, the cost time of decryption increases linearly as the threshold number
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Figure 3.4: Performance comparison in model accuracy, time efficiency and data transmission.
increase.
Model Quality, Training Time and Data Transmission : In this experiment, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of HybridAlpha with respect to multiple techniques to perform FL. In particular, we assess the quality
of models produced and the total training time. The contrasted approaches for this experiment include the
following additional baselines: (i) “FL-no-privacy”, where the neural network is trained without privacy
considerations. This method provides a baseline for maximum possible performance in terms of model qual-
ity; (ii) “Local DP”, where each participant applies differential privacy locally according to [95]; (iii) for
“TP-SMC”, “P-SMC” and “HybridAlpha”, we report the results for two cases: adding differential privacy to
protect privacy of the output and without adding differential privacy. When no differential privacy is added,
we use “TP-SMC no DP”, “P-SMC no DP” and “HybridAlpha no DP”. For privacy-preserving approaches
we use an  = 0.5. Finally, our experiments used t = 5 for HybridAlpha and TP-SMC. This experiment was
run with 10 participants.
To measure quality of model performance, we report the F1-score (a measure that combines precision and
recall) of the resulting models. The results are presented in Figure 3.4a. We see different trends depending
on whether a particular approach protects privacy of the computation and of the output. As expected,
approaches that do not protect the privacy of the final model - those that don’t inject differential privacy
noise- result in a higher F1-score. In contrast, “Local DP” provides the lowest F1-score due to the high
amount of noise injected by each participant. For approaches that use SMC to uniquely protect the privacy
of the computation, “TP-SMC no DP”, “P-SMC no DP” and “HybridAlpha no DP”, we see higher F1-scores
than for those that protect the privacy of the output. This shows the price of protecting against the risk
of inference on the model. Finally, we see that approaches that combine differential privacy with SMC are
capable of achieving higher F1-scores while protecting the privacy of the input and output.
We now analyze these approaches from the perspective of total training time presented in Figure 3.4b.
As it can be seen, our proposed HybridAlpha has very similar training time to “FL-no-privacy”. In other
words, the training time added by ensuring privacy of the input and output is negligent. In contrast, we
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see that the slowest approach is TP-SMC even though we set up t to a conservative 50% of the entire
number of participants in the system. This result is due to the fact that TP-SMC requires more rounds
of communication per global step. The high training time makes TP-SMC suitable for models that require
limited number of interactions with the coordinator during training.
Beside the efficiency in training time, we also evaluate the efficiency of network transmission by mea-
suring the volume of encrypted parameters transmitted over the network. In Figure 3.4c, we present the
total transmitted ciphertext size under different crypto-based SMC approaches for one epoch. The blue
bar represents initial ciphertext size of model parameters, while the spotted purple bar indicates the size
of subsequent ciphertext, including multiplied cipher, and partially decrypted ciphers. We can see that
HybridAlpha provides the lowest transmission rate because it only performs one round of communication on
encrypted data without any subsequent ciphertext transmission. Also, our proposed approach has smaller
ciphertext size of initial parameters compared to contrasted approaches.
3.2 FedV: PPFL over Vertically Partitioned Data
3.2.1 Background and Motivation
Vertical FL is a powerful approach that can help create ML models for many real-world problems where a
single entity does not have access to all the training features or labels. For example, in healthcare, different
entities may collect different sets of data about patients that if combined can help achieve significantly
improved accuracy of prediction and diagnosis of health conditions of patients. In particular, a sensor
company may collect readings of body sensors, including heart rate and sleeping cycle data for a patient.
A second participant may be a hospital that records emergency room visits and medical history of the
patient. A third participant can be an insurance company that maintains the patient’s personal disease
history and approvals or denials of insurance requests (labels). As a second example, consider a set of banks
and a regulator. These banks may want to collaboratively create an ML model using their datasets to flag
individuals who commit money-laundering. Such a collaboration is important as criminals typically use
multiple banks to avoid detection. However, if several banks partner together to find a common vector for
each client and a regulator, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) provides the labels that show
which clients have committed money laundering, such fraud can be identified and/or mitigated. However,
note that each bank may not typically want to share its clients’ account details and in some cases it is even
forbidden to do so. Further, the regulator may also want to maintain labels private.
One of the requirements for privacy-preserving VFL is thus to ensure that the dataset of each participant,
including the labels, are private. VFL requires two different processes: entity resolution and vertical training.
Both these processes are orchestrated by a Coordinator, which acts as a third semi-trusted participant that
interacts with each participant. Before we present the detailed description of each process, we introduce the
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notation used throughout the section.
Notation : Let P = {pi}i∈[n] be the set of n participants in VFL. Let D[X,Y ] be the training dataset, where
X ∈ Rd represents the feature set and Y ∈ R denotes the labels across the set of participants P. Except for
the identifier features, there is no overlapping training features between any two participants’ local datasets,
and these datasets can form the “global” dataset D. In VFL, we assume that only one participant has the
class labels, namely, the active participant, while other participants are passive participants. For simplicity,
in the rest of the section, let p1 be the active participant. The goal of VFL is to train a ML model M over
the dataset D from the participant set P without leaking each participant’s data.
Private Entity Resolution (PER): In VFL, unlike in a centralized ML scenario, D is distributed across
multiple participants. Before training takes place, it is necessary to ‘align’ the records of each participant
without revealing its data. This process is known as entity resolution [45]. After the entity resolution step,
records from all participants are linked to form the complete training samples.
Ensuring that the entity resolution process does not lead to inference of private data of each participant
is paramount in VFL. A curious participant should not be able to infer the presence or absence of a record.
Existing approaches, such as [134, 89], use a bloom filter and random oblivious transfer [57, 99] with a
shuffle process to perform private set intersection. This helps in finding the matching record set while
preserving privacy. We assume there exists shared record identifiers, such as names, dates of birth or
universal identification numbers, that can be used to perform entity matching. In FedV, we employ the
anonymous linking code technique called cryptographic long-term key (CLK) and matching method called
Dice coefficient [159] to perform PER, as has been done in [83]. As part of this process, each participant
generates a set of CLK based on the identifiers of the local dataset and shares it with a coordinator who
matches the CLKs received and generate a permutation vector for each participant to shuffle its local dataset.
The shuffled local datasets are now ready to be used in the private vertical training phase.
Private Vertical Training : After the private entity resolution process takes place, the coordinator dictates
which samples in a PER-processed training batch of each participant will be used to train a model. In the
following, we discuss the challenge of private gradient descent training process in detail.
As the subsets of the feature set are distributed among different participants, gradient descent(GD)-
based methods need to be adapted to such vertically partitioned settings. We now explain how and why this
process needs to be modified. GD method [132][Section 1.2.3] is a class of optimization algorithms to find
the minimum of a target loss function; for example, in machine learning domain, a typical loss function can
be defined as follows,
ED(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(y(i), f(x(i);w)) + λR(w), (3.2)
where L is the loss function, y(i) is the corresponding class label of data sample x(i), w denotes the model
parameters, and R is regularization term with coefficient λ. GD finds a solution of (3.2) by iteratively
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moving in the direction of the locally steepest descent as defined by the negative of the gradient, i.e.,
w ← w − α∇ED(w), (3.3)
where α is the learning rate, and ∇ED(w) is the gradient computed at the current iteration. Due to its
simple algorithmic scheme, GD and its variants, like SGD, have become the common approaches to find the
optimal parameters (a.k.a. the weights) of a ML model based on D. In a VFL setting, since D is vertically
partitioned among participants, the gradient computation ∇ED(w) is more computationally involved than
in a centralized machine learning setting.
Considering the simplest case where there are only two participants {pA, pB} in a vertical federated
learning system, and the target loss function is MSE (Mean Squared Loss), i.e., ED(w) = 1n
∑n
i=1(y
(i) −
f(x(i);w))2, we have
∇ED(w) = − 2
n
n∑
i=1
(y(i) − f(x(i);w))∇f(x(i);w). (3.4)
To compute the first term of (3.4), −y(i)∇f(x(i);w), we need feature information from both pA and
pB , and labels from pB . And clearly, ∇f(x(i);w) = [∂wAf(x(i)A ;w); ∂wBf(x(i)B ;w)] does not always hold for
any function f , since f may not be well-separable w.r.t. w. Even when it holds for linear functions like
f(x(i);w) = x(i)w = x
(i)
A wA + x
(i)
B wB , (3.4) will be reduced to
∇ED(w) = − 2
n
n∑
i=1
(y(i) − x(i)w)[x(i)A ;x(i)B ]
= − 2
n
n∑
i=1
(
[y(i)x
(i)
A ; y
(i)x
(i)
B ] + (x
(i)
A wA + x
(i)
B wB)[x
(i)
A ;x
(i)
B ]
)
= − 2
n
n∑
i=1
(
[(y(i) − x(i)A wA − x(i)B wB)x(i)A ; (y(i) − x(i)A wA − x(i)B wB)x(i)B ]
)
, (3.5)
which may lead to training data exposure between two participants due to the computation of some terms
(colored in red) in (3.5). Under the VFL setting, the gradient computation at each training epoch relies on
(i) the participants’ collaboration to exchange their “partial model” with each other, or (ii) exposing their
data to the coordinator to compute the final gradient update. Therefore, any naive solutions will lead to a
huge risk of privacy leakage, which will be against the initial goal of the federated learning proposals that
primitively protects the data privacy.
In summary, existing approaches to train ML models in vertical FL, e.g., [69, 83, 39, 169], are model-
specific and rely on the hybrid general (garbled circuit based) secure multi-party computation (SMC) or
partially additive homomorphic encryption (HE) (i.e., Paillier cryptosystem [51]). These approaches have
several limitations. First, they require the use of Taylor series approximation to train non-linear ML models,
such as logistic regression, possibly reducing the model performance. Furthermore, the prediction and
inference phases of these vertical FL solutions also rely on the approximation-based secure computation, and
hence, they cannot predict as accurately as does a centralized ML model. Secondly, using such cryptosystems
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of secure aggregation communications via different approaches.
as part of the training process increases substantially the training time. Thirdly, these protocols require a
large number of peer-to-peer communication rounds among participants as illustrated in Figure 3.5 (a)
and (b) making it difficult to deploy them in systems that have unreliable connectivity or require limited
communication for security reasons; for instance, HIPAA limits the connectivity of data centers to a very
few specific entities. Note that figure (a) and (b) show the secure SGD and loss computation proposed in
[83] while figure (c) shows our proposed FedV approach which can be applied to both secure SGD and secure
loss computation. [83] only supports two participants with one coordinator, and the illustration here is our
theoretical extension for the multiple participant scenario based on their proposed algorithm. Our approach
requires a one-shot messaging and eliminates peer-to-peer communication. Finally, other approaches such as
[193] require sharing class distributions which may lead to potential leakage of private information of each
participant.
To address these limitations, in this section, we propose FedV, a framework that substantially reduces
the amount of communication required to train ML models in a vertical FL fashion. FedV does not require
any peer-to-peer communication among participants and can work with gradient-based training algorithms,
such as stochastic gradient descent and its variants, to train a variety of ML models, e.g., logistic regres-
sion, support vector machine (SVM), etc. To achieve these benefits, FedV cleverly orchestrates multiple
functional encryption techniques [4, 5], that are non-interactive in nature, speeding up the training process
with respect to the state-of-the-art approaches. Additionally, FedV supports more than two participants
and allows participants to dynamically join and leave without a need for re-keying. This feature is not pro-
vided by garbled-circuit or homomorphic encryption based encryption techniques utilized by state-of-the-art
approaches.
3.2.2 FedV Framework
FedV enables vertical federated learning without a need for any peer-to-peer communication resulting
in a drastic reduction in training time and total data transfer as shown in Figure 3.6. We first overview
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Figure 3.6: Overview of the FedV. Note that we assume participant p1 owns the labels, while all other
participants (i.e., p2, ..., pn) are passive participants.
the entities in the system and explain how they interact under our proposed two-phase secure aggregation
technique that makes these results possible.
FedV has three types of entities: a coordinator, a set of participants and a third-party authority.
• Each participant owns a training dataset which contains a subset of features and wants to collaboratively
train a global model. As in [39], we divide participants into two categories: (i) one active participant
who has training samples with partial features and the class labels, represented by p1 in Figure 3.6; (ii)
multiple passive participants who have training samples with only partial features.
• The coordinator orchestrates the private entity resolution procedure and coordinates the training process
among the participants.
• To enable functional encryption, FedV includes a TPA that is responsible for setting up the underlying
cryptosystem, delivering the public key to each participant and providing private key service to the
coordinator. The TPA is in charge of holding the master private and public key. It is also trusted to
perform public key distribution and to generate a functionally derived secret key. In real-world scenarios,
different sectors of the economy already have entities that can take the role of a TPA. For example,
central banks of the banking industry often play a fully trusted role, and some third companies in other
sectors such as a service or consultancy firm can embody the TPA. As it will become apparent in our
security evaluation, in FedV the TPA does not have access to neither the dataset nor the ML model.
To perform the private entity resolution, we make use of the approach proposed in [159] which was
described in Section 3.2.1. This approach is then expanded to include a set of random vectors one for each
participant to re-shuffle their dataset similarly to [83]. At the end of the entity resolution, the coordinator
generates permutation vector pii for each participant to shuffle its local records. This results in participants
having all records aligned before training. Finally, prior to the training process, all participants also agree
upon a random seed that will be used to generate a one-time-password sequence [81]. During the training
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Algorithm 3: FedV Framework
1 Initialize cryptosystems and deliver public keys and a random seed r for each participant;
2 Each participant shuffles samples according to the entity resolution vectors pi1, .., pin ;
3 w ← random initialization;
4 repeat
5 foreach mini-batch B ∈ D do
6 ∇EB(w)← execute FedV-SecGrad with batch index si;
7 w ← w − α∇EB(w)
8 EB(w)← secure loss computation;
9 if EB(w) is stable for a while then break;
10 until reach maximum iteration;
11 return w
process, at a given round, each participant will use the one-time-password associated with the training
epoch as the seed to randomly select the samples that are going to be included in a batch for the given
round. The random seed could be generated by the TPA and is only shared among participants that do not
play the role of coordinator (this is done to prevent inference attacks).
After the private entity resolution, FedV starts the Federated Vertical Secure Gradient Descent (FedV-
SecGrad) operation which is the core novelty of this paper. FedV-SecGrad is a two-phased secure aggregation
operation that enables the computation of gradients by uniquely requiring a single message to be exchanged
between participants and the coordinator. For this purpose, participants perform a sample-dimension and
feature-dimension encryption. The resulting cyphertexts are then sent to the coordinator, which in turn
generates the aggregation vectors to compute the inner products. These aggregation vectors are subsequently
sent to the TPA that verifies their validity (we will expand on this later). If the aggregation vectors are
concluded to be adequate, the TPA provides the cryptographic key to the coordinator to perform the inner
products. As a result of these computations, the coordinator can obtain the gradients.
Threat Model and Assumptions. We consider the following threat model:
• Honest-but-curious coordinator : We assume that the coordinator correctly follows the algorithms and
protocols, but may try to learn private information from the aggregated model updates. This is a common
assumption as claimed in related work [22, 173]. The coordinator does not have to be a separate entity in
FedV. Any active participant following an honest-but-curious behavior can play the role of coordinator.
Just like the coordinator, active participants do not get access to random seed used to select data points
in each batch.
• Trusted TPA: As a critical component in the underlying cryptosystem infrastructure, the TPA is an
independent entity which is trusted by participants and the coordinator. Assuming such a trusted and
independent entity is common in existing cryptosystems such as [4, 5].
• Participants: We assume a limited number of dishonest participants who may try to infer the honest
participants’ private information. Dishonest participants may collude with each other.
Our proposed FedV can guarantee that an honest-but-curious coordinator cannot learn additional in-
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formation beyond the excepted gradient updates. The coordinator and TPA are assumed not to collude.
Additionally, the coordinator and participants do not collude. We note that the TPA does not have access
to the training data. A detailed security analysis is presented in Section 3.2.3.
We assume secure channels are in place and hence man-in-the-middle and snooping attacks are not
feasible. Similarly, secure key distribution is assumed to be in place. Finally, denial of service attacks and
backdoor attacks where participants try to cause the final model to create a targeted miss classification
[36, 15] are outside the scope of this paper.
Vertical Training Process - FedV-SecGrad . We now present in detail our federated vertical secure
gradient descent (FedV-SecGrad) approach for supported ML models. First we provide a high level overview
of the secure aggregation operations follow by FedV-SecGrad and describe in detail the operations performed
by FedV-SecGrad in Procedure 4 for linear models. Then, we extend FedV-SecGrad to other popular ML
models and discuss the Inference Prevention Module (IPM).
We describe FedV and its supported ML models in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. FedV-SecGrad is a generic approach to perform private vertical federated learning which adopts
gradient-based algorithms to train a machine learning model with prediction function that can be written in the
form of f(x;w) := g(wᵀx), where x and w denote the feature vector and the model weight vector, respectively.
And the loss function is either mean-squared loss or cross-entropy loss depends on the problem context, i.e.,
L := 1n
∑n
i=1(y
(i) − f(x(i);w))2 or L := 1n
∑n
i=1[−y(i) log(f(x(i);w))− (1− y(i)) log(1− f(x(i);w))].
Lemma 1 covers ML models besides linear models. Specifically, FedV-SecGrad supports non-linear ML
models such as logistic regression and SVMs. We demonstrate how this is achieved later. Note that in
Lemma 1, we deliberately omitted the regularizer R commonly used in ML, see equation (3.2), because
regularizers only depend on model weights w so that it can be computed by the coordinator independent of
the dataset of each participant.
For simplicity, we first use linear models, where g is the identity function and the loss is a mean-squared
loss, as an example to walk through FedV-SecGrad. The target loss function then becomes
ED(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(y(i) −wTx(i))2. (3.6)
We observe that during an SGD training round the gradient computations over vertically partitioned data
∇ED(w) can be reduced to two types of operations: (i) feature-dimension aggregation and (ii) sample/batch-
dimension aggregation. To perform these two operations, FedV-SecGrad follows a two-phased secure aggre-
gation (2Phased-SA) process. Specifically, the feature dimension SA securely aggregates several batches of
training data that belong to different participants in feature-dimension to acquire the value of y(i)−x(i)w for
each data sample as illustrated in (3.5), while the sample dimension SA can securely aggregate one batch of
training data owned by one participant in sample-dimension with the weight of y(i)−x(i)w for each sample,
to obtain the batch gradient ∇EB(w). The communication between the participants and the coordinator is
a one-way interaction requiring a single message.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of the FedV-SecGrad protocol.
The active participant and all other passive participants perform slightly different pre-processing steps
before invoking FedV. The active participant pi appends a vector with labels y to obtain x
(i)
pi wpi − y before
encryption. In the case where the active participant does not have any feature data of its own but only labels,
it needs to flip the sign of the labels which serves as input to the FedV-SecGrad for the feature dimension
SA. For each passive participant pj , they only encrypt their x
(i)
pjwpj .
Figure 3.7 illustrates the proposed protocol for a simple case where only two participants with active
participant being p1 and passive participant being p2. Assume that the training batch size is b and that the
current training batch samples for p1 and p2 are Bb×mp1 and Bb×np2 :
Bb×mp1 Bb×np2
y(i+1)
...
y(i+b)


x
(i+1)
1 . . . x
(i+1)
m
...
. . .
...
x
(i+b)
1 . . . x
(i+b)
m


x
(i+1)
m+1 . . . x
(i+1)
m+n
...
. . .
...
x
(i+b)
m+1 . . . x
(i+b)
m+n

Feature dimension SA. The goal of feature dimension SA is to securely aggregate the sum of a group of inputs
from multiple participants without disclosing the inputs to the coordinator. Taking the (i+b)-th data sample
as an example, the coordinator is able to securely aggregate
∑m
k=1 wkx
(i+b)
k − y(i+b) +
∑m+n
k=m+1 wkx
(i+b)
k .
To perform this operation, the coordinator prepares an aggregation functionality vector vP (e.g., (1, 1)) and
sends it to the TPA to request a function key skMIFEvP .
Each participant pi encrypts each ‘partial model’ in the batch sample using the MIFE encryption algo-
rithm with its public key pki. Then, each pi sends the encrypted batch sample to the coordinator. With
the received key skMIFEvP , the coordinator can decrypt the collected set of encrypted batch samples. The
resulting decryption is the aggregated sum of the elements of wm×1p1 D
b×m
p1 − y1×b and wn×1p2 Db×np2 in the
feature dimension.
It is easy to extend the above protocol to a general case with k participants. In this case, the weight
vector vP can be set as an all-one vector (1, 1, ..., 1) with k elements indicating that the coordinator has
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received the replies from all participants and wants to weight all replies equally in the feature dimension
aggregation. In scenarios where only a subset of participants have replied, it is possible to securely aggregate
the results by adapting v, accordingly. We will discuss this case in more details later.
Sample dimension SA. The goal of the sample dimension SA is to securely aggregate the batch gradient. For
example, considering the first feature weight for data sample owned by p1, the coordinator is able to securely
aggregate ∇EB(w1) =
∑k=i+b
k=i+1 x
(k)
1 uk via sample dimension SA where u is the aggregation result of feature
dimension SA discussed above. This SA protocol requires the participant to encrypt its batch samples using
the SIFE cryptosystem with its public key pk, as shown in Figure 3.7. Then, the coordinator exploits the
results of the feature dimension SA, i.e., an element-related weight vector u to request a function key skSIFEu
from the TPA. With the function key skSIFEu , the coordinator is able to decrypt the ciphertext and acquire
the batch gradient EB(w).
Detailed execution of the FedV-SecGrad process: We now present in detail our federated vertical
secure gradient descent (FedV-SecGrad) approach. As shown in Algorithm 3 the general FedV which adopts
a mini-batch based SGD algorithm to train a ML model in VFL fashion. During the setup phase, the TPA
securely delivers the corresponding public keys to each participant pki and a common secret random seed
r for batch generation. Before the training phase starts, the coordinator sends each participant pi with
the permutation pipi generated by the private entity resolution approach described earlier. A permutation
vector allows the participant to shuffle its local dataset. At each training epoch, the FedV-SecGrad approach
specified in Procedure 4 is invoked in Line 6 of Algorithm 3. The coordinator queries the participants with a
current batch index si and the current model weights wpi with respect to the receiving participant pi. The
batch index allows the participants to subsample the local dataset using the pre-agreed batch generation
function ρ when encrypting the ‘partial model’. To reduce the data transfer and protect against inference
attacks4, the coordinator only sends each participant the weights that pertain to its features. We denote
these partial model weights as wpi .
For each mini-batch, each participant follows the feature-dimension and sample-dimension encryption
process shown in lines 13, 14, and 15 of Procedure 4, respectively. As a result, each participant local ‘partial
model’ is encrypted and the two ciphertexts, cfd, csd, are sent back to the coordinator. The coordinator waits
for a pre-defined amount of time for participant replies, denoted as two sets of corresponding ciphertexts
Scfd ,Scsd . Once this time has elapsed, it continues the training process by performing the following secure
aggregation steps. First, the feature dimension SA is performed. For this purpose, in line 4 vector vP
is initialized. This vector provides the weights for the inputs of each of the received replies and its norm
corresponds to the number of received replies. vP is sent to the TPA which returns the private keep to
perform the decryption; before this key is returned, the TPA verifies the suitability of the vector, more
details described later. The feature dimension SA is completed in line 6, where the MIFE based decryption
takes place resulting in u = (u1, ..., ub) which contains the aggregated weighted feature values of b batch
4In this type of attack, a participant may try to find out if its features are more important than those of other participants.
This can be easily inferred in linear models.
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Procedure 4: FedV-SecGrad.
1 .The n participants group P are indexed as pi; each participant pi with rearranged dataset Dpi , model
weights wpi , current batch index si and pre-agreed batch generate function ρ, has assigned public key pki
and random secret seed r from TPA; current model weights w := (wp1 ,wp2 , ...,wpm);
2 coordinator:
3 foreach pi ∈ P do Scfd ,Scsd ← query-party(wpi , si) ;
4 specify vP according to Scfd ;
5 skvP ← query-key-service(vP , EMIFE) ;
6 foreach cfd ∈ Scfd do u ← EFMCIPFE .DecskvP (cfd) .feature dimension SA ;
7 sku ← query-key-service(u, ESIFE);
8 foreach csd ∈ Scsd do ∇E
′
B(w)← EFSCIPFE .Decsku (csd) .sample dimension SA ;
9 ∇EB(w)← ∇E′B(w) + α∇R(w)
10 participant:
11 function query-party(wpi , si)
12 Bpi ← ρ(r, si,Dpi) .generate the batch in current training epoch;
13 if active pi then cfd ← EFMCIPFE .Encpkpi (wpiBpi − y) ;
14 else cfd ← EFMCIPFE .Encpkpi (wpiBpi) ;
15 csd ← EFSCIPFE .Encpk(Bpi) in sample dimension;
16 return (cfd, csd) to the coordinator;
17 TPA:
18 function query-key-service(v, E)
19 return skv ← EFE.SKGen(v);
samples. After that, the sample dimension SA takes place. The coordinator uses u as an aggregation vector
that is sent to the TPA to obtain a functional key skf,u . The TPA verifies the validity of vector u and returns
the key if appropriate. Finally, the aggregated model update ∇EB(w) is found in line 8 by performing a
SIFE decryption using skf,u .
Extending FedV to other machine learning models: We now briefly analyze how to apply FedV-
SecGrad approach on three classic machine learning models, and defer detailed analysis in Appendix C.
Logistic Regression. The minor modification of directly applying FedV-SecGrad in logistic model is either
sharing the labels with the coordinator or making the active participant play the role of the coordinator.
Suppose that the prediction function f(x;w) = 1
1+e−wᵀx can be written as g(w
ᵀx), where g(·) is the sigmoid
function, i.e., g(z) = 11+e−z . The gradient computation over a mini-batch B of size n can be described
as ∇EB(w) = 1n
∑
i∈B(g(w
(i)ᵀx(i))) − y(i))x(i). In our proposed FedV-SecGrad, the coordinator is able to
acquire w(i)ᵀx(i) following the feature dimension SA process. With the provided labels, it can then compute
u(i) = g(w(i)ᵀx(i)) − y(i). Finally, sample dimension SA is applied to compute ∇EB(w) =
∑
i∈B u
(i)x(i).
FedV-SecGrad also provide an alternative approach for the case of restricting label sharing, where the logistic
computation is transferred to linear computation via Taylor approximation as used existing VFL solutions
[83].
SVMs with Kernels. The prediction function can be presented as f(x;w) =
∑n
i=1 wiyik(xi,x), where k(·) is
the corresponding kernel function. As kernel functions, such as, linear kernel xᵀi xj , polynomial kernel (x
ᵀ
i xj)
d,
sigmoid kernel tanh(βxᵀi xj + θ) (β and θ are kernel coefficients), are based on inner-product computation
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Procedure 5: Inference Prevention Module
1 function IPM(v)
2 if exploited-vector-filter(v) then forward v to the TPA ;
3 else return “exploited vector” message ;
4 function exploited-vector-filter
5 cnz ← count the non-zero element in v;
6 if cnz < t then true;
7 else false;
which is supported by our feature dimension SA and sample dimension SA protocols, these kernel matrices
can be computed before the training process. Therefore FedV-SecGrad can securely compute the kernel
matrix first and then use it in the training process. The gradient computation process for all SVMs equipped
with the aforementioned kernel functions will be reduced to a gradient computation of a standard linear SVM,
which can clearly be supported by FedV-SecGrad.
Inference Prevention Module : The original inner-product based functional encryption schemes proposed
in [4, 5] do not consider the case of a curious decryption party who manipulates a specially constructed
vector to request the functional private key from the TPA, and hence it is possible to reveal one element
in the encrypted vector. Our FedV-SecGrad approach in FedV is much more complex than the simple
adoption of functional encryption cryptosystems. For instance, an honest-but-curious coordinator can send
a manipulated vector such as vexploited = (0, ..., 1, 0) to request function key to infer the second last element
in the input vector x because the inner-product 〈x,vexploited〉 is known to the coordinator. Another potential
attack to infer the second last element in x is to utilize two manipulated vectors such as we,1 = (1, 1, 1) and
we,2 = (1, 0, 1) in two training epochs, respectively. We add a IPM in the TPA to prevent the potential
partial private information leakage caused by inference attacks.
As presented in Procedure 5, IPM includes one filter, namely exploited vector filter, that checks the
validity of the querying vector used for generating the function derived key. Throughout the training phase,
the exploited vector filter will ensure that the non-zero element in the request is less than a threshold t. We
present the detailed analysis in Section 3.2.3.
Enabling Dynamic Participation in FedV . An important feature in FL systems is the ability to allow
participants dynamically to join in and drop out during the training phase. In VFL, a participant or the
coordinator may be absent in several application scenarios. Here, we discuss these variations in our proposed
FedV framework.
Our FedV supports the absence of the coordinator. In such a case, the active participant is able to play
the role of the coordinator. As the active participant could be curious, but assumed to not collude with other
malicious participants in the threat model described above, the privacy requirement of the active participant
is the same as that of the coordinator. A detailed security and privacy analysis will be presented in Section
3.2.3. In addition, the proposed FedV framework is also applicable to the dynamic group of participants.
In particular, it allows limited number of participants to join in and drop out during the FL training phase.
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Existing VFL frameworks rely on the peer-to-peer communications among the participants, which prevents
the drop-out behaviors of participants. In FedV, communication only occurs between the coordinator and the
participants, which makes the join-in and drop-out behaviors easy to manage, without affecting the existing
participants.
Generally, FedV can employ the coordinate descent (CD) algorithms (and its variations, block coordinate
descent (BCD) algorithms) [185] instead of the SGD to train the ML model. In particular, BCD algorithms
allow optimization of the objective function only over one segment (i.e., group of features) at each sub-
iteration, while keeping all the other feature segments fixed. Specifically, to train a target ML model, suppose
that it requires features Fd = (f1, ..., fd) that are owned by different participants. For each sub-iteration, the
FedV only needs one participant’s data including one feature or partial features in the CD/BCD training.
That means the rest of the participants are allowed to drop-out during the training process, and can re-join
to continue training when they are available. Unlike the VFL proposal in [83], such CD/BCD are achievable
in our FedV as our design does not rely on the peer-to-peer communications among the participants.
3.2.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
Security Analysis. The SA protocols are the critical components to build the FedV-SecGrad approach
in the FedV framework that supports the basis for the security and privacy guarantees. As illustrated in
Appendix A, we employ two types of functional encryption schemes, namely, SIFE and MIFE to construct
the SA protocols. In our implementation of SIFE [4] and MIFE [5], we add a public key distribution method
run by fully trusted TPA as a supplement of existing functional encryption schemes. Such additional method
is only responsible for distributing the public key for each participant. This, however, does not affect the
ordinal encryption and decryption constructions as compared to the originally schemes. Thus, for the formal
proof of security of adopted FE schemes we refer the readers to [4, 5].
Our FedV allows a limited number of colluding participants, but still provides the privacy guarantee
for the rest most honest participants. Here, we analyze the possible security concern related to a brute-
force attack where a limited number of colluding participants monitor/inspect the encrypted partial model
from other participants. With regards to the public-key setting in FedV, each participant has its respective
public key pkMIFE and they all have a common public key pkSIFE. Intuitively, such settings could enable
the colluding participants to infer the target encrypted data by iteratively encrypting its candidate partial
model and then checking the ciphertext with target encrypted model as all participants share a common
public key pkSIFE. The SIFE [4] has proved to be IND-CPA secure that indicates the encrypted models are
indistinguishable. For instance, for input data x, with the same public key pkSIFE, the encrypted ciphertexts
c1 = EpkSIFE(x), c2 = EpkSIFE(x), ..., cn = EpkSIFE(x) are indistinguishable even for the same input. Thus,
there is still a non-negligible advantage for the attackers by increasing the number of colluding participants
to brute-force the encrypted data from the honest participants. In summary, our proposed FedV is resist to
the inference attacks from the colluding participants.
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Privacy Analysis. Beside the security guarantee, we analyze extra privacy guarantee in FedV under the
threat model presented in Section 3.2.2. Briefly, in our threat model, the TPA is fully trusted, while the
coordinator could be honest-but-curious.
Here, we analyze the possible inference attacks. As honest-but-curious coordinator can launch two types
of inference attacks in our designed FedV framework: (i) sending exploited weight-related vector such as
wexploited = (0, ..., 1, 0) to request function key to infer the second last element in the input vector x as the
inner-product 〈x,wexploited〉 is known to the coordinator; (ii) storing the intermediate inner-product results
of each iteration to construct degree-1 multivariate polynomial equations, namely, solving Wxtarget = z to
infer target sample xtarget, where W = [w1, ...,wnepoch ] is constructed from the model weight of each epoch,
and z is collected from the inner-product of each epoch.
To prevent the inference attack (i), our proposed Inference Prevention Module is able to filter the
wexploited. Specifically, the filter module will check the vectorwexploited to ensure that the number of non-zero
elements is greater than a threshold τ , and hence the curious server cannot distinguish a specific element
of x among the weighted-sum of at least τ w. The inference attack (ii) is able to occur at both F-SA and
S-SA phase. To solve a system of linear multivariate equations, it requires the curious coordinator is able
to collect enough number of equations for a target training sample xtarget during the secure aggregation
phase. However, the coordinator has non-negligible advantage to distinguish the ciphertext of xtarget among
all encrypted training samples as illustrated as indistinguishability in [4, 5]. Different from existing solutions
where the coordinator is responsible for generating the permutations and encrypted mask in the phase of
privacy-preserving entity resolution, our proposed solution does not require the encrypted mask. In our
FedV, each training batch is generated by an agreed batch generation function ρ that relies on the input of a
secret random seed generated by a trusted independent entity such as TPA as illustrated in our framework.
Hence, the coordinator cannot learn the position of target xtarget in FedV for different training epochs due
to periodical shuffle operations. Furthermore, in the dynamic groups case, one training record only appears
in limited number of training epochs. As a result, the curious coordinator cannot collect enough number of
equations for a specific training record.
3.2.4 Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our proposed FedV framework, we compare with the following baselines:
(i) Contrasted baseline: we refer the contrasted baseline as the proposed VFL in [83]. Here, the underlying
ML need to be trained is the logistic regression model and the secure protocols are built on the additive
homomorphic encryption (HE). In addition, like most additive HE based privacy-preserving ML solutions,
the SGD and loss computation in [83] also relies on the Taylor series expansion to approximately compute
logistic function. (ii) Centralized baselines: we refer the centralized baselines as the training of different
ML models in centralized manner. The contrasted ML algorithms include: the logistic regression model,
the logistic regression model with Taylor approximation, the basic linear regression model in ordinary least
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Table 3.6: The number of required crypto-related communication for each iteration in the VFL.
Types Communication Entities [83] FedV
Secure Stochastic Gradient Descent
coordinator ↔ participants 2n n
participants ↔ participants 2(n− 1) 0
TOTAL 2(2n− 1) n
Secure Loss Computation
coordinator ↔ participants 2n n
participants ↔ participants n(n− 1)/2 0
TOTAL (n2 + 3n)/2 n
squares (OLS), the Support Vector Machine (SVM). Note that as the supported lasso regression and ridge
regression models are based on the OLS-based linear regression by adding the L1 and L2 regularization in
the cost function respectively. Such regularization module has no affect on the collaboration of participants
in the VFL, and hence, we do not report such results in the centralized baselines.
Before the experimental evaluation, we first theoretically evaluate the proposed FedV with contrasted
baseline that use additive HE as the underlying cryptosystem to construct the secure aggregation approach
to support secure SGD over the vertically partitioned dataset. A graphical overview and comparison of our
proposed FedV-SecGrad approach and existing additive HE approach is presented in Figure 3.5. Here, we
theoretically compare the number of crypto-related communication in our proposed FedV framework to the
contrasted approaches. Suppose that there are n participants and one coordinator in the VFL framework.
Note that here we did not consider the dynamic groups case in the FedV as the existing VFL does not
support such dynamic drop-out and join-in cases. As shown in Table 3.6, in total, FedV has reduced the
number of interactions in SGD phase from 4n − 2 to n, while reducing the number of interactions in loss
computation by an order of magnitude, from (n2−3n)/2 to n. The number of interactions during the secure
aggregation at the SGD phase of loss computation phase is linear to the number of participants in our FedV.
Experimental Setup. To evaluate the performance of the FedV, we train several popular ML models such
as linear regression, logistic regression, Taylor approximation based logistic regression, and SVM to classify
several publicly available datasets from UCI Machine Learning Repository. As depicted in Table 3.7, the
evaluated datasets include website phishing, ionosphere, landsat satellite (statlog), and optical recognition of
handwritten digits (optdigits). The number of attributes of those dataset cover from 10 to 64, while the total
number of sample instances is from 351 to 6435. The division of training set and test set is also presented
in Table 3.7. Please note that if the original problem of the studied dataset is multi-class then we convert it
into binary classification problem.
Implementation. We implement the contrasted VFL, our proposed FedV and several centralized baseline
ML models in Python. To achieve the integer group computation that is required by both the additive
homomorphic encryption and the functional encryption, we employ the gmpy2 library that is a C-coded
Python extension module that supports multiple-precision arithmetic, where the underlying performance-
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Table 3.7: Dataset description in the experimental evaluation.
Dataset Attributes Total Samples Training Test
Phishing 10 1353 1120 233
Ionosphere 34 351 288 63
Statlog 36 6435 4432 2003
OptDigits 64 5620 3808 1812
intensive arithmetic operations are implemented in native C modules such as the GMP library. We implement
the Paillier cryptosystem as the construction of additive HE scheme that is same to the scheme used in [83],
and the constructions of MIFE and SIFE are from [4, 5], respectively.
As those constructions do not provide the solution to address the discrete logarithm problem in the
decryption phases, which is a performance intensive computation, we use the same approach as mentioned in
Section 3.1, where a hybrid approach is employed. Specifically, to compute the f in h = gf , we setup a hash
table Th,g,b to store (h, f) with a specified g and a bound b, where −b ≤ f ≤ b, when the system initializes.
When computing discrete logarithms, the algorithm first looks up Th,g,b to find f , where the complexity is
O(1). If there is no result in Th,g,b, the algorithm employs the traditional baby-step giant-step algorithm
[161] to compute f , where the complexity is O(n 12 ).
Experimental Environment. All the experiments are performed on a 2.3 GHz 8-Core Intel Core i9
platform with 32 GB of RAM. Note that both the contrasted VFL and our FedV frameworks are distributed
by multiple processes, where each process represents a participant. The participants and the coordinator
communicate over local socket (not run on the real distributed environment for real network), hence the
network latency is not measured in our experiment.
Experimental Results. As the contrasted baseline [83] only supports two participants to train a logistic
regression model, we first present the comparison results in the setting of two participants, and then we
explore the performance of FedV using different machine learning models. In last, we study the impact of
varying number of participants in FedV.
Comparison to Contrasted Approach. We first compare the performance of FedV to existing contrasted
baseline [83] and centralized baselines, i.e., the non-FL logistic regression model and logistic regression with
Taylor approximation over four selected datasets.
As the underlying logistic regression is a non-linear model, we implement two types of FedV : normal
FedV and approximation FedV according to our proposed approaches, where approximation FedV is the
implementation applying our FedV-SecGrad to address the approximated logistical regression that is same
to the contrasted baseline but use different secure aggregation approaches. The normal FedV is the im-
plementation applying our FedV-SecGrad to address the secure aggregation directly. Accordingly, we also
implement a non-FL centralized logistic regression in approximation setting.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of model accuracy and training time in LR model in two-participant setting.
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Figure 3.9: Decomposition of training time in FedV and contrasted VFL baseline.
In Figure 3.8 we present the test accuracy and training time of each contrasted approach for different
datasets. Results show that both of our approximation FedV and normal FedV can achieve the comparable
test accuracy to the contrasted baseline [83] and the centralized non-FL baselines for all four datasets.
Regarding training time, our implemented approximation FedV and normal FedV efficiently reduce the
training time by 10% to 70% for the studied datasets when training for 360 iterations. For instance, as
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of the size of total data transmitted of training LR model over various datasets.
depicted in Figure 3.8, our FedV can reduce around 70% training time for ionosphere dataset while just
reducing around 10% training time for sat dataset. The variation in training time reduction among different
datasets is caused by the dataset distribution and model convergence speed.
Furthermore, we decompose the training time of LR model over ionosphere dataset in FedV and the
contrasted VFL baseline to show the exact reason of the training time reduction. As shown in Figure 3.9,
compared to the contrasted VFL baseline, FedV does not rely on two phase communications for secure
gradient computation. Note that in the legend, “C” represents the coordinator, while “P1” and “P2”
denotes the active participant and the passive participant, respectively. Besides, the process time of phase
1 of coordinator and phase 2 of each participant is significantly higher than our FedV.
We also compare and decompose the size of total data transmitted of LR model over various datasets
in FedV and the contrasted VFL baseline. As shown in Figure 3.10, compared to the contrasted VFL
baseline, FedV can reduce the size of total data transmitted by 80% to 90%, because FedV only relies on
designed non-interactive secure aggregation protocols and does not need the frequent communications used
in contrasted VFL baseline.
Performance of FedV over Different ML Models and Impact of Number of Participants. We explore the
performance of FedV using different popular machine learning models, i.e., the OLS-based linear regression,
support vector machine, logistic regression, and also compare with the contrasted centralized baselines -
non-FL machine learning models. The first row of Figure 3.11 reports the test accuracy while second row of
Figure 3.11 shows the training time for 360 training iterations. In general, our proposed FedV can achieve
the comparable test accuracy for all machine learning models for all the studied datasets, even though the
rates of convergence are different for different datasets. Our FedV-SecGrad is based on cryptosystems that
computes over integers instead of floating-point number, so FedV will lose portion of fractional part of a
floating-point number. As shown in Figure 3.11, our FedV is able to achieve comparable training time to
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Figure 3.11: Performance of FedV over various ML models and the comparison.
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Figure 3.12: Impact of number of participants on the performance of the FedV framework.
the corresponding non-FL machine learning models. We also explore the impact of number of participants
in FedV. Figure 3.12 reports the experimental results of FedV under multiple participants setting (i.e., from
2 participants to 15 participants) over the OptDigits dataset. Note that the contrasted baseline [83] does
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not support more than two participants, and hence we cannot report its performance here. Each of the test
setting has a random initialization model weight. As reported in Figure 3.12, the number of participants does
not impact the model accuracy, finally, all test cases reach the 100% accuracy. Note that the result is based
on the evaluation on OptDigits dataset with FedV Logistic Regression model. Besides, the training time is
linear to the number of participants, and is still very efficient. As reported in Figure 3.8, the training time
of FedV in logistic reugression model is very close to the normal non-FL logistic regression. For instance,
for 100 iterations, the training time of FedV with 14 participants is around 10 seconds, while the normal
non-FL logistic regression training is about 9.5 seconds.
3.3 Summary and Discussion
FL promises to address privacy concerns and regulatory compliance. However, extant approaches ad-
dressing privacy concerns in FL provide strong privacy guarantees and good model performance at the cost
of higher training time and high network transmission. We propose HybridAlpha, a novel federated learning
framework to address these issues. Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that, compared to ex-
isting techniques, on average, HybridAlpha can reduce the training time by 68% and data transfer volume
by 92% without sacrificing privacy guarantees or model performance. Using HybridAlpha, FL can be applied
to use cases sensitive to training time and communication overhead, in particular for models with a large
number of parameters. Most of existing PPFL frameworks only focus on the case of horizontally partitioned
data, while few vertical FL solutions just work on a specific machine learning model and suffer from inefficient
secure computation and training time. To address the challenges, we proposed FedV an efficient and vertical
PPFL framework built based on a two-phase secure aggregation approach that makes use of functional en-
cryption schemes. FedV can be used to train a variety of ML models without any approximation including
linear models, logistic regression, SVMs among others. Importantly, FedV removes the need of peer-to-peer
communications among participants reducing substantially the training time and making it applicable for
applications where participants cannot connect with each other. Our experiments show reduction of 10%-
70% of training time and 80%-90% transmitted data size with respect to the state-of-the art approaches.
FedV is first VFL framework to support dynamic participants that may be unable to sustain connection
throughout the training process, a challenge characteristic of FL. It allows a subset of participants to drop
off and rejoin the training process without requiring expensive re-keying operations or affecting the training
process.
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4.0 Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Networks using Secure Computing
Deep neural networks (DNN), also known as deep learning (DL), have been increasingly used in many
fields such as computer vision, natural language processing, speech/audio recognition, etc. With increasing
availability of huge amounts of training data and devices with increased computing power, they are becoming
more practical for use in ML based applications. Such DNNs usually consist of two phases: the training
phase and the inference phase. In the training phase, a well-designed DNN is provided as input a training
dataset and an appropriate optimization algorithm to generate optimal parameters; then, in the inference
phase, the generated model (i.e., optimal parameters) is used for inference tasks, namely, predicting a label
for a specific input sample.
In DNN-enabled applications, one of the critically needed components is a powerful computing infras-
tructure with powerful CPU and GPU, larger memory storage, etc. Existing commercial AI service providers
such as Google, Microsoft, and IBM have devoted significant efforts toward building infrastructure as a ser-
vice (IaaS) platforms for clients that do not have such powerful computing devices. The clients can employ
these AI related IaaS to manage and train their models and provide prediction services to their customers.
The size of the available training dataset is another critical issue. In particular, the performance of a
DNN system heavily relies on the availability of a large volume of training data. However, in many scenarios,
training data used by a DNN may contain privacy-sensitive information. Recent data breach incidents have
increased the privacy concerns related to large-scale collection and use of personal data [150, 176]. Moreover,
recent regulations such as European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), California Consumer
Privacy Act, Cybersecurity Law of China, etc., restrict the availability and use of privacy sensitive data.
Such privacy concerns of users and requirements imposed by regulations pose a significant challenge for the
deployment of DNN solutions.
To balance the privacy concerns and regulatory issues mentioned above, with that of the need of large
volumes of training data, several approaches have been proposed in the literature for building privacy-
preserving ML (PPML) solutions. These approaches include: (i) applying privacy-preserving mechanisms
such as differential privacy to limit the disclosure of private information before outsourcing a dataset to a
third party to train a DNN model [1]; (ii) employing new DNN architectures such as federated learning (FL)
where each participant trains a model locally and exchanges only the model parameters with the coordinating
server [166]; and (iii) utilizing existing general secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques or other
encryption schemes (e.g., homomorphic encryption) to build appropriate security protocols to protect the
input training data while training a DNN model [128, 151, 73, 129, 191].
In Table 4.1, we summarize existing representative privacy-preserving approaches used by DNN models.
Existing solutions such as a FL approach and those based on differential privacy cannot provide strong
privacy guarantees because of inference attacks, as demonstrated in the literature [66, 167, 131]. The general
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Table 4.1: Comparison of representative privacy-preserving approaches in deep learning
Proposal Training Prediction Privacy . Multi-Source † Technique
[166] 3 7 # - Federated Setting ∗
[1] 3 7 # - Differential Privacy
[128] - 3 H# 7 Customized SMC (GC)‡
[151] - 3 H# 7 General SMC (GC)
[73, 86, 31, 92] 7 3  7 Homomorphic Encryption
[129] 3 3  7 Homomorphic Encryption
CryptoNN (our work) [191] 3 3  - Functional Encryption
NN-EMD (our work) 3 3  3 Hybrid Functional Encryption
. The column denotes privacy guarantee degree such as mild approach # (e.g. differential privacy) and strong guarantee  
(e.g. confidentiality level privacy guarantee).
† The minus symbol indicates the approach supports multiple data sources to some extent.
‡ The data owner trains the model by itself and outsources partial computation in a privacy-preserving setting.
∗ The model is trained in a federated manner where each data owner trains a partial model on their private data.
SMC(garbled circuits based) approaches, such as those proposed in [128, 151], have a limitation with regards
to large volumes of encrypted data that need to be transferred during the execution of the associated secure
protocols. Except for the recently proposed solutions in [191, 129], most of these SMC approaches only
address privacy issues in the inference phase rather than in the training phase; this is mainly due to the
efficiency challenges related to both computation and communication.
Furthermore, none of the existing solutions for privacy-preserving training of a DNN consider the fact that
training data may be coming from multiple data sources partitioned horizontally or vertically. The training
dataset may have different composition cases; it may include data from multiple data sources, where:
(i) Each data source provides a dataset that includes all the features;
(ii) Each source provides a dataset that has only a subset of the required features; but, collectively these
datasets cover the complete set of features;
(iii) It is a hybrid of (i) and (ii).
Even though existing privacy-preserving solutions such as CryptoNN [191] support case (i), cases (ii) and
(iii) still pose a huge challenge.
In this chapter, we propose a framework to train a Neural Network over Encrypted Multi-sourced Datasets
(NN-EMD). That is, NN-EMD trains a DNN using a dataset that is composed of independently encrypted
datasets from many different sources. Each data source may provide its encrypted data that may include a
complete set of features or only a subset of features.
The goal here is to provide a strong privacy guarantee, while training a DNN model in a more efficient
way as compared to the most recently proposed solutions, namely, those in [191, 129]. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first efficient and more practical approach for training a DNN over a set of
encrypted/private datasets.
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4.1 NN-EMD: Training Neural Networks using Encrypted Multi-Sourced Datasets
4.1.1 Background and Motivation
As mentioned earlier, training DNNs requires a large volume data that may have privacy sensitive data
and significant computational resources. An entity that aims to employ a DNN-based solution may not
have both. For instance, DNN for breast cancer screening can provide much more effective, efficient, and
patient-centric breast cancer screening support than ever before [44]. However, some small clinics may not
be able to train a breast cancer screening AI model based on their collected patients’ healthcare records
because of lack of adequate computing power and ML expertise. So, as an alternative, they can use a
commercial cloud service that can provide the required computational infrastructure or DNN models; but
such outsourced computation is not desirable without employing appropriate privacy-preserving techniques
that can guarantee users’ or regulatory privacy protection requirements.
In this section, we focus on a privacy-preserving DNN (PPDNN) approach that uses a client-server archi-
tecture with two parties: (i) the cloud service provider (server) with powerful computational infrastructure
that can be employed for training a DNN model; and (ii) a client pool (data sources) that have privacy-
sensitive datasets and need to build a DNN model based on these training datasets without leaking private
information.
Such a PPDNN approach needs novel secure computation protocols to support efficient computation
and interactions between a pool of clients and a server, while offering strong privacy guarantees. Existing
general SMC solutions (i.e., garbled circuits) have limitations because they need to perform several rounds
of communication involving transmission of large volumes of intermediate data. Using these techniques for
DNN is cost prohibitive because of huge volumes of training data needed. Cryptography-based solutions
(e.g., homomorphic encryption-based SMC) also have computational efficiency problems.
To the best of our knowledge, the approach proposed by Bost et al. in [27] is the initial work that sup-
ports both training and predictive analysis over encrypted data. Their approach achieves this by integrating
several crypto schemes (i.e., Quadratic Residuosity cryptosystem, Paillier cryptosystem, and homomorphic
encryption) with secure protocols designed for them. However, it only supports limited types of basic ML
models such as na¨ıve bayes, decision trees and support vector machines, but not DNN. Most recently, ap-
proaches proposed by Nandakumar et al. in [129], and Xu et al. in [191] are the only ones that support
training DNN over encrypted data; their approaches use homomorphic and functional encryption, respec-
tively. Insight from these two approaches indicate that the crypto-based secure computing techniques are
promising for the training phase of a DNN model. However, there are two key challenges toward achieving
effective and efficient training of DNNs over encrypted datasets that we address in this paper:
• Efficiency of Training Process. The existing secure computing protocols are not efficient, as mentioned
above. For instance, with optimized approaches (e.g., multiple threads, training data distillation) in [129],
59
Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed NN-EMD framework.
training time for one mini-batch, with 60 samples, is around 40 minutes. This indicates that training
time in the case of a larger volume of training data will be significantly higher.
• Multiple Data Sources. There is a lack of consideration of real complex training data composed of
horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets coming from multiple data sources. Meanwhile, the
training techniques also provide strong confidentiality-level privacy guarantees.
4.1.2 Overview of NN-EMD
In NN-EMD, we have the following three roles/entities: a client pool, a server, and a trusted third-party
authority (TPA):
• A client pool of multiple data sources that collaboratively contribute to the final training dataset com-
posed of horizontally and vertically partitioned data, or a hybrid mix of the two. Each data source still
keeps its data confidential from the rest.
• A server responsible for training a DNN over a training dataset composed of multiple private datasets.
• A trusted TPA that initializes the underlying cryptosystems by setting secret credentials. Then, it
distributes the associated public keys to data sources in the client pool and the server, and provides
private key service to the server during the training phase. Note that it is not necessary for a TPA to
acquire/access any (encrypted) training data.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the NN-EMD framework. Before training a model , the server collects the meta
information about the training datasets from the client pool and then client pool coordinates the privacy-
preserving entity resolution task with each data source if the final training dataset is a vertical composition
of datasets from sources in the client pool. We assume that for each data sample, there exists at least one
data source having the label and only one data source’s labels are enrolled in the training phase. Meanwhile,
all the clients in the client pool and the server acquire associated cryptographic keys from the TPA. Then,
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of secure two-party computation approaches between the client pool and the server.
each data source in the client pool pre-processes its data as required by the framework and outsources
the encrypted data to the server. The server starts to train the model by setting up the proper training
hyperparameters, e.g., learning rate, number of iterations, and the total number of data sources, etc.
4.1.3 Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that there exists a trusted TPA. This TPA is an independent third-party that is trusted by all
the data sources in a client pool and the server. Note that it is also a common assumption in cryptosystems
such as those proposed in [25, 23, 77]. The role of a trusted TPA is similar to the role of a trusted certificate
authority in existing public key infrastructures. In this paper, we consider the following threat model:
(i) Honest-but-curious Server ; which is a common assumption in most of the existing approaches ([22,
191, 129]). Here, the server follows the instructions of a protocol or algorithm, but may try to learn private
information by inspecting the collected encrypted dataset and decrypted functional results during the training
phase.
(ii) Curious and Colluding Data Sources: In a client pool, some of curious data sources may try to collude to
infer private information of other non-colluding data sources by inspecting their outsourced encrypted data.
4.1.4 Secure Computation Approaches
Here, we present our proposed privacy-preserving secure computation approach between a server and a
client pool (data sources). To be specific, we propose two secure computation protocols, namely, secure two-
party horizontally partitioned computation protocol (S2PHC, see Figure 4.3) and secure two-party vertically
partitioned computation protocol (S2PVC, see Figure 4.4).
Note that arrows indicate assignment operation, while the equal sign is a comparison operation. Both
the protocols are non-interactive secure two-party computation protocols, where there are no interactions
between the server and the client pool ; i.e., they have only one-way communication between them.
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Secure Two-party Horizontally Partitioned Computation Protocol
Initialization and Key Services
⇒ TPA initializes the system as follows:
- initializes the single-input FEIP cryptosystem by generating a common public key and master private key, pkSCIP,com,mskSCIP ←
EFSCIPFE .Setup(1λ, 1η) by giving parameters λ and η, where λ is the security parameter indicating the bit length of security credentials,
while η denotes the maximum length of all possible input vectors of the inner-product function fSIIP during the execution phase of the
protocol.
- initializes a private authenticated channel with the server and the client pool, respectively.
- delivers the public key pkSCIP,com and the parameter η to both parties, namely, client pool and server.
⇒ TPA provides key services as follows:
- receives a functional private key request, and w from the server.
- checks the w to prevent potential inference attack by making sure |w| ≤ η and non-zero elements of w is less than the threshold τ using
the weights filter module .
- executes private key generation algorithm to generate private key skSCIP,w ← EFSCIPFE .KeyGen(msk,w), and sends back the key via
the private authenticated channel.
Party: Client Pool ⇒ all data sources in the client pool agree on an encoding precision client. For each data source dk ∈ {d1, ..., dl} in the
client pool, each client in the pool executes the following steps:
- receives the public key pkcom and η from the TPA and verifies the validity of pkcom.
- encodes elements in data from floating-point format X fp into integer format X int with encoding precision client.
- counts the shape of the length of X int → (sdk .r, sdk .c), and checks sdk .c ≤ η.
- for each row xi of X int, calls SCIP encryption algorithm ctxi,dk ← EFSCIPFE .Enc(pkcom,xi).
- if any above operations (assertion, verification, encoding, encryption) fails, abort.
- sends all ciphertexts {ctx1,dk , ..., ctxl,dk} and parameters client, (sdk .r, sdk .c) to the server.
Party: Server ⇒ the server executes the following steps:
- receives the public key pkSCIP,com and η from the TPA and verifies the validity of pkSCIP,com.
- collects ciphertexts ct← {ctx1,dk , ..., ctxl,dk} and parameters client, {(sdk .r, sdk .c)} from the client party.
- sets up the encoding precision server, and encodes each element in input weights from floating-point format W fp into integer format
W int.
- counts the shape of W int → (sserver.r, sserver.c), and checks ∀i, j, sclient.c← sdi .c = sdj .c and sserver.r = sclient.c ∧ sserver.r ≤ η.
- for each column wi of W int, sends a function private key request to the TPA, and collects the received private keys sk ←
{skfSIIP,w1 , ..., skfSIIP,wm} with verification.
- if all above operations (assertion, verification, encoding, encryption) fails, abort.
- initializes a matrix Z with shape (|ct|, |sk|), and for each i ∈ {1, ..., |ct|} and j ∈ {1, ..., |sk|}, calls decryption algorithm wi,j ←
EFSCIPFE .Dec(pkSCIP,com, ct[i], sk[j],wj).
- decodes each element in Z from integer format into floating-point format using server and client.
1
Figure 4.3: Description of secure two-party horizontally partitioned computation protocol.
The difference between the two secure computation protocols is mainly with regards to how the input
datasets from client pool are composed. Suppose that there is a secure computation task such as a matrix
multiplication X l×mWm×l between the client pool and the server, where the client pool has the matrix
X l×m that is composed of data from different data sources {dk} and the server has Wm×l. As shown in
Figure 4.2, X l×m represents horizontal or vertical composition of data from multiple sources.
Secure Two-party Horizontally Partitioned Computation Protocol. We present the detailed de-
scription of the S2PHC protocol in Figure 4.3. The protocol is built from the single-input functional encryp-
tion scheme. Here, we suppose that each data source in the client pool has the same column length related
to X as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that the S2PHC protocol can be considered as an improvement
of the secure matrix computation approach proposed in [191] where the possibility of multiple horizontal
data sources had been mentioned, but no theoretical analysis and practical implementation were presented.
Unlike in [191], we present specific practical construction in our protocol with the experimental evaluation
62
Secure Two-party Vertically Partitioned Computation Protocol
Initialization and Key Services
⇒ TPA initializes the system as follows:
- initializes the multi-input FEIP crypto schemes by generating a common public key, master public key and private key
pkMCIP,com,mpkMCIP,mskMCIP ← EFMCIPFE .Setup(1λ,~η, n) by giving parameters λ and (~η, n), where (~η, n) indicates the allowed n max-
imum number of data sources where each data source has maximum input length represented as ~η, during the computation execution
of fMCIP.
- assigns a identity iddk for each registered data source dk in the client pool.
- initializes a private authenticated channel with the server and the data sources, respectively.
- delivers dk-associated pkMCIP,iddk ← E
FMCIP
FE .PK(mpkMCIP,mskMCIP, iddk ), ηiddk ← ~η and the common public key pkMCIP,com to each
data source iddk , respectively.
- delivers the common public key pkMCIP,com,~η, n to the server.
⇒ TPA provides key services:
- receives the request w from the server.
- checks w to prevent potential inference attack by checking that non-zero elements of w is less than the threshold τ using weights filter
module.
- generates private key skMCIP,w ← EFMCIPFE .SK(mpkMCIP,mskMCIP,w), and sends back the key via the private authenticated channel.
Party: Client Pool ⇒ all data sources agree on an encoding precision client. For each data source dk ∈ {d1, ..., dm} in the client pool, each
client executes the following steps:
- receives the public key pkMCIP,com, pkMCIP,iduk and ηiduk from the TPA and verifies the validity of pkMCIP,com and pkMCIP,iduk .
- encodes elements in data from floating-point format X fp into integer format X int with encoding precision client.
- counts the shape of the length of X int → (sdk .r, sdk .c), and checks sdk .c ≤ ηiduk .
- for each row xi of X int, calls MCIP encryption ctxi,dk ← EFMCIPFE .E(pkcom,xi).
- if any above operations (assertion, verification, encoding, encryption) fails, abort.
- sends all ciphertexts {ctx1,dk , ..., ctxl,dk} and parameters client, (sdk .r, sdk .c) to the server.
Party: Server ⇒ the server executes the following steps:
- receives the public key pkMCIP,com,~η, n from the TPA and verifies the validity of pkMCIP,com.
- collects the ciphertexts ct← {{ctxi,d1}, ..., {ctxi,dm}} and parameters client, {(sdk .r, sdk .c)} from the client pool.
- sets up the encoding precision server and encodes each element in input weights from floating-point number W fp into integer number
W int.
- counts the shape of W int → (sserver.r, sserver.c), and checks ∀i, j, sdi .r = sdj .r and sserver.r =
∑
sdi .c ∧ sserver.r ≤
∑
~η ∧ |ct| < n.
- for each column wi of W int, sends a function private key request to the TPA, and collects the received keys sk ←
{skfMCIP,w1 , ..., skfMCIP,wm} with verification.
- if all above operations (assertion, verification, encoding, encryption) fails, abort.
- re-organizes ct → ct′ by aggregating by ct index.
- initializes a matrix Z with |ct′ | rows and |sk| columns, and for each i ∈ {1, ..., |ct′ |} and j ∈ {1, ..., |sk|}, and calls decryption algorithm
wi,j ← EFMCIPFE .D(pkcom, ct[i], sk[j],wj).
- decodes each element in Z from integer format into float point format using server and client.
1
Figure 4.4: Description of secure two-party vertically partitioned computation protocol.
in Section 4.3.
Secure Two-party Vertically Partitioned Computation Protocol. Figure 4.4 shows the details of
the S2PVC protocol. As for the S2PHC protocol, here, we assume that each data source from the client
pool has the same row length with regards to X . The S2PVC protocol is constructed using the multi-input
functional encryption scheme as the key underlying scheme.
4.1.5 NN-EMD Training
Here, we present the details of our proposed NN-EMD framework. As mentioned above, NN-EMD
mainly includes two parties: the server and the client pool, and they use S2PHC and S2PVC protocols.
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Algorithm 6: NN-EMD Training Algorithm
Input: secure parameter 1λ, functionality parameters (η,~η, n), data sources Sd = {dk}, each data source dk has
dataset Xdk .
Output: trained model W
1 initialize S2PHC protocol by setting (1λ, η) and S2PVC protocol by setting (1λ,~η, n);
2 pbatch, Tdk ←exchange meta-information of {Xdk} ;
3 party client pre-process({Xdk , pbatch, pTXdk })
4 foreach dk ∈ Sdk do
5 if Tdk=Tf then
6 foreach mini batch Xdk,batch ∈Xdk do
7 Sctff ← S2PHC(dk,Xdk,batch), Sctbp ← S2PHC(dk,Xᵀdk,batch);
8 else
9 start entity resolution with shuffle;
10 foreach mini batch Xdk,batch ∈Xdk do
11 Sctff ← S2PVC(dk,Xdk,batch) Sctbp ← S2PHC(dk,Xᵀdk,batch);
12 sends Sctff , Sctbp , Tdk and Y if dk has the label;
13 party server training({Sctff , Sctbp , Tdk ,Y })
14 W ← initialize model weights;
15 foreach iteration do
16 foreach mini batch ctff ∈ Sctff , ctbp ∈ Sctbp do
17 if Tdk=Tp then A1 ← S2PVC(server, ctff);
18 else A1 ← S2PHC(server, ctff,W 1);
19 A ← feed-forward(A1,W );
20 ∇2,...,l,σ ← gradient compute( Y ,W ,A);
21 ∇1 ← S2PHC(server, ctbp,σ);
22 W ←W − α∇;
23 return W
The NN-EMD training includes three types: (i) horizontal partitioning based training (HPT), (ii) vertical
partitioning based training (VPT), and (iii) hybrid partitioning based training (HybridPT).
Suppose that there exists data sources Sd={d1, ..., dm}, where each data source dk ∈ Sd has dataset Xdk .
The goal of the NN-EMD framework is to train a DNN model based on the dataset X that is composed of
{Xd1 , ...,Xdm} without leakingX to the server, and without disclosingXdi to dj where di, dj ∈ Sd∧di 6= dj .
Such an assumption is common in existing vertical ML related literature, and also indicates there is no
overlapping features among those data sources except for the identity feature used for the privacy-preserving
entity resolution.
Algorithm 6 illustrates how our proposed S2PHC and S2PVC protocols are integrated in the training
process of a DNN model. First, we initialize S2PHC and S2PVC protocols with proper security parameter
1λ and function parameters (η,~η, n) as defined in Section 4.1.4. Then, the server acquires the basic meta-
information of the training dataset from each source from the client pool, and decides several training
hyperparameters such as proper mini-batch size pbatch and dataset type Tdk shared with each data source
(lines 1-3). Here, we define dataset types: Tf and Tp to indicate a dataset with full or partial set of features,
respectively.
According to different compositions of final training data X , we propose three different training ap-
proaches: training over horizontally partitioned data, training over vertically partitioned data, and training
over hybrid partitioned data.
HPT. This approach deals with the case where each data source’s dataset has full set of features needed
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in the training. That is, X is horizontally composed of {Xd1 , ...,Xdm}. In this case, each data source first
divides its local dataset into several mini-batches according to the received batch parameter. Then, for each
mini-batch, the data source executes S2PHC protocol twice with input mini-batchXdk,batch and its transpose
Xᵀdk,batch, respectively. The generated ciphertexts Sctff and Sctbp are used in feed-forward computation and
back-propagation computation in the training phase, respectively.
On the server side, weights are randomly initialized for the model. For each mini-batch iteration, S2PHC
protocol is executed with Sctff to support secure computation that occurs between the input layer and the
first hidden layer (line 25). As the output is in plaintext, the normal feed-forward operations can be continued
as in a normal DNN training phase. In the back-propagation phase, the normal gradient computation can
be done first from the last layer. When it comes to the first layer, the server executes the S2PHC protocol
with different ciphertext, namely, Sctbp . Finally, the weights are updated using the learning rate and current
gradients.
VPT. This approach is for the case where each data source’s dataset has a subset of features, however,
these partial features collected from all the sources form the complete set of features; i.e., X is vertically
composed of {Xd1 , ...,Xdm}. Note that we assume that eachXdk has an identity column so that the privacy-
preserving entity resolution mechanism can be executed; there is no overlapping features that will be used
in the training. In this case, each data source starts with a privacy-preserving entity resolution mechanism
with the server that plays the role of a coordinator, similar to those in other approaches such as in [159, 89].
Here, each data source sends the encoded identical features to the server for entity matching. Then, the
server generates a proper permutation for each data source to re-order its local data. As a result, a data
source does not know which entity in its dataset has been enrolled in the training; and the server still cannot
learn the training dataset. As entity resolution is not the core contribution in our framework, we refer the
reader to [89] for more details on that.
Here, each data source generates Sctff by executing the S2PVC with input Xdk,batch, while generating
Sctbp by executing S2PHC with input X
ᵀ
dk,batch
. The server acquires the output of the first hidden layer by
executing the S2PVC protocol with corresponding Sctff .
HybridPT. Our NN-EMD framework can also be applied to the hybrid case where X is composed of the
data from multiple data sources using a mix of horizontal and vertical compositions. Algorithm 6 is for
processing the hybrid training case by integrating a HPT approach with a VPT approach.
Comparison with Existing Solutions. Here we briefly compare our NN-EMD framework with CryptoNN
[191] and the one in [129]. CryptoNN is actually a special instance of our NN-EMD framework in the HPT
setting. Unlike those in [191] [129], NN-EMD does not protect the label information in the training dataset.
Actually, the encrypted label information in CryptoNN framework can be easily inferred, while the design
of encrypting label in [129] is required by the adoption of underlying homomorphic encryption. We argue
that NN-EMD satisfies the privacy requirements even though the label is exposed to the server ; we analyze
this in Section 4.2. In [129], all the outputs of each layer are still in ciphertext form. The output of the first
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hidden layer in NN-EMD is in plaintext; because of which the training time does not increase as in [129].
Note that we do not present the inference phase of the DNN model since the inference can be viewed as
one iteration of feed-forward computation in the training phase, as shown in Algorithm 6.
4.2 Security and Privacy Analysis
4.2.1 Security of Underlying Cryptosystems
S2PHC and S2PVC protocols are critical components of the NN-EMD framework that provides the
basis for privacy guarantees. As presented in Appendix A, we add protocols to deliver the public keys and
private keys generated by the TPA on the originally proposed constructions of single-input and multi-input
functional encryption schemes that we adopt for our proposed scheme.
For the formal proof of security of adopted functional encryption schemes we refer the readers to [4, 5].
In our adoption of these schemes, the added public key distribution and private key delivery methods are
managed by the TPA. This, however, does not affect the ordinal encryption and decryption constructions as
compared to the originally proposed schemes.
Colluding Data Sources. With regards to the public-key setting in our framework with multiple data
sources, each data source has its respective public key pkMI-FEIP and they all have a common public key
pkSI-FEIP. Here, we analyze the possible security concern related to a brute-force attack where a colluding
data source monitors or inspects the encrypted outsourced datasets from other data sources/clients. Intu-
itively, such settings could enable the colluding data source in the client pool to infer the target encrypted
data by iteratively encrypting its candidate data and then checking the ciphertext with target encrypted data
as all sources share a common public key pkSI-FEIP. However, the underlying SI-FEIP scheme can prevent
such an attack by introducing a random initialization factor in the encryption algorithm. The encryption
algorithm will generate different ciphertext even for the same input when invoked by the secure computation
protocols. For instance, for input data x, with the same public key pkSI-FEIP, the encrypted ciphertexts
c1 = EpkSI-FEIP(x), c2 = EpkSI-FEIP(x), ..., cn = EpkSI-FEIP(x) are indistinguishable. That ciphertext indistin-
guishability is guaranteed by the IND-CPA security of SI-FEIP [4]. Thus, there is still a non-negligible
advantage for the attackers by increasing the number of colluding data sources to brute-force the encrypted
data from the non-colluding data source [4]. As a result, our framework can resist such a brute-force attack
by the colluding data sources.
As mentioned earlier, the labels in our framework is not protected. We argue that such a design does
not disclose the private information of the training data. Essentially, in the binary classification task,
the label is encoded into meaningless value such as using {1,-1} to represent positive and negative labels
rather than using a meaningful/concrete label such as “this x-ray image represents cancer”. The server
can only learn group information of the encrypted data such as the information that EFE(X y=1) belongs
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to label y = 1, but the server cannot learn X y=1, as it is protected by the cryptosystems, and what
y = 1 means. The server is also not able to launch the enrollment inference attack where the curious
server tries to infer whether a target data is enrolled in the training or not, because the training data is
encrypted via functional encryption. In particular, the adopted FE schemes have the IND-CPA security
guarantee, where the ciphertexts ci = EpkSI-FEIP(x), cj = EpkSI-FEIP(x) of the same data x is indistinguishable
[4]. Let us suppose the target of enrollment inference attack is xtarget. The data source encrypt xtarget to
ctarget = EpkSI-FEIP(xtarget). Even though the server has the original data xtarget, it is not able to infer whether
xtarget is in the training dataset nor not, because the generated ciphertext of cserver = EpkSI-FEIP(xtarget) by
the server is indistinguishable from the ciphertext ctarget.
4.2.2 Privacy Analysis
NN-EMD also ensures the privacy of the output of the secure computation protocols. Here, we present
two types of inference attacks launched by an honest-but-curious server .
Inference Type I. Note that our proposed S2PHC and S2PVC protocols adopt functional encryption
as the underlying cryptosystems. For both functions, fSIIP(x,w) and fMIIP((x1, ...,xn),w) as described in
Appendix A, the server is able to acquire the decryption results (i.e., the output of the first layer in NN),
and the weights of the first layer (i.e., w). The security of functional encryption scheme can ensure that
the server cannot break/infer the input x or (x1, ...,xn). However, an inference attack may be possible by
iteratively employing FE on a specific x. Consider the iterative training such that the curious server may be
able to collect enough polynomial equations for a specific training sample. For instance, suppose we have one
training data sample x. For each iteration i in the training phase, the server is able to acquire fi = 〈x,wi〉,
where fi and wi are available or visible to the server. Obviously, with enough pairs of (wi, fi), the server is
able to solve the linear equation system {fi = 〈x,wi〉} and acquire x. Formally, suppose that the sample x
has nfeature features, i.e., x = (x1, x2, ..., nfeature), and each sample is used once in one training epoch. Let
the total number of training epoch be nepoch, and the number of periodical shuffle operations is nshuffle. We
have the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. NN-EMD is able to prevent Inference Type I, if
nepoch
nshuffle
< nfeature
Proof. Suppose that the curious server has advantage  to infer x, which indicates it has  advantage to
solve the system of linear equation problems {fi = 〈x,wi〉} with determined solution. According to theorem
of PSSLS in linear algebra, the curious server has the advantage  to collect n linear equations for the
specific sample x, where n ≥ nfeature.
However, in NN-EMD, the server has non-negligible advantage to distinguish the ciphertext of x among
all encrypted training samples as proved in [4, 5]. After encrypted sample shuffle by the data source, the
server also has non-negligible advantage to learn the position of x in the training set. Thus, the server only
has the advantage to collect n =
nepoch
nshuffle
linear equations. Here,
nepoch
nshuffle
< nfeature in NN-EMD is subject to
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the requirement of PSSLS theorem, namely, n < nfeature. As a result, the curious server has no advantage
to infer x.
Inference Type II. The curious server could also launch another type of inference attack by specifying
“malicious” w to acquire the functional private key. For instance, by specifying w = (1, 0, ..., 0), the decryp-
tion result of 〈x,w〉 will disclose the first element x1 of x. To prevent such an attack, we have introduced
inference weights filter into the TPA. Specifically, the filter module will check the vector w = (1, 0, ..., 0) to
ensure that the number of non-zero elements is greater than a threshold τ , basically, τ ≥ 2. As a result, it
is not possible to launch above inference attack.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the following aspects of NN-EMD : (i) To present the efficiency advantage of training time
of our NN-EMD framework, we compare its training time with that of only those closely related solutions
proposed in [129, 191]. We also explore the impact of network architecture and the number of network
layers on training time in our NN-EMD framework. (ii) With respect to the trained model accuracy, we
compare our NN-EMD framework in a HPT setting and a vertical partitining based training setting with
a baseline model, namely, a normal DNN without any privacy-preserving settings. (iii) As the underlying
cryptosystems only work on the integer field, while the training of DNNs model works on the floating-point
number field, we try to evaluate the impact of the precision on the model performance after the numeric
encoding/decoding.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
To benchmark the performance of the NN-EMD framework, we train a model of a DNN with the same
topology as the one used in [129] on the publicly available MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [106] that
includes 60000 training samples and 10000 test samples. In our evaluation, each sample (28×28 image) in the
MNIST dataset is mapped to a vector with length 784. Besides, we also explore the framework performance
on different DNN architectures and different numbers of network layers. Essentially, we run the experiments
for 5 data sources forming the client pool. Each data source is randomly assigned 60000/5 = 12000 data
samples from the MNIST dataset for the HPT, while in the VPT, each data source is assigned 60000 data
samples but only around 784/5 ≈ 157 features for each sample. We use comparable settings when evaluating
the impact of the number of data sources on the model performance. Note that in all the experiments we
utilize the same model hyperparameters of a DNN model such as learning rate, l2 regularization parameter,
etc.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of time cost for training one mini-batch (60 samples)
Proposed Work Network Architecture CPU Threads Mem Time
[129] 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Xeon E5-2698v3 16-Core 1 250G ≈ 1.5d
[129] 64 7→ 32 7→ 16 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Xeon E5-2698v3 16-Core 1 250G 9h24m
[129] 64 7→ 32 7→ 16 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Xeon E5-2698v3 16-Core 30 250G 40m
CryptoNN [191] 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Core i7 8-Core 1 16G ≈ 2d
CryptoNN [191] 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Core i7 8-Core 8 16G ≈ 94m
NN-EMD (HPT) 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Core i9 8-Core 1 32G 49.83s
NN-EMD (VPT) 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.3GHz Intel Core i9 8-Core 1 32G 31.71s
NN-EMD (HPT) 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.5GHz Intel Xeon 8124M 32 vCPUs 1 128G 55.63s
NN-EMD (VPT) 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10 2.5GHz Intel Xeon 8124M 32 vCPUs 1 128G 33.67s
Implementation Consideration. We have implemented the NN-EMD framework based on the NumPy
library to use the high-level mathematical functions in Python programming language. The underlying
cryptosystems, namely, the functional encryption schemes, are also implemented in Python based on the
gmpy2 library, which is a C-coded Python extension module that supports multiple-precision arithmetic and
relies on the GNU multiple precision arithmetic (GMP) library.
Different from the implementation of functional encryption in [191], we incorporate the following acceler-
ation techniques. By tracking the time cost of each decryption step in the functional encryption scheme, we
find that the most inefficient computing step is the final step that computes the discrete logarithm of a small
integer. To be specific, it involves computing f in h = gf , where h, and g are big integers while f is a small
integer. To accelerate such discrete logarithm computations, we employ a bounded-table-lookup method by
initially setting up a hash table to store pairs of (g, f) with a specified public key parameter g and a positive
bound fb where −fb ≤ f ≤ fb. Then, the final discrete logarithm computation is a table look-up operation
with complexity O(1) compared to traditional baby-step giant-step algorithm that has complexity O(n 12 ).
Environment Setup. All the experiments have been performed on two test platforms: Test Platform I
(TP I) that is a local Macbook Pro with 2.3GHz Intel Core i9 8-Core CPU and 32GB RAM, and Test
Platform II (TP II) that is a remote cloud service, i.e., AWS m5d.8xlarge instance with 2.5GHz Intel Xeon
8124M 32 vCPUs and 128GB RAM. For the evaluations of model performance, where the client pool and
the server are put in the same platform, we repeat the experiments in both the test platforms. To simulate
real scenarios, we use TP I as the client pool and TP II as the server.
4.3.2 Experimental Results
Comparison with Contracted Frameworks. As shown in Table 4.2, we compare the training time of our
NN-EMD framework with the approaches proposed in [129, 191]. Note that as the codes and experimental
platforms for work in [129] are not publicly available, we report the experimental results reported in [129]
directly. We also include the test environment reported in their papers. In our evaluation, we use comparable
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Table 4.3: Training time cost of one mini-batch of different network architectures
NN Framework Network architecture Local (TP I) Remote AWS (TP II)
NN-Normal (Baseline)
784 7→ 256 7→ 10 0.00718s 0.01169s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 10 0.00708s 0.01088s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 32 7→ 16 7→ 10 0.00741s 0.01083s
NN-EMD (HPT)
784 7→ 256 7→ 10 91.45s 111.50s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 10 90.54s 111.28s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 32 7→ 16 7→ 10 89.66s 111.13s
NN-EMD (VPT)
784 7→ 256 7→ 10 55.58s 67.48s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 10 55.21s 67.26s
784 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 32 7→ 16 7→ 10 56.19s 67.05s
† HPT indicates horizontally partitioned based training (HPT) setting, while VPT represents vertically partitioned
based training setting. In both of HPT and VPT, there are 5 data sources. Each mini-batch includes 60 samples;
experimental platforms used in [129, 191], and train the model on the same MNIST dataset with the same
DNN architecture.
We evaluate the NN-EMD framework both in HPT and VPT settings. Our experimental results show
that the training time of one mini-batch including 60 samples in our NN-EMD only needs 49.83 seconds
and 55.63 seconds in TP I and TP II environments, respectively. Compared to the existing best result (i.e.,
40 minutes) as reported in [129] where each training sample is extracted from 28 × 28 to 8 × 8 to reduce
the input size and the multithreaded parallelism technique is employed in the training phase, our proposed
NN-EMD reduces the training time by approximately 90%.
Impact of NN Architectures and Number of Layers. As reported in Table 4.2, the training time of
existing solution such as the framework proposed in [129] increases significantly as the network architecture
changes. To evaluate the impact of network architectures on the training time in our NN-EMD framework,
we train DNN models with different architectures on the MNIST dataset with the same number of data
sources. As presented in Table 4.3, the training time for our proposed approach is only impacted by the
number of nodes in the first hidden layer. When the network architecture of the rest of the layers changes,
the training time does not change compared to the normal DNNs without privacy-preserving setting.
For further verification of such a claim, we conducted additional experiments with a large number of
hidden layers. As shown in Figure 4.5 (c), we measure the training time of one mini-batch in our NN-EMD
framework in bother settings (i.e., HPT and VPT) and vary the number of hidden layers from 1 to 30 where
each layer includes 64 neural nodes. As can be seen, the training time does not change drastically like in
existing solutions as the number of hidden layers increases.
Evaluation of Accuracy. Except for the performance with respect to the training time, we compare
our framework with a baseline DNN (Normal-NN) that has the same network architecture but without any
privacy-preserving settings. As shown in Figure 4.5 (a), our proposed NN-EMD framework can achieve
model accuracy comparable to a normal DNN both in HPT and VPT. Further, the results in Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.5: Model accuracy, impact of encoding precision and impact of hidden layers.
(b) shows that the precision setting does not have an effect on the model accuracy. Note that the network
architecture used for model accuracy comparison is 784 7→ 512 7→ 256 7→ 128 7→ 64 7→ 32 7→ 10. Each hidden
layer of network architecture in right figure includes 64 neural nodes and the results are generated on the
TP II platform.
Deployment in Client-Server Scenario. To evaluate the impact of the number of data sources on
the training time, we have deployed our end-to-end NN-EMD system in a client-server scenario. In this
experiment, our local machine (TP I ) plays the role of client pool with varying number of data sources to
pre-process the encrypted training datasets, while the remote AWS instance (TP II ) plays the role of the
server to train the DNN model based on these encrypted data samples.
As shown in Table 4.4, we present the training time for both the client pool and the server. All reported
times for the server side is based on one mini-batch, while the time reported for the client pool is for one
mini-batch per data source. In the case of the HPT, the training time of NN-EMD framework does not
change drastically like existing solutions as the number of data sources increases. In the case of the VPT,
each data source pre-processes a same number of data samples. As the total number of features is fixed, the
number of features from each data source decreases as the number of data sources increase, and hence the
pre-processing time decreases, while the training time still does not change drastically.
4.4 Summary and Discussion
Training DNN models over encrypted data show significant promise towards addressing strong privacy
requirements, while taking full advantage of an existing ML platform as a service infrastructure. However,
there is a lack of efficient and practical privacy-preserving solutions for training a DNN over privacy-sensitive
datasets. In this chapter, we have proposed NN-EMD, a novel DNN that supports training a DNN model
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Table 4.4: Time cost for different data source numbers in client-server setting
Training Data Sources Pre-process Time - Client (TP I) Training Time - Remote AWS (TP II)
HPT Setting
5 1.2769s 56.02s
7 1.0579s 55.95s
9 1.1195s 55.86s
11 1.1246s 55.87s
13 1.1463s 56.04s
15 1.1260s 56.13s
VPT Setting
5 0.3716s 33.75s
7 0.3363s 32.48s
9 0.2372s 31.93s
11 0.2214s 31.50s
13 0.1867s 31.24s
15 0.1711s 31.17s
† The DNNs architecture used in this experiment is 784 7→ 128 7→ 32 7→ 10. Note that the cost time reported here is
for only one mini-batch that includes 60 samples.
on a dataset where the data is composed, both horizontally and vertically, of encrypted datasets from
multiple data sources. Our evaluation shows that NN-EMD can reduce the training time by 90% while still
providing the same model accuracy and strong privacy guarantee as compared to the most of the recent
comparable approaches. Furthermore, the depth and complexity of DNNs do not affect the training time
despite introducing a privacy-preserving NN-EMD setting. Future work includes applying the NN-EMD
framework in a more complex distributed environments such as an edge computing environment.
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5.0 Practical Secure Aggregation in Edge Computing
Recently, edge computing has attracted significant industry investment and efforts from research com-
munities [165, 164]. For instance, the Open Edge Computing (OEC) initiative [48] was launched in June
2015 by Vodafone, Intel, and Huawei in partnership with Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), and then ex-
panded to include Verizon, T-Mobile, Nokia, etc. Emerging edge computing technologies promise to deliver
highly responsive and scalable cloud services, and enhance preprocessing services for the Internet of Things
(IoT) [157]. Such enhanced preprocessing services of edge computing primarily include operations such as
cleaning, formatting, filtering, and aggregation of the raw data generated by the IoT and mobile devices.
These benefits are achieved by appropriately placing edge nodes with computing and storage capabilities at
the edge of the Internet closer to mobile devices or sensors. Aggregation is a common and typical operation
in edge and cloud computing environments [163, 148, 112, 140, 195, 174, 177, 162, 196]. Usually, rather than
uploading an entire dataset, it may be sufficient to compute and upload its statistical results to the cloud;
this will reduce various processing, data transfer or storage costs. For instance, in a temperature sensor based
application, rather than collecting the temperature and transmitting it to the cloud every second, an average
temperature over one hour period for a target environment can be computed and uploaded. Computation
of such an average is a form of an aggregation.
Huge amounts of collected data in device rich environments is often subject to privacy or regulatory
requirements that restrict the way data can be shared, transmitted, and used. Furthermore, while cloud
servers in cloud data centers may follow strict policies and regulations, edge nodes may not have the same
degree of regulatory and monitoring oversight. Especially, these edge nodes deployed in the public area for
public edge computing services. A motivating example here could be a self-driving delivering system in a
smart city environment, where several self-driving trucks from different commercial companies serve their
customers. To acquire a more intelligent self-driving model, those self-driving trucks can collaboratively
train an ML model in a federated learning manner without leaking each company’s private commercial data
such as the destination of served customers and delivering paths. To accelerate the training phase (e.g., FL
training in real-time), these self-driving trucks can take advantage of these edge nodes deployed in the places
such as traffic intersections, which is a part of a public infrastructure in a smart city. However, these edge
nodes may not fully monitored and hence not fully trusted as are cloud servers by the commercial companies
to process their self-driving model.
To address privacy concerns discussed above, various aggregation approaches (i.e., privacy-preserving
aggregation and secure aggregation) have been proposed in the literature. These approaches focus on pro-
tecting the raw data by sanitizing or perturbing privacy sensitive information [163, 148, 174], or enhanc-
ing the data processing procedure to prevent a third-party from acquiring the privacy sensitive informa-
tion [195, 112, 196, 162]. These approaches include data anonymization mechanisms (e.g., k-anonymity,
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the three-tier CryptoEdge platform.
l-diversity, differential privacy, etc.), secure multi-party computation (SMC) protocols, and cryptographic
schemes. Compared to differential privacy based privacy-preserving aggregation, crypto-based secure aggre-
gation approaches ensure that the original data is protected by the cryptosystem and the aggregation results
are accurate.
Newly emerging cryptographic schemes such as homomorphic encryption and functional encryption have
shown tremendous promise of achieving practical computation over encrypted data[129, 191]. However,
most of the existing homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes or functional encryption (FE) schemes are
not applicable in edge computing environments because of the following reasons: (i) the constructions of
homomorphic encryption are neither efficient enough for complex computation such as privacy-preserving FL
nor computationally-friendly with regards to capabilities of the IoT devices; (ii) existing FE solutions do not
support three-tier edge computing based architecture; in particular if we directly apply existing FE schemes,
untrusted edge nodes can either (a) acquire the functional results in plaintext resulting in privacy-disclosure
to the untrusted edge nodes, or (b) not process the encrypted data at all. Thus, achieving practical secure
aggregation the encrypted data in within a three-tier edge computing architecture is still a huge challenge.
In this chapter, we propose CryptoEdge to support practical secure aggregation over encrypted data at
the edge. The approach is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Here, IoT devices can easily encrypt the raw data; the
untrusted edge nodes have the capability to process the encrypted data (i.e., partially decrypt the encrypted
raw data) without learning any privacy sensitive information from the data; and the cloud data center then
can obtain the final aggregation results, but it still cannot learn any privacy sensitive information. In general,
the cloud center can randomly specify the number of edge nodes to collaboratively pre-process the encrypted
data and then combine the processed results to compose final aggregation results. As a result CryptoEdge
can dramatically reduce the overall decryption time and save computational resources for the cloud, as the
edge nodes are able to do preprocessing over the encrypted data.
The proposed CryptoEdge approach includes a novel threshold functional encryption (TFE) scheme, a
secure aggregation module that supports various types of aggregation demands; and a PPFL framework for
the edge environment. The goal of threshold setting in FE allows all participant edge nodes to enroll in the
aggregation of encrypted data or local model without knowing the final aggregated result, while the cloud
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server can acquire the final aggregated result by calling final decryption algorithm on a number of partially
aggregated encrypted data (still in confidentiality) from selected edge nodes.
5.1 Threshold Functional Encryption Scheme
5.1.1 Motivation for TFE
To achieve the goals of CryptoEdge, namely, practical secure computation over encrypted data in three-
tier edge computing architecture, we need crypto schemes that meet the following design requirements:
• The crypto scheme should support practical aggregation over the encrypted data; i.e., it should be efficient
enough for practical deployment in edge computing environments;
• The responsibilities related to encryption, computation, and decryption should be given to separate
parties; for instance, IoT devices are issued keys to encrypt the data; edge nodes are issued keys to
compute over encrypted data; and cloud servers are able to acquire the final computation result by
decrypting the encrypted data.
Existing HE and FE schemes are two promising candidates that support computation over the encrypted
data.
We do not pursue HE for the following reasons: (i) As shown in [189] and [129], existing constructions
of HE are not efficient enough to support complex applications over encrypted data; hence, they are not
computationally friendly for IoT devices; (ii) As encryption/decryption keys in a HE scheme are generated
in pairs, its adoption in edge computing environments will not fulfill the second design requirement, and
hence, it will introduce extra key management burden into the system.
FE is a promising approach for secure computation over encrypted data as the encryption and decryption
keys are independently issued to different parties. The recent construction of FE for the functionality of
the inner-product, such as the one proposed in [165, 5], shows the possibility of using the basic DDH
assumption that is more appropriate for IoT devices as compared to pairing-based and garbled circuits
based cryptosystems. Furthermore, these FE constructions have been proved to be promising approaches
for building practical privacy-preserving ML applications [191, 189] in two-tier cloud-based architecture. In
summary, there is a need for novel cryptosystems that satisfy the above-mentioned design requirements. We
propose novel threshold functional encryption schemes that address the challenges mentioned above.
5.1.2 Definition of TFE
Notations. Let GroupGen(1λ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter 1λ, and outputs a triplet (G), where G is a group of order p that is generated by g ∈ G, and p is
a λ-bit prime number. Furthermore, let r ←$ Zp denote the assignment to r of an element chosen uniformly
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at random from integer group Zp. We use [n] to denote a set of n sequential natural numbers {1, 2, ..., n}.
The lowercase bold variable such as α1×η represents a vector with length, η. A capital bold variable such as
W n×η denotes a matrix with n rows and η columns.
We define threshold functional encryption (TFE) for functionality F scheme as follows.
Definition 1 (Threshold Functional Encryption Scheme (TFE)). A t-of-s threshold functional encryption
for functionality F is a tuple (Setup, PKDistribute, SKDistribute, Encrypt, ShareDecrypt, CombineDecrypt)
of six algorithms, written as
EFTFE = (S, PK, SK,E, SD,CD). (5.1)
Each algorithm is defined as follows:
- Setup(λ) outputs master public and master secret keys, (mpk,msk) based on security parameter, λ.
- PKDistribute(mpk,msk, idx) distributes public key, pkidx, for entity idx on input master public and secret
keys, (mpk, msk).
- SKDistribute(mpk,msk,K, idx) distributes secret key, skidx, for an entity, idx, on input master public
and secret keys, (mpk, msk), and vector or matrix from K.
- Encrypt(pk,X ) outputs ciphertext ct on input vector or matrix from X and public key, pk.
- ShareDecrypt(pk, ct,K, {skidx}, S) outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext, ct′ , on inputs: a ciphertext,
ct, a public key, pk, a vector or matrix from K and functional private key, {skidx}, from a selected sub-set
of decryption parties.
- CombineDecrypt(pk, ct
′
) outputs functionality result on input public key, pk, and a collected partially
decrypted ciphertext ct
′
.
5.1.3 Threshold FE Scheme for Functionality of Multi-Client Inner-Product
Here, we present our proposed t-of-s threshold functional encryption scheme for functionality of multi-
client inner-product (MCIP) FMCIP, whose security is based on the plain Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption; here, t of s decryption parties are allowed to collaboratively acquire an inner-product over
multiple encrypted vectors.
Functionality of FMCIP. In this chapter, we mainly focus on an inner-product functionality over integers.
Let FIP be a family of inner-product functionality with message space X and key space K both consisting
of vectors in Zηp of norm bounded by p of length η. Here, we focus on multiple inputs inner-product FMCIP,
defined as follows:
fMCIP({xi}, y) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[ηi]
(xijy∑i−1
k=1 ηk+j
) s.t. |xi| = ηi, |y| =
∑
i∈[n]
ηi, (5.2)
where fMCIP ∈ FMCIP, xi ∈ X , and y ∈ K. Also, the length of xi should be equal to the length of vector y.
Construction. The specific construction of TFE scheme for FMCIP is defined as follows:
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• Setup(λ, η, t, s, n): This algorithm first generates a triplet from the integer group, as (G, p, g), on given
security parameter λ as input. Then, it randomizes a matrix of 1 × η samples and two matrix samples
with size n× η, as follows:
α1×η,W n×η,U n×η ←$ Zp. (5.3)
The master public key and master private key are defined as follows:
msk = (W n×η,U n×η) (5.4)
mpk = (G, p, g, gα , {gαᵀW i}i∈[n]) (5.5)
Note that αᵀW i denotes that the transpose of α multiplies i-th row of W n×η.
• PKDistribute(mpk,msk, idx): Given the master public and secret keys, for encryption entity idx, this
algorithm distributes the public keys as follows:
pkidx = (G, p, t, s, n, g, gα , gα
ᵀW idx ,U idx). (5.6)
The algorithm distributes the common public key pkcom = (G, p, g) to the decryption entities.
• SKDistribute(mpk,msk,y, idx): The algorithm takes master public and secret keys, y = (y1, y2, ..., yn),
and distributes the functional private key to the corresponding decryption entity idx. This algorithm
first defines a set of polynomial functions (f (0)(x), {f (i)(x)}i∈[1,...,n]) as follows:
f (0)(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
ajx
j , where a0 ←
n∑
i=1
〈yi,U i〉, aj∈[1,...,t−1] ←$ Zp (5.7)
f (i)(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
bi,jx
j , where bi,0 ← 〈yi,W i〉, bi,j∈[1,...,t−1] ←$ Zp. (5.8)
It then generates a set of functional secret keys as follows:
sk = {vk,0 ← f (0)(k), vk,1 ← {f (i)(k)}i∈[n]}k∈[s]. (5.9)
It provides the functional private key, skidx = (vidx,0, vidx,1) to the corresponding partial decryption
entity, idx,
• Encrypt(pkidx,xidx): For encryption entity idx ∈ [n], the algorithm takes as input corresponding pkidx
and xidx, and returns ciphertext ct. It first chooses a random element ridx ←$ Zp and computes ciphertext
ctidx = (ctidx,0, ctidx,1) as follows:
ctidx,0 = g
xidx+U idx ◦ (gαᵀW idx)ridx , (5.10)
ctidx,1 = (g
α)ridx =
∏
k∈[η]
gαkridx . (5.11)
Note that symbol ◦ denotes an element-wise multiplication. For instance, x1×η ◦ Y η×η denotes the
element-multiply computation of x and each row of Y .
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• ShareDecrypt(pkcom, ct, y, {skj}j∈S , S): This algorithm takes ciphertext ct = {cti,0, cti,1}i∈[n], the com-
mon public key pkcom and vector y = {yi}i∈[n] associated functional key ski from an authorized sub-set
S, where |S| ≥ t. To share with decryption entity i ∈ S, it outputs partially decrypted ciphertext
ct
′
j = (ct
′
j,0, ct
′
j,1, ct
′
j,2) as follows:
ct
′
j,0 =
∏
i∈[n]
ct◦yii,0 , (5.12)
ct
′
j,1 = {(cti,1)vj,1Lj(j)}i∈[n], (5.13)
ct
′
j,2 = g
vj,0Lj(j), (5.14)
where Lj(j) is the Lagrange basis polynomials defined as
∏
j′∈S,j′ 6=j
−j′
j−j′ .
• CombineDecrypt(pkcom, ct′): This algorithm takes all received ciphertext ct′ and returns the inner-
product 〈{xi}i∈[n], y〉. ∀ct′i,0 ∈ ct
′
; it tries verify that they are all equal. If the verification fails,
it returns the stop symbol; otherwise, let C = ct
′
j,0. Then, it returns the final combined decryption
results as follows:
D =
C∏
i∈[n]
∏
j∈|ct′ | ct
′
i,j,1 ·
∏
j∈|ct′ |(ct
′
j,2)
2
(5.15)
Finally, fMCIP({xi}i∈[n], y) can be recovered by computing 12 log(D).
Correctness. Given the common public key pkcom and the collected partially decrypted ciphertext ct
′
, we
have that
D =
∏
i∈[n] ct
yi
i,0∏
i∈[n]
∏
j∈|ct′ | ct
′
i,j,1 ·
∏
j∈|ct′ |(ct
′
j,2)
2
(5.16)
=
∏
i∈[n](g
xi+U i ◦ (gαᵀW i)ri)yi∏
i∈[n](cti,1)
∑
j∈|ct′ | f
(i)(j)Lj(j) · (ct′j,2)2
∑
j∈|ct′ | f
(0)(j)Lj(j)
(5.17)
=
∏
i∈[n](g
xi+U i ◦ (gαᵀW iri)yi∏
i∈[n](griα)f
(i)(0) · g2f(0)(0) (5.18)
=
∏
i∈[n] g
(xi+U i)◦yi
g2
∑n
i=1〈yiU i〉
(5.19)
=
g2
∑n
i=1〈xiyi〉 · g2
∑n
i=1〈yiU i〉
g2
∑n
i=1〈yiU i〉
(5.20)
= g2fMCFE({xi}i∈[n],y) (5.21)
Security. For the security of TFE scheme for FMCIP, we employ the security definition, namely, selective
simulation-based security (SEL-SIM security) as in [5]. Here, we propose Lemma 3 as follows. The specific
proof will be presented in Section 5.3.1.
Lemma 3. Assume a static adversary that corrupts maximum of t-1 players from the beginning; then, under
the DDH assumption, the TFE scheme for FMCIP achieves selective simulation-based security. Furthermore,
the non-authorized player is not able to acquire the functionality result.
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5.2 CryptoEdge Platform
5.2.1 Overview of CryptoEdge
Our proposed CryptoEdge platform supports various applications such as (i) infrastructure-level appli-
cations that need to compute various types of secure aggregates (CryptoEdge-SA); and (ii) high-level ap-
plications that employ a privacy-preserving edge-based federated learning (CryptoEdge-PPFL) framework.
In particular, CryptoEdge-SA applications are built on our proposed TFE scheme, while CryptoEdge-PPFL
framework is built on the CryptoEdge-SA applications.
Architecture and Entities. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the proposed CryptoEdge platform includes three
tiers that include IoT devices layer, edge nodes layer, and cloud service layer, with following entities.
• Third-party Authority (TPA) is responsible for setting up the underlying cryptosystem, delivering the
public key to each IoT devices and providing private key service to the edge nodes for preprocessing.
The TPA is also in charge of holding the master private and public keys and is also trusted to perform
distribution of public-keys and generation of a function derived secret key .
• IoT Devices generate stream data such as healthcare data and location data. Such privacy-sensitive data
is encrypted using the key issued by the TPA before they are sent out. Furthermore, the IoT devices have
limited computational capabilities and hence cannot support the complex encryption algorithm involved.
• Edge Nodes primarily process the encrypted data from the IoT devices using the key issued by the TPA.
These edge nodes do not learn any information during the data processing step and the confidentiality of
the processed data is maintained.
• Cloud Service Provider does the final decryption on the partially decrypted data collected from these
edge nodes with the key issued by the TPA. Furthermore, the cloud center is only able to acquire the
result of a function over the encrypted data rather than the original encrypted stream data.
Remark. As it is part of the cryptosystem, the TPA is not illustrated in Figure 5.1. In real-world scenarios,
different application domains/environments already have entities that can take the role of a TPA. For
example, central banks of the banking industry often play a fully trusted role, and some other companies in
other sectors such as a service or consultancy firm can embody the TPA. Note that the TPA has NO access
to raw data generated by the IoT devices in the CryptoEdge platform.
Threat Model and Assumptions. In CryptoEdge platform, we consider the following threat model and
assumptions. A TPA is an independent entity widely trusted by all the entities in the CryptoEdge platform.
Note that assuming such a trusted and independent entity is common in existing cryptosystems that employ
a TPA as a key component [25, 4, 5]. A limited number of edge nodes can be considered unreliable or
untrustworthy by the IoT and the cloud layers. We assume that a limited number of edge nodes may be
controlled by an adversary with a goal of inferring private information while processing data. Note that the
denial-of-service attack is not considered in CryptoEdge; i.e, we assume that the enrolled edge node do not
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of various types of secure aggregation scenarios supported by the CryptoEdge
stop or exit during the execution of an algorithm or a protocol. A cloud center is assumed to be honest-
but-curious; i.e., the cloud center will follow the designed algorithm/protocol but will attempt to learn all
possible private information from the received encrypted data or final decrypted function result.
Platform Statement. Suppose that the CryptoEdge platform includes one cloud center, Pcloud, s edge
nodes, {Pedgej }j∈[s], with at least t-of-s trustworthy edge nodes, and n IoT devices {P ioti }i∈[n]. With the
issued public key pkPioti , P ioti protects its data, denoted as DP
iot
i = {dPiotik }k∈S(t) . For edge node {Pedgej }j∈[s],
with the functional private key skPedgej issued by the TPA, P
edge
j is able to process (i.e., partially decrypt) the
encrypted data received from the IoT devices. The cloud center Pcloud can randomly select t′ > t edge nodes
to collaboratively compute the final functionality result over the IoT device’s encrypted data, where t is the
threshold in the TFE scheme. In particular, the edge nodes {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ] selected process the encrypted
data as discussed above. Then, Pcloud combines these partially decrypted data and do the final decryption
to acquire the functionality result.
Note that we have omitted the key issuance phase in the description; in this phase, each entity is issued
a common public key, IoT-entity-specific public key, or functional private key as introduced in Section 5.1.
5.2.2 CryptoEdge-SA: Secure Aggregation at the Edge
Unlike privacy-preserving approaches proposed in [163, 148, 174], our proposed CryptoEdge platform
supports secure aggregation where the original data is protected by the cryptosystem and the aggregation
results are accurate. Figure 5.2 illustrates a set of various types of secure aggregation applications supported
by CryptoEdge. The single data source SA is a simplified version of multiple data sources SA, and the
element-weighted SA is also a simplified version of group-weighted SA, where the sliding window is reduced
to one element. Thus, we only present the detailed secure aggregation approaches of later ones in the
following subsections.
Secure Aggregation over Multiple Data Sources. The secure aggregation in the case of multiple data
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sources attempts to securely aggregate the stream data for a specific sliding window from multiple IoTs.
Each entity’s operations are presented as follows:
• Entity P iot. Each IoT device {P ioti }i∈[n] in the group of data sources encrypts its dataset DP
iot
i =
{dPiotik }k∈S with the issued public key pkP
iot
i , and generates the ciphertext as follows:
CPioti = EFMCIPTFE .EpkPioti (D
Pioti ). (5.22)
Then, each {CPioti }i∈[n] is emitted to nearby group of edge nodes {Pedgej }j∈[s].
• Entity Pedge. Each edge node Pedgej in the selected group {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ] processes the encrypted data with
the issued functional private key skP
edge
j , and sends to the cloud with the processed ciphertext as follows:
CP
edge
j
partial = EFMCIPTFE .SD
sk
Pedge
j
({CPioti }i∈[n]). (5.23)
• Entity Pcloud. The cloud collects the processed {CP
edge
j
partial}j∈[t′ ] from the group of edge nodes. With the
final decryption, the aggregation is achieved as follows:∑
i∈[n]
∑
k∈S
d
Pioti
k = EFMCIPTFE .CD({C
Pedgej
partial}j∈[t′ ]). (5.24)
Remark. Here, we use our proposed TFE scheme as an illustration for secure aggregation over multiple data
sources. Note that the threshold Paillier cryptosystem is also able to address the same secure aggregation
task, and hence, we take the Paillier system as the baseline to compare with.
Group-Weighted Secure Aggregation. Unlike simple aggregation discussed in Section 5.2.2, our Cryp-
toEdge platform also supports the weighted-aggregation that is also a typical aggregation; for instance, a
healthcare application may need to apply a set of coefficients on the time-series heart rate data generated
by smartwatch monitors. Each entity’s operations are presented as follows:
• Entity P iot. Each P iot does encryption as in Section 5.2.2.
• Entity Pedge. Each edge node Pedgei in the selected group {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ] receives the coefficients w =
{wk}k∈[n] delivered by the Pcloud. Then, Pedge acquires the issued w related functional private key
sk
Pedgej
w from the TPA using the coefficients w. Finally, each edge node does processing over encrypted
data as in Section 5.2.2
• Entity Pcloud. The cloud specifies the coefficients w for each element in DPiot and delivers to the selected
edge nodes group {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ]. And then, it does aggregate compuatation as in Section 5.2.2 to acquire
the element-weighted aggregation
∑
k∈S d
Piot
k wk.
Remark. Note that the element-weighted secure aggregation is omitted here, and it can also be applied here
by reducing the sliding window to 1, namely, DPioti = {dPiotik }k∈S , |S| = 1. Furthermore, note that element-
weighted secure aggregation is much more fine-grained than the group-weighted secure aggregation, which
is a coarse-grained, high-level aggregation. The element-weighted secure aggregation can be applied to both
the cases of single data source and multiple data sources, while the group-weighted secure aggregation only
works on the later one.
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5.2.3 CryptoEdge-PPFL: Privacy-Preserving FL at the Edge
Privacy-Preserving FL: from Two-Tier to Three-Tier Architecture. FL approaches have been
recently studied to address privacy concerns by allowing collaborative training of ML models among multiple
participants where each participant can keep its data private. However, this approach still poses privacy risks
such as inference attacks [131, 167]. To address such privacy leakage, several techniques have been adopted
in PPFL. For instance, hybrid approaches, such as those proposed in [141, 173, 189], combine differential
privacy techniques and secure multiparty aggregation techniques [189, 22].
In traditional two-tier FL architecture, each participant trains a model locally and exchanges only model
parameters with others, instead of the active privacy-sensitive training data, with the coordination of a
central entity called coordinator. In particular, the coordinator merges the model parameters collected by
each participant, and then distribute the aggregated model to each participant for the next round of training.
Existing secure aggregation solutions as proposed in [189, 22], however, do not support the three-tier edge
computing architecture, where the participants (i.e., the IoTs) encrypt its local model updates, the edge nodes
help process the encrypted model update (i.e., partial decryption), and only the coordinator (i.e., the cloud)
is able to acquire the final aggregated model update. To the best of our knowledge, the secure aggregation
approach adopted in [173] is based on the threshold Paillier system that is actually applicable in the three-tier
edge-based PPFL systems. However, the approach proposed in [173] relies on the IoTs (i.e., participants)
instead of the edge nodes to collaboratively decrypt the final aggregated model. Specifically, such a threshold
Paillier based secure aggregation includes two steps: the coordinator combines all encrypted local model
from all participants; and then the deliver the combined (encrypted) to each participant for collaborative
decryption. Our proposed CryptoEdge-PPFL does not rely on such combination related communications.
To take advantage of the edge facilities, here, we propose our efficient solution for the privacy-preserving
edge-based FL, wherein the multiple data sources based CryptoEdge-SA as proposed in Section 5.2.2 is
adopted. Similar to the privacy-preserving FL approaches as proposed in [173, 189], where each participant
adds its own local differential privacy noise independently and then uses secure multi-party aggregation
(SMA) to hide the participant’s input, our CryptoEdge-PPFL still adopts a similar hybrid approach, namely,
differential noise reduction through SMA [173], and the SMA approach is replaced by our proposed multiple
data sources based CryptoEdge-SA.
CryptoEdge-PPFL Framework. In CryptoEdge-PPFL, each P ioti in {P ioti }i∈[n] uses the same approach
as in [173] to independently add noise (denoted as NPioti ) to the local ML model update MPioti that is
trained based on local dataset DPioti . Considering n IoT participants, the total aggregated noise adds up
to n × NPioti . With the adoption of CryptoEdge-SA technique, each P ioti can add a fraction of the noise
NPioti
n , and then the total aggregated noise is still NP
iot
i without leaking each IoT device’s private local model
update even though the local privacy budget is divided by n. The effect of such an approach is proved in
[173, 189].
Figure 5.3 illustrates the framework for privacy-preserving edge-based FL in our CryptoEdge platform.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of privacy-preserving FL in CryptoEdge
Algorithm 7: Pseudocode of CryptoEdge-PPFL
Input: L := ML algorithm to be trained; m := minimum required aggregated replies;  := privacy
guarantee;
Output: Trained global model M
1 function cloud-aggregate(L, {P ioti }i∈[n], {Pedgej }j∈[s],m)
2 foreach P ioti ∈ {P ioti }i∈[n] do asynchronously query P ioti with msgP
iot
i
q = (L,m) ;
3 randomly select {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ] from {Pedgej }j∈[s];
4 foreach Pedgej ∈ {Pedgej }j∈[t′ ] do SP
edge
msgr
← collect response msgP
edge
j
r ;
5
1
n
∑
i∈[n]MP
iot
i +NPiot ← EFMCFETFE .CD(SP
edge
msgr
);
6 returnM← 1
n
∑
i∈[n]MP
iot
i +NPiot
7 function edge-process({P ioti }i∈[n], skP
edge
j ,m)
8 do SPiotmsgr ← collect response msg
Pioti
r while |SPiotmsgr | ≥ m and still in max waiting time;
9 msg
Pedgej
r ← EFMCFETFE .SD
sk
Pedge
j
(SPiotmsgr );
10 sends msg
Pedgej
r to the cloud;
11 function iot-train(msg
Pioti
q ,DPioti , pkPioti , )
12 MPioti ← L(DPioti );
13 NPiot ← NDP(,MPioti ,m);
14 msg
Pioti
r ← EFMCFETFE .EpkPioti (M
Pioti + N
Piot
n
);
15 sends msg
Pioti
r to the edge nodes {Pedgej }j∈[s];
Unlike the traditional FL setting of two roles (i.e., participants and coordinator), we add an additional role
(i.e., edge nodes) to help preprocess the encrypted model update. Note that we assume that each IoT device
is able to train the local ML model independently as required in the FL setting. Those IoT devices could be
monitors/sensors with Nvidia Jetson TX2i that has the basic computation capability for machine learning
training.
Algorithm 7 presents the pseudocode of privacy-preserving FL at CryptoEdge. Here, each step for one-
round of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) training in FL is presented as follows:
FL Cloud Coordinator - aggregating a global model. The cloud starts by querying all IoT devices with
a specific ML algorithm that will be adopted and the minimum number of responses needed. Then, it
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randomly selects a subgroup of edge nodes to help pre-process the encrypted local model and waits to collect
the responses from the selected edge nodes. Finally, the cloud is able to recover the aggregated model by
calling the CombineDecrypt algorithm of EFMCFETFE .
FL Edge Node - preprocessing encrypted model. Each edge node starts to collect the response from the IoT
participants until the minimum number of responses is reached. Then, with the issued functional private
key, it calls the ShareDecrypt algorithm of EFMCFETFE to generate the partially decrypted data and send to the
cloud.
FL IoT Participant - encrypting the trained local model. Each edge node starts with training the local model
based on the local model with the specified ML algorithm (line 1). Then, it adds differential privacy noise
on the trained model with input of privacy guarantee, a minimum number of participants (line 2). Finally,
it does the encryption as same as in Section 5.2.2 and emits out the encrypted model to edge nodes.
Remark. Unlike the case of sum-aggregation in Section 5.2.2, it requires the average-aggregation of all
generated models in the above-mentioned privacy-preserving FL application. Here, we omit the process of
average that can be achieved by (i) either dividing each parameter in the aggregated model or (ii) issuing
each edge node with the functional private key that is associated with the vector ( 1m )j∈[t′ ] instead of vector
(1)j∈[t′ ] used in Section 5.2.2. Furthermore, by adjusting the functional private key associated vector, it is
able to achieve privacy-preserving FL with trustworthiness on each IoT’s local model.
5.3 Security and Privacy Analysis
5.3.1 Security Evaluation
Here, we use security proof methodology similar to that in [5], namely, simulation-based proof, to prove
our claimed security guarantee. Then, we analyze other security aspects of the proposed TFE scheme.
To prove the security of TFE, we consider the following two cases: (i) A can break one player (i.e., a
sharing decryptor or a combining decryptor); (ii) A can corrupt up to t-1 players, including two sub-cases:
(ii.a) one combining decryptor with t-2 sharing decryptors; (ii.b) t-1 sharing decryptors. Note that the sharing
decryptor and the combining decryptor denote the entities that run the ShareDecrypt and CombineDecrypt
algorithms as illustrated in Definition 1. Then, we analyze the security from two aspects: encrypted data
and functional result.
Security Proof. For the security of the encrypted data, we have the security claim as presented in
Lemma 3 in Section 5.1.3. Specifically, under the DDH assumption, TFE scheme for FMCIP achieves selective
simulation-based security (SEL-SIM-security). Below is the formal proof in detail.
Proof. For the case (i), the security risk is the same as the case of an ordinary multiple input functional
encryption scheme. Hence, we adopt the same security definition and advantage of the adversary A as
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illustrated in Appendix A.3, in the following formal proof.
To prove the SEL-SIM-security of TFE scheme ETFE for FMCIP, we need to prove that for any adversary
A, AdvSEL-SIMA,ETFE = 0.
First, for the setup and encryption steps, we define the following simulator algorithms: SetupSIM =
Setupot, Encrypt(mskSIM ) = ui, and for the generation of functional private key we have the following
simulator: KeyDeriveSIM (mskSIM , y, aux)→ sky = z, where z is set as
∑
i∈[n]〈uiyi〉 − aux mod L.
Then, we have the following fact for u and u−x: ∀xi ∈ {xi}i∈[n], the distributions {ui mod L}i∈[n] and
{(ui − xi) mod L}i∈[n] are identical, where xi ∈ ZL and ui ←$ ZL. Note that symbol ←$ denotes that ui
is randomly sampled from ZL, and the independence of the xi from ui is only true in the selective security
game.
Hence, we have the simulator to rewrite the experiment REAL
EotFE
SEL(1
λ,B) and oracle OH(·) as follows:
REAL
EotFE
SEL(1
λ,B)
{xi}i∈[n] ← B(1λ,F)
∀i ∈ [n] :
ui ←$ ZL
cti ← ui mod L
α← BOH(·)({cti}i∈[n])
Output : α
Oracle OH(·)
z ←∑i∈[n]〈ui, yi〉 − 〈xi, yi〉 mod L
return : z
Therefore, the constructed REAL
EotFE
SEL(1
λ,B) is also identical to the experiment IDEALEotFESEL(1λ,B) when
executed with our simulator algorithms. We can observe that the constructed oracle OH(·) as corresponds to
the oracle O(·) (see Appendix A.3) that returns KeyGeriveSIM (mskSIM , y, {〈xi, yi〉}i∈[n] for every queried
y. Thus, we can obtain that AdvSEL-SIMA,ETFE = 0. Hence, the adversary A does not have advantage to break the
encrypted ciphertext.
For case (ii), the adversary A still has no advantage to breaking the encrypted ciphertext because A in
the above-illustrated simulation game has been able to do as many queries as expected, that is, the increment
on the corrupted players does not change the such a situation.
Other Security of Functionality Result. Next, we analyze the security of the functionality result. The
TFE scheme can ensure that the non-authorized player is not able to acquire the functionality result. Here,
we do not consider the case (ii.a) because A is not assumed to break the authorized combine-decryptor.
For case (ii.b), suppose that A who corrupts t-1 players has non-negligible advantage  to break the
TFE to acquire the functionality result. In particular, the “master” functional private key is split into s
shares via Shamir’s secret share scheme [160] in the TFE scheme, so that we can construct a simulator to
transfer A’s advantage to solve the t-of -s Shamir’s secret share scheme with t-1 shares. As proved in [160],
there is no adversary who has a non-negligible advantage to solve that, and hence, A also does not have the
non-negligible advantage to acquire the functionality result.
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5.3.2 Privacy Analysis
The underlying cryptosystems is proved to be secure, indicating that the untrusted edge nodes and
honest-but-curious cloud center are not able to reveal private information from the inputs of each IoT by
breaking the TFE cryptosystem. As both the input and output of the edge layer are still in ciphertext forms
in the CryptoEdge platform, there is no chance for the untrusted edge nodes to launch potential inference
attacks. Thus, we only analyze a few inference attempts launched by an honest-but-curious adversary (i.e.,
cloud center) who is able to acquire the functionality results that are in plaintext.
Inference Attack against Secure Aggregation. There is one possible inference attempt in the single
data source secure aggregation approach, namely, the honest-but-curious adversary may subtract the adja-
cent aggregation results. For instance, suppose that the stream data in the sliding window S(T ) is denoted
as DPiotST = {dP
iot
T−m, ..., d
Piot
T+m}. Then, for the sliding window ST+1 would be DP
iot
ST+1 = {dP
iot
T−m+1, ..., d
Piot
T+m+1}.
By subtracting the aggregation results of adjacent sliding window ST and ST+1, the adversary may acquire
dP
iot
T−m+d
Piot
T+m+1 =
∑
DPiot
ST+1
−∑DPiot
ST
. Obviously, in the case of non-weighted secure aggregation, the adver-
sary can only infer the average of dP
iot
T−m and d
Piot
T+m+1 instead of the individual data, and hence, it does not
violate our privacy guarantee. Furthermore, another inference attempt is that the adversary tries to narrow
the sliding window ST+1 by one so that it can infer the dP
iot
T−m. However, the adjustment of the size of the
sliding window needs the cooperation of the IoT, and hence, such an inference attack would be noticed by
the IoT. Note that such an inference attempt can only occur at the situation of single data source secure
aggregation.
Inference Attack against CyptoEdge-PPFL. As illustrated in [189], we consider another inference
attempt launched by a curious adversary who may use exploited weight wexploit = (1, 0, ..., 0) to assign to
the edge nodes so that each edge node can be issued with function private key from the TPA. Except for
the first element, the rest of the elements in wexploit are all zero, and hence the curious adversary is able to
acquire the first participant’s model update.
To prevent such an attack, similar to a solution presented in [189], we also add inference weights filter
(IWF) into the TPA. In general, the IWF module will check the vector w = (1, 0, ..., 0) to ensure that the
number of non-zero elements is greater than a threshold τ , basically, τ ≥ 2. As a result, it is impossible to
launch the above inference attack. For more details about the IWF module, we refer the reader to [189].
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate CryptoEdge platform along the following lines. (i) To evaluate the performance of the basic
secure aggregation, we consider ifferent edge computing settings such as the number of enrolled edge nodes,
the number of IoTs, the size of the sliding window, etc. (ii) We compare the performance of our CryptoEdge-
SA to the existing threshold Paillier based secure aggregation. (iii) We also evaluate the performance of the
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proposed CryptoEdge-PPFL framework with different baselines: TP-PPFL, where the secure aggregation
adopts the threshold Paillier scheme; HybridAlpha(HA)-PPFL - the HybridAlpha framework [189] - a PPFL
framework in two-layer cloud scenario.
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation Consideration. We have implemented the CryptoEdge platform in Python programming
language. Specifically, the underlying cryptosystems, namely, the threshold functional encryption scheme
and the threshold Pailier system, are also implemented in Python based on the gmpy2 library, which is a C-
coded Python extension module that supports multiple-precision arithmetic and relies on the GNU multiple
precision arithmetic (GMP) library. We also employ similar decryption acceleration techniques as adopted
in [189].
The underlying ML model to be trained in the CryptoEdge-PPFL framework is a convolutional neural
network (CNN) as the one used in [189] that is implemented using Keras with a Tensorflow as the back-end.
Specifically, CNN has two internal layers of ReLU units and a softmax layer of ten classes with cross-entropy
loss. The first layer contains 60 neurons and the second layer contains 1000 neurons. The total number of
parameters of this CNN is 118,110. We use the same hyperparameters as reported in [189], i.e., a learning
rate of 0.1, a batch rate of 0.01. and for differential privacy we use a norm clipping of 4.0, and epsilon of 0.5.
Dataset . To evaluate the performance of the secure aggregation approach, we use the randomly generated
numbers for each IoT device to simulate the data in the sliding window. For the evaluation of the CryptoEdge-
PPFL framework, we use the CNN to classify the publicly available MNIST dataset of handwritten digits
[106]. We also equally split the MNIST training samples and assign them to each IoT device in the training
phase of CryptoEdge-PPFL.
Experimental Environment . All experiments have been performed on the following test platforms: Plat-
form I - a local Macbook Pro with 2.5GHz quad-core Intel Core i7 CPU and 16GB RAM - is used for the
evaluation of various secure aggregation approaches; Platform II that is a remote cloud service to simulate
the edge computing scenario including three parties: (i) one AWS c5.18xlarge instance with 72 vCPUs and
144GB RAM to play the role of the cloud center; (ii) one AWS m5d.8xlarge instance with 32 vCPUs and
128GB RAM to play the role of the edge nodes; (iii) one AWS r5a.4xlarge instance with 2 vCPUs and
64GB RAM to play the role of the IoT devices. Note that multiple edge nodes and multiple IoT devices are
simulated at each machine platform.
5.4.2 Experimental Results
Evaluation of Secure Aggregation. As shown in Figure 5.4, we report the performance (i.e., the elaspsed
time cost in millisecond) of our proposed CryptoEdge(CE)-SA and also compare its results with that of
Threshold Paillier(TP)-SA. Overall, we evaluate all SA mechanisms in different edge computing settings:
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Figure 5.4: Performance comparison between weighted CryptoEdge(CE)-SA and Threshold Paillier(TP)-SA
in different settings: various number of IoTs and various number of enrolled edge nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Performance comparison among our CryptoEdge(CE)-PPFL, Threshold Paillier(TP)-PPFL and
HybridAlpha(HA)-PPFL in different settings.
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(i) we fix the number of IoTs (i.e., 100 and 1000), and then we evaluate the performance by increasing the
number of enrolled edge nodes; (ii) we fix the number of enrolled edge nodes (i.e., 5 and 10), and then
increase the number of IoTs to evaluate performance. In the upper part of the figure, our CE-SA has lesser
setup time (i.e., from 0.5 ms to 5 ms in our experiment), especially, compared to the TP-SA approach that
costs more than 100ms. Regarding IoT performance, our CE-SA approach reduces 70% processing time
than the TP-SA approach. Besides, we observe that the processing time of the IoT device is linear to the
number of IoT devices and is not impacted by the number of enrolled edge nodes. Also, a similar conclusion
is also applied for the processing time of the edge nodes. Furthermore, the processing time of cloud is only
impacted by the number of edge nodes, and our CE-SA still has better performance than the TP-SA.
Evaluation of CryptoEdge-FL. As reported in Figure 5.5, we compare the performance of our framework
(CryptoEdge(CE)-PPFL) with that of two baselines - HybridAlpha(HA)-PPFL and Threshold Paillier(TP)-
PPFL - in the different settings such as encoding precision (p), number of edge nodes, number of IoT devices,
and differential privacy (dp) settings. With regards to model accuracy (i.e., F1 score), our CE-PPFL can
achieve accuracy that is comparable to HA-PPFL in traditional two-tier architecture and TP-PPFL in
three-tier architecture. However, compared to HA-PPFL, CE-PPFL can reduce a participating IoT device’s
local processing time by 53% on average, and the cloud (i.e., the coordinator) processing time by 95% on
average. Furthermore, compared to TP-PPFL, our CE-PPFL can reduce the IoT (i.e., the participant)
local processing time 28% on average, the edge processing time 93% in average, and the cloud (i.e., the
coordinator) processing time 57% in average. Besides, we also observe that the higher encoding precision
setting will result in higher model accuracy, and the edge process time is a positive correlation to the number
of participating IoT devices.
5.5 Summary and Discussion
To tackle the challenge of potential privacy leakage in the aggregation computation in three-tier edge
computing architecture, we propose CryptoEdge to support practical and efficient secure aggregation over
the encrypted data in edge computing environments. CryptoEdge includes our proposed threshold func-
tional encryption (TFE) scheme, our secure aggregation approaches, and a privacy-preserving edge-based
FL framework. Besides, we have presented formal security and privacy analysis, as well as an experimental
evaluation considering various settings. Our evaluation results show that CryptoEdge achieves the security
and privacy guarantee and provides significant performance improvements.
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6.0 Transparent and Trustworthy Secure Computation Infrastructure using Blockchain
The provisioning of openness and accountability, also referred to as transparency, in recently proposed
works such as in [104, 152, 102, 122, 58, 33, 64] is an approach to increase users’ trust or confidence on
infrastructure service providers, especially, the cryptographic infrastructure that supports security related
services and is commonly assumed to be fully trusted. For instance, the certificate authorities (CAs), as
the underlying public key infrastructure for SSL/TLS protocol, are responsible for issuing digital certificates
that certify the ownership of a public key by the named principal of the certificate and allows others to rely
upon signatures made by the private key corresponding to the certified public key. To address the various
attacks [17, 194, 26] and mis-issuance problems [101, 158, 37] in the certificate issuing procedure, notions of
certificate transparency [102, 104] and transparency overlay [33] have been proposed. Transparency overlay
is actually a formal study of several specific certificate transparency frameworks.
Similar to certificate authority, we have proposed the notion of authority transparency in [190] to address
similar but more complex issues related to a TPA that is critical component of many emerging cryptosystems
such as FE schemes adopted in this dissertation and our proposed TFE scheme. Unlike the CAs that only
need to issue a certificate that proves the identity-to-public-key binding, the TPA is responsible for more
complex authority tasks such as setting public parameters and providing private key service for authorized
entities according to various credentials such as attribute identities and functionality-related vectors. In
particular, compared to certificate transparency, authority transparency can further capture multiple rounds
of interactions between the TPA and other entities.
Our initial authority transparency [190] work presents a formal architecture to make the TPAs transpar-
ent and trustworthy. There are still limitations that hinder its deployment and application in the privacy-
preserving machine learning (PPML) domains: (i) the definitions and protocols designed in [190] only work
on, as well as relies on, the attribute-based encryption schemes; (ii) the implementation of authority trans-
parency is based on a secure logging system. As a result, existing authority transparency proposal may
not nicely support other emerging cryptosystems such as functional encryption (FE) family that has been
used for secure computation in our proposed PPML systems. Except for the identity-to-public-key-binding
stealthy targeted attack and the private-key-service censorship attack as illustrated in [190], FE-based PPML
systems have additional privacy leakage issues, for instance, the inference attack by manipulating a mali-
cious vector as illustrated in [189, 191]. Furthermore, the deployment of distributed secure logging system
based authority transparency may not be widely accepted by the Internet community because (i) it requires
several commercial companies or non-profit organization who have the computation and storage capability
to deploy a secure logging system such as that occurs in the certificate transparency community (e.g., those
secure logging system deployed by Google and Mozilla); (ii) there is also a lack of a concrete mechanism for
the entities to participate in a transparency framework, and monitor and audit unintentional or malicious
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the T 3AB transparency framework.
behaviors.
To address the above-mentioned limitations, in this chapter, building up on our initial notion of authority
transparency framework in [190], we propose T 3AB framework to provide Transparency and Trustworthiness
of Third-party Authority and related entities using the Blockchain techniques. These entities (e.g., honest-
but-curious cloud server, third-party IaaS, and coordinator) and TPAs form the foundation of the secure
infrastructure for our proposed PPML approaches presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In
general, to achieve transparency and trustworthy goals, T 3AB employs the Ethereum blockchain as the
underlying public ledger infrastructure, and also uses a well-designed novel Ethereum smart contract to
support automatic accountability with additional incentive mechanisms that motivates participants’ auditing
behavior and punishes the misbehaviors or malicious behaviors.
6.1 Transparency Framework
6.1.1 Overview of the Framework
To tackle trust issues caused by a third-party authority and curious entities in FE-based applications,
here, we present our proposed T 3AB framework that increases the transparency and trustworthiness of the
entities using Ethereum blockchain.
Entities. Figure 6.1 illustrates the T 3AB framework. Note that the dashed lines represent the procedures of
FE-based applications, while the solid lines denote the procedures of the T 3AB framework. T 3AB consists
of the following entities:
• TPA. The TPA is the same role as in the ordinary functional encryption cryptosystem, but with addi-
tional responsibilities to fulfill in our T 3AB, including (a) submitting the public parameters obligations
(in particular, identity-to-public-key bindings), (b) reporting its fulfillment of obligations in the key
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service process, and (c) verifying that the submitted/reported obligations are permanently recorded in
blockchain.
• Actors. Actors include all users of an FE-based PPML system, namely, the entities (e.g., participants)
that employ the encryption algorithm and the entities (e.g., coordinator) that employ the decryption
algorithm. Besides, the actors may also need to fulfill the obligations of key service because it involves
interaction between the actors and the TPA.
• Monitors. Monitors are responsible for inspecting the contents of the recorded auditing obligations to
find suspicious obligations. In our T 3AB, the encryption entities or the additional independent entities
play the role of the monitors.
• Administrator. An administrator is responsible for the deployment, maintenance, administration of the
smart contract. The smart contract mainly includes three modules: (a) the obligation record module
that provides various interaction functions for the entities to achieve recording, auditing and inspection
requirements for the obligations, (b) the incentive mechanism that provides the payment and reward
functions to the participants, and (c) the inference prevention module (IPM), previously deployed in
a TPA as illustrated in [189]. Note that the Ethereum blockchain can ensure the trustworthiness of
smart contracts; it can also ensure that the recorded obligations are distributed, open, and against any
malicious tampering and normal revision. Furthermore, once deployed it does not need a centralized
administration.
Notations and Statement. To elaborate our T 3AB, we first present the notations, entities, and scenarios
of applying our T 3AB framework in an FE-based environment. Suppose that we have a group of data owners
{Cowneri }i∈[n] that will share their private data x = {xi}i∈[n] encrypted by an FE scheme where for simplicity
we assume that Cowneri owns data xi , a group of data users {Cuserj }j∈[m], where each data user has a vector
yj and needs to acquire the inner-product 〈x,yj〉 over the ciphertext of x, and a TPA A that provides public
and private key services for these data owners and users. Furthermore, let {Cownerk }k∈[l] be the monitors. We
use B representing the Ethereum blockchain, and let BT 3ABSC denote our proposed smart contract deployed
in the blockchain.
6.1.2 Threat Model
Existing FE-based applications are usually based on the assumption that the TPA is assumed to be fully
trusted and the coordinator (a.k.a., the decryption party) is assumed to be honest-but-curious. Hence, the
threat models in such cases typically focus on an adversary who attempts to compromise the encrypted
data and acurious entity that launches potential privacy attacks (e.g., infer the private information), while
honestly following the protocol/algorithm.
Unlike such a threat model, our T 3AB focuses on increasing entities’ trust on the TPA and the coordinator
via the transparency approach. In particular, T 3AB tries to reduce the dependence of FE-based applications
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on the assumptions of a trusted TPA and an honest coordinator. As the identity-to-public-key-binding stealthy
targeted attack and the private-key-service censorship attack illustrated in [190], the TPA may not be trusted
because of its unintentional misbehaviors or malicious behaviors. Similarly, the coordinator may also behave
dishonestly. We assume that such a dishonest adversary may pretend to behave honestly without being
detected by other entities. Adversaries may not follow the specification in the protocols, and/or attempt to
conceal their activities. In general, the dishonest adversary includes the TPA and actors, where a dishonest
TPA may attempt to forge a key service proof-of-work without actually providing a valid key service; and,
a dishonest actor may try to incorrectly blame other entities for misbehavior. Note that misbehavior may
be related to non-malicious misuse by normal actors or the behavior of compromised actors controlled by an
attacker.
We note that unlike the secure logging system based authority transparency framework in [190], where
the logger is treated as a potential dishonest adversary, in our T 3AB the Ethereum smart contract is adopted
as the public ledger infrastructure that has been proved to be a trusted computation platform.
6.1.3 Framework Details
T 3AB Model. Unlike the authority transparency model in [190] that builds on the secure logging system
for attribute-based encryption (ABE) cryptosystem, T 3AB uses the Ethereum blockchain, and to keep
consistency, we adopt the similar concepts/notions of the authority transparency model but it considers
different scenarios including FE-based applications and blockchain-based public ledger infrastructure.
Unlike ABE-based applications, in FE-based applications, there is no need to define complex attribute
identities in the functional encryption scheme, and hence, we update the related concepts with consideration
of the simplified identities and smart contracts.
Suppose that each entity e in T 3AB is issued or self-generates an identity-based public and private key
pair 〈pke, ske〉. Besides, the key service occurs between entity Cactor and authority A, where each entity
has already owned its public and private key pair. For instance, let 〈pkactor, skactor〉 and 〈pkTPA, skTPA〉
represent the public/private key pairs of the actor and the TPA, respectively. Here, we first present the
notion of public parameter audit obligation and key service audit obligation, and then the formal definition
of T 3AB model.
Definition 2 (Public Parameter Audit Obligation (PPAO)). A PPAO Opp of e is a map structure as follows:
Oepp := H(eid) : 〈eid, pke,Sigske(eid, pke)〉, (6.1)
where eid represents the descriptive identifier of e, H(·) is the hash function, pke denotes the public key
binding of entity e, and Sigske is the signature using ske.
Definition 3 (Key Service Audit Obligation (KSAO)). A KSAO OCactor,Aks is a map structure consisting of
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a pair of key service snapshots
OCactor,Aks := H(Cactorid ,Aid, r) : 〈Sreq,Sresp〉, (6.2)
where each snapshot is a 4-tuple as follows:
Sreq := H(Cactorid ,Aid, r) : 〈r, f, tCactor ,Sigskactor(r, f, tCactor)〉, (6.3)
Sresp := H(Cactorid ,Aid, r) : 〈r,Sigma, tA,SigskTPA(r,Sigma, tA)〉, (6.4)
such that
Sreq.H(Cactorid ,Aid, r) = Sresp.H(Cactorid ,Aid, r) (6.5)
Sresp.tA − Sreq.tCactor > 0 (6.6)
Sreq.tA − Sresp.tCactor < δt (6.7)
where r is the nonce selected by the key service requester, t is the timestamp of key service processed by each
entity, f denotes the request content such as function related vector, Sigma represents the proof-of-work that
TPA has issued the key, δt is the threshold of timestamp difference indicating the expected time of processing
of the key service request by the TPA.
Remark. In particular, the Opp is an identity-to-public-key binding with the issuer’s signature, while OC
actor,A
ks
is the proof-of-key-service. In the OCactor,Aks , for simplicity, to provide the proof-of-work of issuing the func-
tional private key skf for the function related materials f , let Sigma be H(skf ).
Based on the notion of public parameter audit obligation and key service audit obligation, we present the
formal T 3AB model as follows:
Definition 4 (T 3AB Model). Let A,B and C denote the third party authority, blockchain, and actor,
respectively, which are parties involved in the interactive protocols. Let C.actor and C.monitor represent the
roles of the actor and monitor that execute the functional and monitoring modules, respectively. We define
T 3AB model M as a set of five interactive protocols:
MA,B,CO = (GenO,LogOpp ,LogOks , Inspect), (6.8)
and each protocol is defined as follows:
(SOpp , SOks)← Run(1λ,GenO, {A, C.actor}) (6.9)
(bA, ε)← Run(1λ,LogOpp , {A,B}, (SOpp , ε)) (6.10)
(bA, bC , ε)← Run(1λ,LogOks , {A, C.actor,B}, (Oks.SA,Oks.SC , ε)) (6.11)
(bB, ε)← Run(1λ, Inspect, {B, C.monitor}, (ε, ε)) (6.12)
Lemma 4 presents the security guarantee as follows, which is proved later.
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Lemma 4. If the hash function is collision-resistant and the signature scheme is unforgeable, then T 3AB
model comprises a secure transparency framework.
Remark. Note that the formal definition of our T 3AB model is inherited from the authority transparency
model [190] with needed changes considering the underlying Ethereum blockchain infrastructure. Specifically,
in the authority transparency model, the gossip protocol essentially ensures the consistency of distributed logs
without being tampered by an adversary, while the check protocol guarantees that the submitted obligations
are recorded by the logging system. As T 3AB adopts the Ethereum blockchain as the underlying public
ledger infrastructure, there is no need to run the gossip and check protocols because these logging-related
functions are the implicit feature in the Ethereum smart contract.
Design of BT 3ABSC . The T 3AB smart contract is a critical component in our framework. To support the
goal of T 3AB framework, BT 3ABSC includes various types of modules: administrative module, access control
module, obligation module, inspection module, and incentive module. Each module is presented as follows:
Administrative module allows the role of administrator to deploy the smart contract into the Ethereum
network. The module also includes functions such as opening and locking the enrollment, allowing the
participants to drop out.
Access control module supports a basic role based access control mechanism that allows the account (a.k.a,
the participating entities) have permission to call role-related functions. In BT 3ABSC , we define four types of
roles: the TPA, the actors of data owner, the actors of data user, the monitors and the administrator (i.e.,
the smart contract owner). Obviously, the administrative entity who deploys the smart contract becomes
the smart contract owner. The ownership can be transferred to a new account if necessary. Besides, it is also
possible to relinquish this administrative privilege, which is a common pattern after an initial stage when
there is a decentralized administration requirement. After the deployment, each entity needs to register its
role by calling the corresponding function before they can use the ordinary features of the smart contract.
Obligation module works on recording the audit obligation into the public ledger. Regarding the entity
registration, it also publishes its identity-to-public-key binding to the Ethereum blockchain, as illustrated
above. Note that the identity of the entity is the unique public address (i.e., 42 hex string characters
without case-sensitivity) of the blockchain account, which is derived from the entity’s private key. With
regards to the key service audit obligation procedure, the key service requestor (i.e., data owner) can call
the corresponding function that includes role verification with a randomly generated request identifier, the
key-related request parameters, and the corresponding signature. The function then automatically analyzes
the key-related request parameters via executing the Inference Prevention Module (IPM). Note that BT 3ABSC
has already integrated the IPM module that is previously integrated in the TPA entity as illustrated in
Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5.2. Upon receiving the key service request with the request identifier,
the TPA first checks the verification result of IPM. If the request passes the verification, the TPA will issue
the functional private key and then publish a response snapshot to fulfill the key service obligation.
Inspection module mainly inspects the completeness of a pair of the key service snapshot to check whether the
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TPA’s fulfill its key service obligation or not. Besides, it also allows to check the published identity-to-public-
key binding. Beside the inspection module that can prevent potential misbehaviors, we have introduced the
access control mechanism to prevent partial misbehaviors and malicious behaviors as each entity only will
be allowed to call corresponding functions with limited privilege.
Incentive module in the BT 3ABSC includes several functions to achieve the incentive mechanism, as depicted
in Figure 6.3. The incentive mechanism is based on payment features of the Ethereum network, where the
token can be exchanged to real concurrency. As illustrated in Figure 6.3, we design several functions as
‘public payable’, which indicates that the smart contract is able to receive the transaction value (e.g., the
Ether) when the function is successfully called and executed.
In general, m data users need to equally pay for the cost of calling registration function for themselves as
well as n data owners and the TPA. Each data user also needs to pay for the cost of calling request obligation
record function and also the cost of calling response obligation record function by the TPA. Additionally,
there exists a mechanism to punish the misbehaviors and malicious activities by a dishonest TPA and data
users. To achieve that, the data users and the TPA first need to register and pay the cost by themselves.
The data owners equally make a deposit for all the entities’ registration cost after the enrollment phase.
Then, the data users and the TPA can call the disposable reward function to withdraw the registration
cost. Besides, we make the TPA and data owners make a guarantee deposit after the registration phase.
The monitors can register and pay the cost by themselves, and then calls the inspection function to check
the suspicious behaviors. If monitors find the malicious behaviors, they will acquire the reward from the
fine to the corresponding entity (i.e., the guarantee deposit of the entity). Without the guarantee deposit,
the corresponding entity is not allowed to operate in the system. Additionally, we discuss the quantitative
analysis of the cost of each entity in BT 3ABSC in Section 6.3.
T 3AB Procedures. As depicted in Figure 6.2, we illustrate the four phases of the T 3AB framework with
specific procedures in a typical FE-based application scenario. Note that the dashed arrows represent the
functional procedures of a typical FE-based application, while the solid arrows denote procedures of the
T 3AB framework. In our design, each entity in the FE-based application can also play the role of the
auditor and monitor in the T 3AB framework, and we also allow additional monitors to help inspect the
misbehaviors and malicious behaviors.
Here, we present the specific procedures of each phase in the T 3AB framework as follows:
Phase I: entity initialization: For each entity e with role erole and identifier eid in the framework, it generates
a public and private key pair 〈pke, ske〉. Then, entity e registers its role erole to BT
3AB
SC , and publish its id-
to-public-key binding 〈eid,pke〉 with its signature Sigske(eid,pke) to BT
3AB
SC .
Phase II: FE initialization. The TPA A setups the FE cryptosystem with the master public key and master
private key pair 〈mpkFE,mskFE〉. Using the master keys, the TPA generates and sends the common public
key pkFEcom for all entities (i.e., data owners and data users) in the FE-based application. Then, the TPA
publishes the binding 〈Aid,pkFEcom〉 with its signature SigskA(Aid,pkFEcom) to BT
3AB
SC .
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of the four phases of T 3AB framework in a FE-based application scenario
Phase III: secure data publishing. For each data owner Cowneri , it first selects a nonce r as the key service
identifier. Then Cowneri requests the entity-specific public key pkFECowneri from the TPA with r. Meanwhile,
Cowneri also sends a request key service snapshot SC
owner
i
req to BT 3ABSC as follows:
SCownerireq = 〈r, 0, tCowneri ,SigskCowner
i
(r, 0, tCowneri )〉. (6.13)
Then, the TPA generates pkFECowneri for Cowneri using its master keys, and also publishes a corresponding
response key service snapshot SAresp to BT
3AB
SC to fulfill its key service audit obligation OC
owner
i ,A
ks with mapping
key H(Cowneri,id ,Aid, r) as follows:
SAresp = 〈r,H(pkFECowneri ), tA,SigskA(r,H(pk
FE
Cowneri ), tA)〉. (6.14)
Each data owner then uses pkFEeowneri to encrypt its data as {EncpkFEeowner
i
(xi)}i∈[n]. Finally, the data owner
publishes a receipt for the received pkFEeowneri .
Phase IV: secure data computation. Suppose that a data user Cuserj who has a vector yj = (y1, ..., yn)j would
apply inner-product functionality over the encrypted data {Enc(x1), ...,Enc(xn)}. Cuserj also select a key
service identifier r′ first, and then requests the functional private key skFEyj to the TPA with the vector yj
and r′. At the same time, Cuserj also sends the request key service snapshot S
Cuserj
req to BT 3ABSC as follows:
SC
user
j
req = 〈r′, yj , tCuserj ,SigskCuser
j
(r′, 0, tCuserj )〉. (6.15)
Unlike the approaches proposed in [191, 189] that deploy the inference prevention module (IPM) into the
TPA, we propose to deploy IPM in the smart contract as the TPA is not fully trusted in the T 3AB framework.
Thus, the TPA needs to query BT 3ABSC to check the validity result of yi. If yi is valid, the TPA generates
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skFEyj for Cuserj using its master keys, and then publishes a corresponding response key service snapshot SAresp
to BT 3ABSC to fulfill its key service audit obligation O
Cuserj ,A
ks with mapping key H(Cuserj ,A, r′) as follows:
SAresp = 〈r′,H(skFEyj ), tA,SigskA(r′,H(skFEyj ), tA)〉. (6.16)
Otherwise, the TPA legally refuses the key service and also publishes key service snapshot indicating that it
has legally refuse the key service. SA,refuseresp with refusing symbol ⊥ to BT
3AB
SC to fulfill its key service audit
obligation as follows:
SA,refuseresp = 〈r′,H(⊥, yj), tA,SigskA(r′,H(skFEyj ), tA)〉. (6.17)
With the received skFEy , data user can compute the inner-product of 〈x,y〉 by decryting as follows:
〈x,yj〉 = DecskFEyj ({EncpkFECowneri (xi)}i∈[n]). (6.18)
Finally, the data owner publishes a receipt for the received skFEy .
Remark. To avoid redundant description, we do not present the roles of auditor and monitor in the above-
discussed procedures. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, the data users, data owners and the TPA
also play the role of auditor that checks whether the audit obligations are recorded into the blochchain
permanently. In our design, the data owners also play the role of a monitor to check the suspicious obligations
caused by misbehaviors and malicious behaviors from the TPA and adversarial data users. For instance, as
illustrated in [191, 189], an adversarial data user may infer the private vector x by manipulating a vector
to request the functional private key. The monitor can inspect Oeuser,eTPAks to find adversary’s suspicious
behaviors.
6.2 Analysis of Security, Privacy and Trustworthiness
6.2.1 Security Guarantee
The security for the transparency framework is defined in terms of three properties [190, 33]: (i) log-
consistency - a dishonest public ledger cannot remain undetected if it tries to present inconsistent versions of
the record obligations; (ii) unforgeable-service - a dishonest TPA cannot forge a key service by sending valid
key service snapshots, but not provide the key service to the actors; (iii) non-fabrication - a dishonest TPA
or actors cannot blame the public ledger for misbehavior if it has behaved honestly, and dishonest actors
cannot prove the TPA for misbehavior if it has behaved honestly.
Briefly, log-consistency relies on the security properties of the Ethereum blockchain. The unforgeable-
service and non-fabrication properties depend on the designed smart contract functions and the adopted
signature scheme. Here, we use the game simulation-based reduction methodology to prove Lemma 4.
Proof. The T 3AB is built on three fundamental security components: the Ethereum blockchain as the
public ledger infrastructure, the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA3) as the collision-resistance hash function,
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the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to sign and validate the origin and integrity of
messages. The security of three components has been proved in corresponding related work [184, 63, 93].
We only prove the above-mentioned three security properties.
log-consistency. Unlike the existing transparency framework, [190, 33] that relies on the customized public
ledger, our T 3AB uses the public blockchain that has already been proved with secure consistency feature
[184], and hence we do not present it here to avoid redundancy.
unforgeable-service. In T 3AB, there are two possible forgeable-service issues:
• the dishonest TPA may publish SAresp to the blockchain, but does not send the key skf to the actors;
• the dishonest TPA may send an invalid key sk′f to the actors, but publishes correct SAresp generated from
the valid key skf .
For the first issue, the confirmation phase cannot be achieved in our designed smart contract, and then such
adversarial behavior is easily detected by the monitors. For the second issue, suppose that the dishonest
TPA has the non-negligible advantage  to break the unforgeable-service security guarantee, and hence it
can forge the hashed key component HSHA3(sk
′
f ) for skf with advantage Adv
A
HSHA3(sk
′
f )→skf
≥ .
To achieve that, the dishonest TPA hence needs the ability to find potential collision HSHA3(skf ) =
HSHA3(sk
′
f ). According to the security promise of SHA3, it is impossible to find that collision with non-
negligible advantage. Thus, dishonest TPA does not have a non-negligible advantage to provide an unforge-
able key service without being detected.
non-fabrication. In T 3AB, the possible fabrication case is that the dishonest actors attempt to blame
the TPA by publishing SCactorreq to the blockchain but does not actually send the key request to the TPA.
Suppose that the dishonest actor has the non-negligible advantage  to break the non-fabrication security
promise. To launch the fabrication case, the dishonest actor needs to forge a fake SAresp so that it can
accomplish the confirmation phase. Thus, the dishonest actor is able to forge a fake signature of the TPA
with advantage AdvC
actor
skA ≥ . However, it is impossible to break the ECDSA that has been proved, namely,
the unforgeability of the signature scheme. Thus, the actors do not have a non-negligible advantage to frame
up the TPA.
6.2.2 Privacy Guarantee
Unlike the authority transparency framework that focuses on attribute-based encryption-based applica-
tions where partial attribute identities are privacy-sensitive, the T 3AB framework targets the functional
encryption-based application scenarios. There is no privacy concern regarding the identity in the FE-based
applications. Furthermore, the identity of each entity in T 3AB is the public account address of the Ethereum
network, which is a random 64 character hex string generated from the private key of the entity. Thus, such
account identities do not reveal any private information, even public identity information in the FE-based
applications.
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6.2.3 Trustworthiness Goal
The purpose of the T 3AB framework is dealing with the trust issue for potential dishonest entities by
providing transparency features for them. T 3AB is able to prevent the classic attacks such as stealthy tar-
geted attack and censorship attack as illustrated in [190]. Specifically, each dishonest entity needs to publish
the key service snapshot to prove that it has fulfilled its obligation of public parameter distribution and
private key service. The designed smart contract can ensure that each entity’s submitted audit obligations
can be automatically cross-validated based on our designed protocols before being honestly and permanently
recorded into the blockchain. Our security analysis has shown that the misbehaviors or malicious behaviors
of TPA and the actors are easily detected. Besides, the inference prevention module (IPM) that helps to
mitigate the inference attacks caused by the curious data users, which is also a critical component in FE-
based applications. In our T 3AB, the IPM, previously deployed in the TPA, now is moved to the smart
contract.
6.3 Experimental Evaluation
6.3.1 Implementation and Setup
The T 3AB model does not rely on the specific FE-based applications, and hence for generality, we only
present the evaluation on a pure T 3AB model with the simulated audit obligations where the key-related
components are generated by the FE-based application in an off-line manner.
Implemented Smart Contract. We implemented the smart contracts in Solidity programming lan-
guage using a Truffle 1 framework - a development environment, testing framework and asset pipeline for
blockchains using the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Figure 6.3 presents simplified T 3AB smart contract
interfaces. T 3AB mainly includes four types of functions as follows:
• Access Control Modifiers. The modifier can be used to change the behavior of functions in a declarative
way. In our implementation, we use the modifier to automatically check the privilege of each account that
is defined in the role-based access control (RBAC) module prior to executing the function. We employ
the Ownable and AccessControl smart contract 2 from OpenZeppelin as the base of our access control
mechanism. To be specific, we define various access control modifiers in which the basic RBAC functions
are integrated to satisfy our access control requirement. Except for the registration related functions,
other functions are restricted by these modifiers.
• Administrative and Incentive Functions. We define several administrative functions such as ‘enrollLock()’,
‘enrollOpen()’, ‘dropout()’ that allows the administrator to control the enrollment status. In T 3AB, each
1https://www.trufflesuite.com/
2https://openzeppelin.com/contracts/
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1 pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
2 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
3 import "./Ownable.sol";
4 import "./AccessControl.sol";
5 contract T3AB is Ownable, AccessControl {
6 // access control related modifiers
7 bytes32 public constant AUTHORITY_ROLE = keccak256("AUTHORITY_ROLE");
8 bytes32 public constant ACTOR_DATA_OWNER_ROLE = keccak256("ACTOR_DATA_OWNER_ROLE");
9 bytes32 public constant ACTOR_DATA_USER_ROLE = keccak256("ACTOR_DATA_USER_ROLE");
10 bytes32 public constant MONITOR_ROLE = keccak256("MONITOR_ROLE");
11 modifier onlyAuthority()
12 modifier onlyDataOwner()
13 modifier onlyDataUser()
14 modifier onlyActor()
15 modifier onlyMonitor()
16 modifier onlyDeposit()
17 modifier onlyWithdrawRegisterCost()
18 // administrative and intensive
19 function enrollLock() public onlyOwner
20 function enrollOpen() public onlyOwner
21 function depositeGuarantee() public payable onlyDeposit
22 function rewardRegisterCost() public onlyWithdrawRegisterCost
23 function rewardDeploymentCost() public onlyOwner
24 function _checkGuaranteeDeposit(address account) private returns(bool)
25 function _inferencePreventionModule(uint[l] memory y) private returns(bool)
26 function dropout() public
27 // Registration
28 function registerAuthority(bytes memory pk, signature memory sign) public payable
29 function registerActorDataOwner(bytes memory pk, signature memory sign) public
30 function registerActorDataUser(bytes memory pk, signature memory sign) public
31 function registerMonitor(bytes memory pk, signature memory sign) public
32 // Obligation
33 function recordKSPKReq(bytes32 id, uint pkReqSymbol, uint reqTime, signature memory sign) public onlyDataOwner
34 function recordKSPKResp(bytes32 id, bytes32 pkHash, uint respTime, signature memory sign) public onlyAuthority
35 function recordKSSKReq(bytes32 id, uint[l] memory y, uint reqTime, signature memory sign) public payable onlyDataUser returns(bool)
36 function recordKSSKResp(bytes32 id, bytes32 skHash, uint respTime, signature memory sign) public onlyAuthority
37 function recordKSConfirm(address tpa, bytes32 id, bytes32 keyHash, uint confirmTime,
38 signature memory signRecpt, signature memory sign) public onlyActor
39 // Inspection
40 function inspectObligationKS(bytes32 id) public onlyMonitor returns(bool)
41 function inspectObligationPP(address addr, bytes memory pk, signature memory sign) public onlyMonitor returns(bool)
42 }
1
Figure 6.3: Overview of the smart contract interfaces. Note that the parameter ‘signature’ is our defined
customized struct that are not presented here. Such a feature is provide in ABIEncoderV2.
entity can register if and only if the enrollment is set as open by the administrator. After the enrollment
is locked, the deposit operations are opened to the related entities. Besides, T 3AB also inherits the
administrative functions such as ‘transferOwnership(newOwner)’, ‘renounceOwnership()’ that are not
presented in Figure 6.3. These two functions allow transferring the ownership of the contract and leave
the contract without owner, respectively. Furthermore, we also defined several withdraw and deposit
functions that help to establish the base of the incentive and penalty mechanism.
• Registration Functions. The registration functions mainly focus on the initialization phases of the T 3AB
model (i.e., Phases I and II, as illustrated in Section 6.1.3), where each entity is allowed to register a role,
and publish its identity-to-public-key binding in the blockchain.
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Table 6.1: Gas cost and test time of selected functions in various test case scenarios
Test Cases Functions Gas Cost Test Time Description
Administrative
deployment 4125603 183ms deploy the smart contract
enrollOpen 44126 42ms open the enrollment
enrollLock 14531 46ms lock the enrollment
dropout 28293 178ms allow to drop out and withdraw the balance
Incentive
depositGuarantee 28083 48ms deposit the guarantee
rewardRegisterCost 52949 43ms reward the registration cost for non-payable entity
rewardDeploymentCost 51584 41ms reward the deployment for the administrator
Registeration
registerAuthority 38276 80ms register the role of third-party authority
registerActorDataOwner 38335 71ms register the role of data owner
registerActorDataUser 36555 70ms register the role of data user
registerMonitor 36521 72ms register the role of monitor
Obligation
recordKSSKReq 43173 96ms publish the key service request snapshot
recordKSSKResp 84211 55ms publish the key service response snapshot
recordKSConfirm 43402 49ms confirm the receipt of the key service obligation
Inspection
inspectObligationKS 24511 41ms inspect the key service audit obligation
inspectObligationPP 37482 46ms check the correct of the public parameter
• Obligation Functions. The obligation functions address the core features of the T 3AB model. As illus-
trated in Section 6.1.3 Phases III and IV, we use a three-phase commitment approach to achieve the
obligation features. To be specific, ‘recordKSPKReq’, ‘recordKSSKReq’ allows the actors to publish the
key service request snapshot, while ‘recordKSPKResp’, ‘recordKSSKResp’ allows the TPA to record cor-
responding key service response snapshot. Then, ‘recordKSPKResp’ function allows us to confirm the
receipt of the key service.
• Inspection Functions. The inspection functions address the monitoring task for the recorded audit obliga-
tion as discussed in Section 6.1.3. To be specific, ‘inspectObligationKS’ function allows to automatically
inspect the completeness of the key service obligations, while ‘inspectObligationPP’ function permits the
monitor to verify the published identity-to-public-key binding. Regarding the incentive design, if the
dishonest behavior is detected, the corresponding entity will be fined a fixed number of ether as the
incentive reward for the monitor.
Experimental Setup. Our experiments are performed on a Macbook Pro platform with 2.3GHz 8-Core
Intel Core i9 processors and 32GB DDR4 memory. Besides, we use the Ethereum official test network -
Rinkeby as the experimental environment to deploy our implemented smart contract. Furthermore, we write
several JavaScript test-cases using the automated testing framework of Truffle that is built on Mocha3 and
provides a cleanroom environment.
Specifically, for demonstration, we use five Ethereum accounts to simulate various entities in T 3AB,
namely, the role of the administrator, the TPA, the data owner, the data user and the monitor. With
regards to various scenarios, we write corresponding test-cases to evaluate the performance (i.e., the gas cost
and the time cost) such as the administrative scenario, registration scenario, obligation scenario, etc..
3https://mochajs.org/
102
6.3.2 Experiment Results
We report the performance of T 3AB for selected typical functions in various test case scenarios in
Table 6.1. In particular, the performance includes two aspects: the gas cost and the test time. Gas is spent
in Ethereum for deploying smart contracts or calling functions. As reported in Table 6.1, most functions
cost very little. Specifically, except for the smart contract deployment, the cost of each function is at the
level of 105 gas in general. Regarding the highly called functions for obligation and inspection, to record
an audit obligation for one key service, the functions of three-phase commitment (i.e., recordKSSKReq,
recordKSSKResp, recordKSConfirm) cost 3.7 × 105 gas, 8.4 × 105 gas, 4.3 × 105 gas, respectively. Besides,
the cost of inspection for key service and public parameter audit obligations is 2.4 × 105 gas and 3.7 × 105
gas, respectively.
Furthermore, we also measure the time it takes to test the selected functions. Except for the administra-
tive functions, the calling time of rest of the functions is less than 100ms. Note that the time to test each
function is measured in the Ethereum test network. The testing time is related to execution time instead of
time taken to confirm transaction . Thus, the deployment time of the smart contract is only 183ms rather
than the general time taken to confirm a transaction, namely, about 6 minutes.
6.4 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, we have proposed the T 3AB framework to provide transparency and trustworthiness of
the third-party authority (TPA) and honest-but-curious entities in the recently proposed FE-based privacy-
preserving machine learning (PPML) systems. T 3AB employs the Ethereum blockchain as the underlying
public ledger infrastructure and also includes a novel smart contract mechanism to support accountability.
In addition, it includes an incentive mechanism to motivate participants’ audit and punish the misbehaviors
or malicious behaviors. We presented the evaluation of the proposed framework which shows that the
framework is efficient in the Ethereum official test network, and achieves the security and privacy guarantee
and trustworthiness goal.
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7.0 Conclusion and Future Research
7.1 Conclusion
Privacy-preserving ML (PPML) is critical for ML-powered systems as they typically need to use users’
privacy-sensitive data for training and prediction phases. To tackle privacy challenges in ML, novel PPML
techniques are needed. Towards this, recent approaches proposed in the literature have aimed at integrating
existing privacy-preserving methods into ML models. While various types of privacy-preserving approaches
have been proposed, they have their own limitations. For instance, the use of a garbled circuits-based secure
computation approach incur high communication overhead because of a large volume of intermediate data
that needs to be transmitted during the execution of the protocol, while the adoption of emerging differential
privacy raises challenges related to trade-offs between model accuracy and privacy budget.
In this dissertation, we have discussed various PPML approaches that have been proposed in the literature
and their limitations. We have mainly focused on secure computation approaches, one of the key privacy-
preserving techniques in PPML, in which the released data is protected by a cryptosystem and the ML related
computations occur over encrypted data. Specifically, we have focused on secure computation approaches for
PPML in the context of two-tier and three-tier architectures, and emerging DL models and FL. The central
piece of the secure computation solutions we have proposed is functional encryption. In this dissertation, we
make the following key contributions:
• For two-tier PPML architecture, we have proposed secure computation solutions to achieve PPFL in
Chapter 3. We have proposed the HybridAlpha framework to support efficient training in horizontal
PPFL as well as providing a strong privacy guarantee. Only a few existing approaches address vertical
PPFL problems, where they only support a specific machine learning model and suffer from inefficiency
in terms of both secure computation and training time. To tackle those challenges, we have proposed the
FedV framework built on a well-designed secure SGD approach that makes use of functional encryption
schemes. The security and privacy analysis show that HybridAlpha and FedV achieves privacy and
security goals. We also implemented and experimentally evaluated HybridAlpha and FedV and the
results show that they can reduce the training time and total data transfer volume significantly without
sacrificing privacy guarantee and model performance.
• We have also proposed NN-EMD in Chapter 4, which is a novel privacy-preserving DNN model applicable
in a two-tier cloud-client PPML architecture, where the raw data is protected by functional encryption
schemes and the training task is done over encrypted data. NN-EMD also supports multiple data sources,
where the data may be composed of horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets. The evaluation shows
that NN-EMD can reduce the training time while still providing the same model accuracy and strong
privacy guarantee as compared to most of the recent comparable solutions. Unlike existing HE-based
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solutions, the depth and complexity of DNNs in our NN-EMD do not affect the training time despite
integrating a privacy-preserving component in NN-EMD.
• In edge-enabled three-tier PPML architecture, edge nodes can pre-process data from the client devices
such as sensors or mobile devices. Our proposed CryptoEdge solution in Chapter 5 enable pre-processing
at the edge and final processing at the cloud, both over the encrypted data or model; this approach helps
protect the privacy of data generated by the sensors or mobile devices, where the data and model are
protected by our proposed threshold functional encryption scheme. The proposed CryptoEdge supports
various types of secure aggregations at the edge and PPFL framework in a three-tier PPML architecture.
We evaluated CryptoEdge in a simulated cloud-edge environment, and our evaluation results show that
CryptoEdge provides significant performance improvement on system efficiency as well as achieves the
security and privacy guarantees.
• To address the issues related to trustworthiness of a third-party authority (TPA) and commercial in-
frastructures such as cloud service providers that are essential for the proposed secure computation
approaches, we have proposed a framework in Chapter 6 to address transparency and accountability
issues so as to increase the trust for entities such as a TPA and other honest-but-curious entities in the
proposed FE-based PPML solutions. We show that the proposed transparency framework is effective
and efficient in the Ethereum test network and guarantees the security properties of log-consistency,
unforgeable-service, and non-fabrication.
7.2 Future Research
Here, we present some possible future research directions:
• Our proposed solutions for three-tier PPML architecture only support various types of secure aggre-
gations, and hence the supported ML-enabled applications are limited to those that only need secure
aggregation operations such as privacy-preserving horizontal federated learning. There is still a lack of
secure computation approaches to address more complex computational tasks to support more complex
PPML such as privacy-preserving vertical federated learning and PPML in a three-tier architecture. To
tackle the challenge, it will be worth exploring various threshold functional encryption (TFE) schemes
beyond the multi-client TFE scheme proposed in this dissertation. Based on the newly proposed TFE
schemes in the literature and our proposed TFE scheme, one possible direction is to explore extensions
to these to solve more complex secure computation tasks rather than the aggregation tasks in PPML.
• Note that the solutions proposed in this dissertation are built using existing single-client or multi-client
functional encryption schemes and our proposed threshold functional encryption scheme. A common
and critical component in these schemes is a trusted third-party authority (TPA) that provides the key
service such as generating entity-specific public keys and functional private keys. Another direction
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worth exploring include more efficient and decentralized functional encryption based schemes that do not
depend on a TPA.
• We have explored primarily two-tier PPML architecture and three-tier PPML architecture in this dis-
sertation. We believe there is still a need to explore various other architectures under various security
assumptions. For instance, one research direction maybe addressing secure computation in multi-cloud
environment, where the third-party cloud providers are not fully trusted by an enterprise to process its
private business data.
In summary, ML represents a very critical technological innovation that has a huge potential for a
transformative societal impact. And we are already seeing that in many ML-enabled applications in many
domains. As we make widely available powerful and novel ML solutions, it is important to ensure that
their privacy-implications are properly understood and addressed. The goal of this dissertation has been to
identify some key research challenges related to ensuring privacy protection when various ML techniques are
employed in different kinds of architectural context. Accordingly, we have proposed various approaches based
on functional encryption schemes that provide practical solutions to deploying ML models while ensuring
privacy guarantees. We believe that more work needs to be done to address various related challenges as
discussed above and explore newer approaches that will further improve efficiency while ensuring security
and privacy guarantees. Such solutions will ensure that our society can reap the benefits of ML technologies
without having to worry much about individual privacy, a fundamental for our society.
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Appendix A
Functional Encryption
In this chapter, we introduce the notations and definitions of functional encryption (FE). Then, we
present the specific constructions of single-input functional encryption (SIFE) and multi-input functional
encryption (MIFE) for functionality of inner-product.
A.1 Definitions
Following the initial definition from [25] and [5], we present the notion of functionality, the functional
encryption scheme, security assumption and security definition.
A.1.1 Functionality
Definition 5 (Functionality [25]). A functionality F defined over (K,X) is a function F : K×X → Σ∪{⊥}
where K is the key space, X is the message space and Σ is the output space and ⊥ is a special string not
contained in Σ.
Note that the functionality is undefined when either the key is not in the keyspace or the message is not
in the message space.
A.1.2 Functional Encryption Scheme
Definition 6 (Functional Encryption Scheme [25]). A functional encryption (FE) scheme for functionality
F is a tuple EFFE = (Setup, KeyDerive, Encrypt, Decrypt) of four algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) outputs public and master secret keys (mpk, msk) for security parameter λ;
• KeyDerive(msk, k) outputs secret key skk on input a master secret key msk and key k ∈ K;
• Encrypt(mpk, x) outputs ciphertext ct on input public key mpk and message x ∈ X;
• Decrypt(mpk, ct, skx) outputs z ∈ Σ ∪ {⊥}.
Note that the correctness of EFFE is described as ∀(mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ), ∀k ∈ K,x ∈ X, for skk ←
KeyDerive(msk, k) and ct ← Encrypt(mpk, x), we have that Decrypt(mpk, ct, skx) = F(x, k) whenever
F(x, k) 6=⊥, except with negligible probability.
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A.1.3 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group G of order q, and with generator g. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption states that the tuples (g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc) are computationally indistinguish-
able, where a, b, c ∈ Zp are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
A.1.4 Security of Functional Encryption
Definition 7 (Selective Simulation-based Secure FE [5]). A functional encryption EFE for functionality F
is selective simulation-based secure (SEL-SIM-secure) if there exist PPT simulator algorithms
ESIMFE = (SetupSIM,KeyDeriveSIM, EncryptSIM, DecryptSIM), (A.1)
such that for every stateful PPT adversary A and λ ∈ N, the following two distributions are computationally
indistinguishable:
Experiment REALEFESEL (1
λ,A)
{xi}i∈[n] ← A(1λ,F)
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ,F)
∀i ∈ [n], cti ← Encrypt(mpk, i, xi)
α← AKeyDerive(msk)(mpk, {cti}i∈[n])
Output : α
Experiment IDEALEFESEL (1
λ,A)
{xi}i∈[n] ← A(1λ,F)
(mpkSIM,mskSIM)← SetupSIM(1λ,F)
∀i ∈ [n], cti ← EncryptSIM(mpkSIM, i)
α← AO(·)(mpkSIM , {cti}i∈[n])
Output : α
The oracle O(·) in the ideal experiment above is given access to another oracle that, given f ∈ F , returns
f(x1, ..., xn), and then O(·) returns KeyDeriveSIM (mskSIM, f, f(x1, ..., xn)).
Note that for every stateful adversary A, we define its advantage as follows:
AdvSEL-SIMA,EFE = |Pr[REALEFESEL(1λ,A) = 1]− Pr[IDEALEFESEL(1λ,A)]|. (A.2)
We also require that for every PPT A, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
∀λ ∈ N,AdvSEL−SIMA,EFE = negl(λ). (A.3)
A.2 Single-Client FE for Functionality of Inner-Product
The single-input FE scheme for the functionality of inner-product EFSCIPFE is defined as
EFSCIPFE = (EFSCIPFE .S, EFIPFE .K, EFSCIPFE .E, EFSCIPFE .D), (A.4)
where the functionality is defined as
FSCIP(x,y) = 〈x,y〉 =
η∑
i=1
(xiyi). (A.5)
Each of the algorithm is constructed as follows:
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• EFSCIPFE .S → Setup(1λ, η): The algorithm first generates two samples as (G, p, g) ←$ GroupGen(1λ), and
s = (s1, ..., sη)←$ Zηp on the inputs of security parameters λ and η, and then sets pk and msk as follows:
pk = (g, hi = g
si)i∈[1,...,η] (A.6)
msk = s (A.7)
It returns the pair (pk,msk).
• EFSCIPFE .K → SKGenerate(msk,y): The algorithm outputs the function secret key skf = 〈y,s〉 on the
inputs of master secret key msk and vector y.
• EFSCIPFE .E → Encrypt(pk,x): The algorithm first chooses a random r ←$ Zp and computes ct0 = gr.
For each i ∈ [1, ..., η], it computes cti = hri · gxi . Then the algorithm outputs the ciphertext ct =
(ct0, {cti}i∈[1,...,η]).
• EFSCIPFE .D → Decrypt(pk, ct, skf , y): The algorithm takes the ciphertext ct, the public key mpk and
functional key skf for the vector y, and returns the discrete logarithm in basis g, as follows:
g〈x,y〉 =
∏
i∈[1,...,η]
ctyii /ct
skf
0 . (A.8)
A.3 Multi-Client FE for Functionality of Inner-Product
The multi-input functional encryption scheme for the inner-product EFMCIPFE is defined as
EFMCIPFE = (EFMCIPFE .S, EFMCIPFE .PK, EFMCIPFE .SK, EFMCIPFE .E, EFMCIPFE .D). (A.9)
where the functionality is defined as
FMCIP = 〈{xi}i∈[n], y〉 =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[ηi]
(xijy∑i−1
k=1 ηk+j
) s.t. |xi| = ηi, |y| =
∑
i∈[n]
ηi, (A.10)
The specific construction of each algorithm is defined follows:
• EFMCIPFE .S → Setup(1λ,~η, n): The algorithm first generates secure parameters as G = (G, p, g) ←$
GroupGen(1λ), and then generates several samples as a←$ Zp, a = (1, a)ᵀ, ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n] : W i ←$ Zηi×2p ,
ui ←$ Zηip . Then, it generates the master public key and master private key as
mpk = (G, ga , gWa), (A.11)
msk = (W , (ui)i∈[1,...,n]). (A.12)
• EFMCIPFE .PK → PKDistribute(mpk,msk, idi): It looks up the existing keys via idi and returns the public
key as
pki = (G, ga , (Wa)i,ui). (A.13)
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• EFMCIPFE .SK → SKGenerate(mpk,msk,y): The algorithm first partitions y into (y1||y2||...||yn), where |yi|
is equal to ηi. Then it generates the function derived key as
skf,y = ({dᵀi ← yᵀiW i}, z ←
∑
yᵀi ui). (A.14)
• EFMCIPFE .E → Encrypt(pki,xi): The algorithm first generates a random nonce ri ←R Zp, and then com-
putes the ciphertext as
cti = (ti ← gari , ci ← gxiguig(Wa)iri). (A.15)
• EFMCIPFE .D → Decrypt(ct, skf,y): The algorithm first calculates as follows:
C =
∏
i∈[1,...,n]([y
ᵀ
i ci]/[d
ᵀ
i ti])
z
, (A.16)
and then recovers the function result as
f((x1,x2, ...,xn), y) = logg(C). (A.17)
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Appendix B
Differential Privacy
B.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [60, 62] is a rigorous mathematical framework where an algorithm may be
described as differentially private if and only if the inclusion of a single instance in the training dataset
causes only statistically insignificant changes to the algorithm’s output. The formal definition for DP is as
follows:
Definition 8 (Differential Privacy [60]). A randomized function K gives (, δ)-differential privacy if for all
data sets D and D
′
differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp () · Pr[K(D′) ∈ S] + δ. (B.1)
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of K.
The additive term δ allows for the possibility that plain -differential privacy is broken with probability
δ (which is preferably smaller than 1/|d|). Usually, a paradigm of an approximating a deterministic function
f : D → R with a differentially private mechanism is via additive noise calibrated to function’s sensitivity
Sf that is defined as the maximum of the absolute distance |f(d)− f(d′)|. The representative and common
additive noise mechanisms for real-valued functions are Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism, as
respectively defined as follows:
MGauss(d; f, , δ) = f(d) +N (µ, σ2) = f(d) +N (0, 2 ln(1.25/δ)
2
· S2f ) (B.2)
MLap(d; f, ) = f(d) + Lap(µ, b) = f(d) + Lap(0,
S2f

) (B.3)
Note that -differential privacy can be treated as a special case of (, δ)-differential privacy where δ = 0.
To achieve DP, multiple mechanisms designed to inject noise to the algorithm’s output have been proposed.
These mechanisms add noise proportional to the sensitivity of the output, a measure of the maximum change
of the output resulting by the inclusion of a single data point. Popular mechanisms include Laplacian and
Gaussian mechanisms, where the Gaussian mechanism for a dataset D is defined as M(D) = f(D) +
N(0, S2fσ
2), where N(0, S2fσ
2) is the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation Sfσ. By
applying the Gaussian mechanism to function f with sensitivity Sf satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy [61].
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B.2 Noise Reduction through SMC
SMC allows multiple parties to compute a function over their inputs, without revealing their individual
inputs [21, 49]. SMC can be achieved using different techniques such as garbled circuit with oblivious transfer,
fully or partially homomorphic encryption, and functional encryption.
Prior work has shown that it is possible to maintain the same DP guarantee achieved by local differential
privacy [95, 145], i.e., each party adds its own noise independently, and uses SMC to hide individual inputs.
Concretely, using the Gaussian mechanism defined above, local differential privacy requires each participant
to independently add N(0, S2fσ
2). Considering n parties, the total noise adds up to n. However, when
applying SMC each participant can add a fraction of the noise N(0, 1nS
2σ2) and then use a SMC technique
to share the value for aggregation. As shown in [173], this ensures the same DP guarantee while reducing
the amount of total noise injected by a factor of n.
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Appendix C
Appendix of FedV
C.1 Specific Analysis of Lemma 1
Here, we present our detailed analysis of Lemma 1. Note that we skip the discussion on how to compute
∇R in the rest of the proof such as in ( C.3), since the coordinator can compute it independently.
C.1.1 Linear models in FedV
Here we formally analyze the details of how our proposed 2Phase-SA approach is applied in a vertical
federated learning framework with underlying linear machine learning model. Suppose the a generic linear
model is defined as:
f(x;w) = w0x0 + w1x1 + ...+ wjxj , (C.1)
where x
(i)
0 = 1 represents the bias term. For simplicity, we use the vector-format expression in the rest of
the proof, described as: f(x;w) = wᵀx, where where x ∈ Rd+1,w ∈ Rd+1, x0 = 1. Suppose that the loss
function here is least-squared function, defined as
L(f(x;w), y) = (f(x;w)− y)2 (C.2)
and here we use L2-norm as the regularization term, defined as: R(w) = 12
∑n
i=1 w
2
i . According to equations
(3.2), ( C.1) and ( C.2), the gradient of E(w) computed over a mini-batch S of nS data samples is as follows:
∇ES(w) = ∇LS(w) +∇RS(w) = 2
nS
nS∑
i
(wᵀx(i) − y(i))x(i)
The secure gradient computation is described as (suppose that p1 is the active party with labels y)
∇L = 2
n
n∑
i
(w0x
(i)
0 + w1x
(i)
1 − y(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
(i)
p1
+...+ wjx
(i)
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
(i)
pl
)x(i) =
2
n
n∑
i
d∑
j
(u(i)pj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
F-SA
x(i)
(C.3)
Next, let u(i) be the intermediate value to represent the difference-loss for current w over one sample x(i),
which is also the aggregation result of F-SA. Then, the updated gradient ∇E(w) is continually computed as
follows:
∇L = 2
n
n∑
i
u(i)(x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1︸︷︷︸
p1
, ..., x
(i)
j−1︸︷︷︸
pl−1
, x
(i)
j︸︷︷︸
pl
) =
2
n
(
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
0 ,
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
1,p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S-SA
, ...,
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
j,pl︸ ︷︷ ︸
S-SA
)
(C.4)
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To deal with the secure computation task of training loss as described in Algorithm 3, we only apply F-SA
approach. As the average loss function here is least-squares function, the secure computation is described
as
LD(w) = 1
n
n∑
i
(wᵀx(i) − y(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F-SA
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normal Computation
(C.5)
Obviously, the F-SA could satisfy the computation task in the above equation.
C.1.2 Generalized linear models in FedV
Here we formally analyze the details of applying our 2Phase-SA approach to train generalized linear
models in FedV.
We use logistic regression as an example, which has the following fitting (prediction) function:
f(x;w) =
1
1 + e−wᵀx
(C.6)
For binary label y ∈ {0, 1}, the loss function could be defined as:
LD(f(x;w), y) =
 − log(f(x;w)) if y = 1− log(1− f(x;w)) if y = 0 (C.7)
The gradient computation over a mini-batch S of size n can be described as:
∇ES(w) = 1
n
n∑
i∈S
(
1
1 + e−wᵀx(i)
− y(i))x(i) (C.8)
Note that we also do not include the regularization term λR(w) here for the same aforementioned reason.
Here we show the above-mentioned two solutions in detail:
(i) Taylor approximation. In this approach, the Taylor series expansion of function log(1 + e−z)=log 2 −
1
2z +
1
8z
2 +O(z4) is applied to the equation ( C.7) to approximately generate gradient as follows:
∇ES(w) ≈ 1
n
n∑
i∈S
(
1
4
wᵀx(i) − y(i) + 1
2
)x(i) (C.9)
Similar to equation ( C.3), we are able to apply the 2Phase-SA approach in the secure computation of
equation ( C.9).
(ii) Decomposition-then-2Phase-SA. Different from above-discussed approximation approach, we present
our decomposition-then-2Phase-NS approach to compute the exact value of the gradient which is expressed
as a nonlinear formula. First, although the prediction function ( C.6) is a non-linear function, it can be
decomposed to f(x;w) = g(h(x;w)) as follows:
g(h(x;w)) =
1
1 + e−h(x;w)
→ h(x;w) = wᵀx (C.10)
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Algorithm 8: FedV-SLC
Input: current model weights w ; participants P, where each participant pi has assigned data pre-process
parameter pipi , dataset Dpi and public key pki
1 function coordinator-process(w,P, {pipi}, y)
2 foreach pi ∈ P do query pi with msgq,pi = (wpi , pipi) ;
3 do Smsgr ← collect participants’ response msgr,pi while enough Smsgr and still in max waiting time;
4 specify wP′ according to Smsgr ;
5 foreach msgr,pi ∈ Smsgr do u ← add result of F-SA on msgr,pi .cfd with wP′ ;
6 ED(w)← y log 11+e−u + (1− y) log(1− 11+e−u ) ;
We can see that the sigmoid function g(z) = 11+e−z is not a linear function, while h(x;w) is linear. We then
apply 2Phase-SA on linear h(x;w) instead. To be more specific, the formal description of secure gradient
computation is presented below:
∇L = 1
n
n∑
i∈S
(
1
1 + e−
∑d
j (u
(i)
pj
)}→F-SA
− y(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normal Computation→u(i)
x(i) =
1
n
(
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
0 ,
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
1,p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S-SA
, ...,
n∑
i
u(i)x
(i)
j,pl︸ ︷︷ ︸
S-SA
)
Note that the output of F-SA is in plaintext, and hence the coordinator is able to compute sigmoid function
g(·) and labels. The secure loss computation is described as
ED(w) = − 1
n
n∑
i∈D
y(i) log
1
1 + e−wᵀx(i)}→F-SA
+ (1− y(i)) log(1− 1
1 + e−wᵀx(i)}→F-SA
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normal Computation
(C.11)
Similar to secure gradient descent computation, however, we only have the F-SA with subsequent normal
computation.
Note that in this decomposition-then-2Phase-SA approach, it requires to expose labels to the coordinator.
Here we iterate two different cases: (i) if the VFL framework has the role of coordinator, our solution requires
the active participant expose its labels to the coordinator ; (ii) if the VFL framework does not have the role
of coordinator, usually, the active participant will play the role of the “coordinator”, and hence, there is no
need to expose labels.
Here, we also use another machine learning model, SVMs with Kernels as an example.
The model could be presented as
f(x;w) =
n∑
i=1
wiyik(xi,x), (C.12)
where k(·) is the kernel function. For kernel functions such as linear kernel xᵀi xj , polynomial kernel (xᵀi xj)d,
sigmoid kernel tanh(βxᵀi xj + θ). In the SGD algorithm, to train a SVM with kernels model, we need to
iteratively update the initialize w(t) by comparing the result of
∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i yik(xi,xj ) to the label. As such
supported kernel functions is based on inner-product computation, which is also supported by our F-SA and
S-SA protocols.
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C.2 Secure Loss Computation in FedV
Unlike the secure loss computation (SLC) protocol in the contrasted VFL framework [83], the SLC
approach in FedV is much simpler. Here we use the logistic regression model as an example. As illustrated
in Algorithm 8, unlike the SLC in [83] that is separate and different from the secure gradient computation,
the SLC in does not need additional operations for the participants. The loss result is computed by reusing
the result of the F-SA in the FedV-SecGrad.
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